State v. Lopez’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"`* * * the words of the questioned statute should not be evaluated in the abstract, but should be considered with reference to the particular conduct of the defendant. ' (Emphasis supplied.) "In Carringer , unlike the case at bar, the ugly facts of the specific conduct of the defendant were before the Court and it was on that basis that the Court in Carringer stated: "`It is beyond doubt that the defendant's acts fall squarely within the very core of I.C. § 18-6605 as uniformly construed for 58 years.' " As previously indicated, we have no knowledge of the acts allegedly performed by Lopez." (Emphasis added.) 98 Idaho at 588, 589 , 570 P.2d at 266-267 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Hobbs · State v. Goodrick

2. “The concept of void-for-vagueness arose from a common law practice of refusing to enforce legislation deemed too indefinite to be applied. See, Amsterdam, “The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,” 109 U.Pa.L.Rev. 67 (1960). It has evolved to a protection generally regarded as embodied in a Due Process Clause and prohibits holding a person “criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.” U. S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 , 74 S.Ct. 808, 812 , 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). In addition to this notion of “fair notice or warning” the doctrine is said to require reasonably clear guidelines to prevent “arbitrary and discriminating enforcement” and to prescribe a precise standard for the adjudication of guilt. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 , 94 S.Ct. 1242 , 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974). See also, Amsterdam, supra, at 76. The principle consistently followed is that “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Tuma v. Board of Nursing

3. “Common to most if not all vagueness cases is the principle that the words of the questioned statute should not be evaluated in the abstract but should be considered with reference to the particular conduct of the defendants. United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29 , 83 S.Ct. 594 , 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963); Smith v. Goguen, supra (White, J., concurring in the judgment). We are therefore required to consider the facts giving rise to this action. (Emphasis added.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Kleiber v. City of Idaho Falls