Abdur-Raheem v. Kelly’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The corroboration rule I suggest here for eyewitness identification testimony would not preclude a conviction based on uncorroborated eyewitness testimony. Instead, it would only bar the admission of uncorroborated identification testimony when the totality of circumstances indicated that there was a significant risk of misidentification. Where corroboration was present, the jury would be permitted to determine the weight to be accorded to an otherwise questionable identification that had been suggestively obtained. Such a rule shows appropriate deference to the judicial process of the states, and to the central role of the jury as the finder of fact. It is also consistent with the current practice of many courts, although that practice has not yet achieved recognition as a sixth factor in the admissibility analysis of identification evidence. Most important, the proposed rule provides greater insurance against the conviction of an innocent person than a test that focuses exclusively on the Biggers-Brathwaite factors, which has been almost universally criticized as inadequate. See Charles A. Pulaski, “Neil v. Biggers: The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy’s Due Process Protection,” 26 Stan. L.Rev. 1097 (1974) (suggesting that the Biggers test is so easily satisfied that the due process protection it provides is probably no greater than what already existed before Sto-vall ).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 331 F. Supp. 2d 145 - Vasquez v. Poole · Raheem v. Kelly

2. “The factors set out in Brathwaite ... do not exhaust the possible ways in which identification evidence may prove to be reliable or unreliable. Indeed, the Supreme Court was careful to say that the factors to be considered “include” the ones named. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114 , 97 S.Ct. at 2253 . In my view, another critical factor should be taken into account before an otherwise unassailable jury verdict is set aside in a collateral proceeding: the evidence or lack of evidence that the petitioner is guilty of the crime of which he has been convicted. This sixth factor goes to the heart of the Supreme Court cases that initially addressed the problem posed by eyewitness identifications. Those cases developed out of concerns that eyewitness identifications (by strangers) are not reliable, that juries could not be trusted to evaluate the deficiencies of such apparently compelling evidence, and that the admission of suggestive identifications risked the ultimate injustice — the conviction of an innocent person. In short, the reason the Court involved itself in the first place with suggestively obtained identifications was the recognition that they were a “major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 , 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1933 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 , 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967) (“A conviction which rests on a mistaken identification is a gross miscarriage of ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 331 F. Supp. 2d 145 - Vasquez v. Poole

3. “Some explanation for the puzzling manner in which Justice Blackmun dealt with the issue of corroboration may be found in Judge Friendly’s opinion for the Second Circuit in Brathwaite , which was reversed by the Supreme Court. Judge Friendly took a different view of the reliability of the eyewitness identification when weighed against the five Biggers-Brathwaite factors. At the time of Brathwaite , however, it was the clear rule in the Second Circuit that independent evidence corroborating an identification could provide the basis for admitting an otherwise questionable identification. United States v. Reid, 517 F.2d 953, 967 (2d Cir.1975). Such evidence was present in Brathwaite , corroborating the blatantly suggestive eyewitness identification: An undercover police officer had purchased drugs from Brathtvaite at an apartment, and there was other evidence linking the defendant to that same apartment. Judge Friendly, concluded, however, that this evidence was not strong enough to sustain the admissibility of the eyewitness identification. As he explained, Perhaps the strongest bit of evidence to strengthen the identification was Brath%uaite’s arrest in the very apartment where the sale was made. But Brathwaite offered an explanation of this which was not implausible, although evidently not credited by the jury.... Brathwaite v. Manson, 527 F.2d 363, 372 (2d Cir.1975). These circumstances may explain Justice Blaekmun’s unwillingness to rely on the corroborating evidence other t”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 331 F. Supp. 2d 145 - Vasquez v. Poole