In Re Berry’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

15 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In evaluating the conduct in each and every one of these cases the Court has consistently applied certain principles and tests in our determinations that any particular conduct was — or was not— such that brings the judicial office into disrepute. In all cases where those holdings have been reviewed by our Supreme Court, those holdings have been affirmed. See, In re Berkhimer, 593 Pa. 366 , 930 A.2d 1255 (2007); In re Harrington, 587 Pa. 407 , 899 A.2d 1120 (2006); In re McCarthy, 576 Pa. 224 , 839 A.2d 182 (2003); In re Cicchetti, 560 Pa. 183 , 743 A.2d 431 (2000). These principles for assessing the conduct as bringing the judicial office into disrepute were first set down in this Court’s opinion in In re Smith, 687 A.2d 1229 (Pa.Ct.Jud.Disc.1997). There we said: It cannot be presumed that a violation of any other provision, constitutional, canonical or criminal automatically lowers public acceptance of the authority of the judicial office. (Emphasis the Court’s). Id. at 1238 . This Court, therefore, has never presumed that a violation automatically brings the judicial office into disrepute. See cases cited supra. In Smith we also first enunciated the principle that: “Disrepute” necessarily incorporates some standard with regard to the reasonable expectations of the public of a judicial officer’s conduct. This Court, therefore, has, in every case, made an assessment of what it believed the reasonable expectations of the public would be as to the judicial officer’s conduct in”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re Carney · In Re Stoltzfus

2. “We conclude, as we did in Lokuta , that the conduct of [Appellant] was so extreme as to bring the judicial office into disrepute. We are obligated to mention ... that while we described Lokuta’s conduct as “egregious,” [Appellant’s] practice of “calling off’ was beyond egregious. When one is first presented with the testimony set out above that [Appellant] “called off’ at 10, 10:30, even as late as 11 a.m. all the while knowing that she had a list of as many as 30 hearings scheduled to begin at 9:30 a.m., all the while knowing that her waiting room was crowded with citizens in need of her court and by others who had been summoned there by her, and all the while knowing the serious inconvenience and extra burden she was placing on her staff, and then, when one is presented with Board Exhibit 1 and all its documentation that [Appellant] did this day after day, week after week, month after month, year after year, one’s inclination is to reject this evidence — it, simply, is hard to believe. But it is true: the witnesses are all quite credible — their testimony is unchallenged; Board Exhibit 1 is extremely well documented— and [Appellant] stipulates as to its truth and accuracy. Our evaluation of this record is further influenced by the emphatic testimony of former President Judge Platt and Court Administrator Roberts that [Appellant] was totally unamenable to their corrective efforts. Moreover, [Appellant’s] partial explanation — that she did not take vacation— not only fails to”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Merlo

3. “-From January 1996 to [June 2009, Appellant] served as a Common Pleas Court Judge in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania. ... Prior to becoming a judge in January 1996, [Appellant] had purchased several properties for investment purposes. ... After becoming a judge in 1996, [Appellant] continued to own these properties and purchased an additional one, owning at one point a total of 16 different vacant or occupied properties. Several .of - the occupied buildings [were] multi-unit rental properties operated by [Appellant]. Many of the properties purchased by [Appellant] were in poor condition and non-compliant with various safety,, building^] and licensing codes when initially purchased; and issues concerning property condition and/or, code compliance [ ] continued to exist while under [Appellant’s] ownership. From January. 1996 through and including August 2007-, [Ap•pellant] was issued in excess of 70 citations by the City of Philadelphia Department of Licenses & Inspections ([ ] “L & I”) for various violations of safety, buildingf,] and licensing codes. The various citations issued by L & I included failure to obtain or maintain the proper licenses or permits, and violations involving public nuisance, building, health[,] and safety requirements. As'a result" of the issuance of these citations; [Appellant] was required to take corrective measures to achieve .compliance with the applicable code(s) or be subject to further enforcement action. From January 1997 through April 2007,”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2017 Pa. Super. 214 - Commonwealth v. Berry