Gioioso’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 federal appellate · 5 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 47 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(a) Signature. Every petition, pleading, motion and other paper served or filed in a case under the Code on behalf of a party represented by an attorney ... shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s individual name, whose office address and telephone number shall be stated.... The signature of an attorney or a party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the document; that to the best of the attorney’s or party’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation or administration of the case.... If a document is signed in violation of this rule, the court on motion or on its own initiative, shall impose on the person who signed it, the represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the document, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. In re Beltrami Enterprises, Inc. · In Re Fricker

2. “Although the courts within the Third Circuit have not yet addressed a 7054(b) award of costs in a published opinion, we note that courts elsewhere have denied costs because of a complete absence of bad faith or frivolity . . . because of a prevailing party's unnecessary multiplication of proceedings . . . or because the party seeking costs was not technically a "prevailing party,". . . . Costs have been taxed in favor of a prevailing party without explanation . . . and costs have been taxed in favor a party prevailing on a motion to disqualify an attorney [previously disqualified].”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. V. M. v. S. S. (In re S. S.) · In Re SS

3. “The bankruptcy court did not err in holding that issue preclusion barred[the debtor] from relitigating whether [the plaintiff's] judgment was a debt incurred 'for willful and malicious injury by the debtor.' " Id. at 630. 10 We see no reason why the reasoning of Braen should not apply to the present case, even though Appellant Baldino was unsuccessful at trial in the state court. To prevail in state court, of necessity, Baldino would have to prove that Wilson acted maliciously. If she is ultimately successful and eventually obtains a judgment, it would be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) as a debt incurred by the debtor's willful and malicious conduct. We therefore conclude that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by relying on an erroneous legal premise, to wit, in declaring "[Baldino] could be completely successful in the State Court and not be successful on the nondischargeability determination”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Wilson Baldino