Volume 98 — Illinois Reports

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard, in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. W.. W. .Harwell, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; —heard in that court on an appeal from the County Court of Cook county ; the Hon. Mason B. Loomis, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Partnership—acts of one partner as binding upon the firm. One partner has not the power to bind the other members of the firm by deed, without other authority.</p> <p>2. It is, however, within the power of a partner in the mercantile business to borrow money in the name of che firm, and to bind the firm by an agreement to pay interest on the same at any lawful rate, and to sign the firm name to any writing admitting the fact of borrowing and promising to pay, and thereby furnish evidence against the firm and each of its members.</p> <p>3. In assumpsit against the members of a firm, a note under seal, signed in the firm name by one of the partners, reciting that it was given for money borrowed, and promising to pay ten per cent interest, is admissible under the common counts, and a recovery may he had of both principal and interest on producing the note on the trial, to be canceled. In such case the seal adds nothing to the force and effect of the instrument as an admission of the loan, and of the interest agreed to he paid.</p> <p>4. Payment—effect of giving a promissory note. The giving of a promissory note for a pre-existing debt, whether sealed or unsealed, does not pay or discharge the original debt unless it be agreed that the note shall he accepted as payment and satisfaction,—and, in the absence of such an agreement, assumpsit may be maintained for the original debt if the note be produced on the trial to he canceled.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—■ heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. S. M. Moobe, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. -Description in deed—identity of lot. Where one-half of block numbered 13 was divided into eight lots forty feet wide and 116 feet deep, running back to an alley, and lots one and two were sub-divided into fiye lots twenty-three feet wide and eighty feet deep, running across the original lots one and two, and the owner of lot four of the sub-division, on which was a two-story house with a basement, and whose title was of record, executed a deed of trust to secure a loan of money, in which the lot was described as lot 4, in block 13, of the addition, “having a frontage of 24£ feet, and a depth of 80 feet—one two-story and basement frame dwelling house thereon,” and it appeared that no such dwelling house was on the original lot 4, it was held, the description in the trust deed was sufficient to render the record of that deed notice to subsequent purchasers of lot 4, of the sub-division, and that the description was sufficient to show that sub-lot 4 was the one conveyed, and not the original lot 4.</p> <p>2. It is npt necessary to the conveyance of any parcel of land that it shall be called by any particular name, but it will be enough if the description is such as to identify the property. Critical accuracy in the description is not essential.</p> <p>3. Recording act—sufficiency of description in the deed. Where the description of land in a deed is, by mistake, so defective that the property can not be identified, the record of such deed will not be notice to a subsequent purchaser, and such a deed can not be reformed as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser of the property.</p>

<p>1. Fraudulent conveyance—made before lien attaches, may be avoided. The fact that at the time a conveyance is made to the debtor’s wife, the creditor’s judgment was no lien on the land, by reason of no execution having been issued thereon within a year, will not prevent the creditor, after the revival of his judgment and suing out an execution, from questioning the bonafides of the transaction. If the debtor paid for the land, and had the title made to his wife, in fraud of the rights of the creditor, the land may be reached in equity by the creditor.</p> <p>2. Same—former decision. The case of Newman v. Willetts, 52 111. 98, is not to be understood as announcing a different doctrine. That case holds, and was only intended to hold, that where a bill is filed in aid of an execution, the judgment on which the execution was issued must be, at the time of filing the bill, a lien on the land sought to be subjected to its payment. What was said in respect to the necessity of the existence of a lien in order that the creditor might have his remedy, must be taken as applicable only to the facts of that case.</p> <p>3. Same—wife employing husband. The fact that a wife living with her husband employs him, as her agent, to cultivate her farm, keep it in repair, have the grain harvested, stored and sold, is not evidence that the property belongs to the husband, nor does such an agency convert the products of the farm to the husband, or render them liable for his debts.</p> <p>4. Evidence—declarations of others, not in the presence of the grantee, inadmissible to show fraud. On bill to set aside a conveyance of land to a wife, by a creditor of her husband, on the ground that the latter bought and paid for the property, and had the title made to his wife to defraud his creditors, the declarations of the husband and others, made when the wife was not present, and without her assent, are not admissible to affect her rights. The same rule applies to declarations of her grantor. They can not he received to defeat her title.</p>

<p>1. Contract—of doubtful propriety, not enforcible in equity. An agreement to admit a person into a medical institute and assist in the graduation, and granting to him a diploma, in consideration of such person abandoning a fictitious name nearly the same as that of the other party, who was a member of the faculty, is of such doubtful propriety that equity will not lend its aid to' enforce it. The granting of diplomas to students in colleges ought not to be made the subject of private contracts with individual members of the faculty for personal advantage to themselves.</p> <p>2. Injunction—to prevent use of fictitious name similar to the name of complainant. A bill, by Henry Olin, who was a physician treating diseases of the eye and ear in the city of Chicago, charged that the defendant Bate had assumed the fictitious name of Andrew G. or A. G. Olin, and was engaged in practicing his profession in the same city, whose business was treating venereal diseases, and that in such name he advertised extensively, both in the newspapers and by publications and pamphlets largely circulated, by which means the complainant’s reputation was injured, many taking him for the defendant. It appeared that the defendant had been practicing in the city under the same name before the complainant came there. The bill.sought to enjoin the defendant from the use of the name Olin. On the hearing the bill was dismissed: Held, that the bill was properly dismissed, for want of equity.</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. F. Tuley, Judge, presiding.

<p>1, Chancery—relief refused when the proof is not satisfactory. On creditor’s bill to reach assets alleged to be in a party’s hands to pay debts which such party claimed he had paid to the extent of all coming to him, denying the , receipt of the greater amount charged, when the testimony was so irreconcilably conflicting as to make it impossible to arrive at the truth of the transaction, a decree dismissing the bill was affirmed. "</p> <p>2. Costs—in chancery—discretionary. Under the statute, costs in chancery are in the discretion of the court trying the cause, and when that discretion - is not abused the ruling below will not be reviewed.</p>

' Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. John A. Jameson, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Certificate—of acknowledgment—of evidence to overcome the effect thereof. Nothing short of clear and satisfactory proof, convincing beyond a reasonable doubt, can overcome the proof of the execution of a deed, afforded by the certificate of its acknowledgment. The testimony of the grantor alone is not sufficient.</p> <p>2. Evidence—as to whether a deed was a forgery. The acts and conduct of a party claiming a deed purporting to have been made by him is a forgery, before he had knowledge of said deed, can have no bearing on the question as to its genuineness, and can not be used to contradict his testimony that the deed is not his.</p> <p>3. A deed purporting to have been executed by two persons—brother and sister—to another brother, and purporting to convey the interest of the grantors in premises of which the three were tenants in common, was claimed by both the grantors to be a forgery. It was considered that proof that the pretended deed was a forgery as to one of the grantors, would raise a strong presumption that it was also a forgery as to the other. The joint execution of the deed in the form it was made, was essential to its validity,—-so proof of the forgery as to one, was of the res gestee, and tended to shed light on the whole transaction.</p> <p>4. Contribution—as between tenants in common, for improvements, etc. It is a familiar and elementary rule, that where a tenant in common makes necessary repairs on the property, necessarily purchases an incumbrance or outstanding title, or improves the property with the express or implied assent of his co-tenants, these all inure to the benefit of all the tenants, and the law requires each to contribute to the expense in proportion to his interest in the property.</p> <p>5. Same—<zs to forged deed purporting to convey the interest of one tenant in common to ajiother—estoppel. Where one tenant in common had given his express assent to the erection of buildings by his co-tenant upon premises held by them, even though there then existed what purported to be a conveyance from the tenant so assenting, to his co-tenant, of the interest of the former in the premises, of which he at the time had no knowledge, and which proved to be a forgery, it was held, the tenant so assenting to the making of the improvements, having held his co-tenant—the grantee in the forged deed —out to the world as the sole owner, by superintending the construction of the buildings, and by other acts, will be estopped to claim that his interest in the property shall not be liable for its proportionate share of the cost of the improvements.</p> <p>6. Incumbrances—improvements bp owner. All improvements placed on real estate by the owner while it is incumbered inures to the benefit of the holder of the incumbrance, and their value can not be claimed against the lien when they savor of the realty, but are subject to it.</p> <p>7. Same—as to improvements by one tenant in common with the assent of his co-tenant. So, where one tenant in common, by the express assent of his co-tenant, places valuable buildings on the common property, and thereby acquires a lien on his co-tenant’s interest for a proportionate share of the cost of the improvement, it will be an accession to his interest, which will be subject to a deed of trust given by him on the property, and it will pass to the trustee to the same extent, in the same manner, and for the same reasons that the improvements became liable to the lien of the trust deed.</p> <p>8. Same—where there is a lien upon two funds—when one of them must be first exhausted. It is a rule of equity, that where a creditor has a lien upon two funds, in one of which the debtor has no interest, but has in the oilier, the debtor has a right to compel the creditor to exhaust the fund in which the former has no interest before resorting to that in which he has an interest. This is subject, however, to the limitation, that if other persons have a superior equity in the fund to which the debtor has no claim, then the rule has no application.</p> <p>9. Chancery—bill—whether multifarious. As the statute contemplates that more than one tract of land, and even separate tracts in different counties, may be embraced in one bill for partition, a bill seeking partition of two distinct parcels of land held by different claimants, and to have forged deeds made in his name for the same set aside as clouds upon his title, is not multifarious, but the claimants of one lot of the land should only be taxed with one-half the costs in such a case.</p> <p>10. Courts of chancery will always exercise a sound discretion in determining whether the subject matters of a bill are properly joined or not, and whether the parties, plaintiffs or defendants, are properly joined, each particular case, to some extent, depending upon its own facts.</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the First District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. W. W. Farwerr, Judge, presiding.

John G. Rogers, Judge>presiding. The Bank of Montreal brought assumpsit, in the circuit court of Cook county, against Gregg, Swift,… Held: at Avhich the defendant Bowen was appointed to take charge of the property and accounts of the partners, then held by E. E. Knight, for the purpose of winding up the partnership business, with full power to act in the premises as attorney and agent for the other partners; that Bowen, pursuant to this appointment, proceeded, with the…

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon, Murray F. Tuley, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District ;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. John G. Rogebs, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District; —heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Will county; the Hon. Erakcis Goodspeed, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ oe Error to the Appellate Court for the First District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. W. W. Farwell, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Ebastus S. Williams, Judge, presiding.</p>

This cause was before this court at the.September term, 1878, when the decree which had been rendered by the circuit court of LaSalle county was reversed as to the defendant in error, William Wenner, and the cause remanded. In all other respects the decree of the circuit court was affirmed. The case is that of Thornton et al. v. Houtze et al. reported in 91 Ill. 200, where will be found a full statement of the questions then presented by the pleadings.

<p>1. Taxes—one per cent per month penalty is not retrospective. That part of sec. 177, of the Revenue act, which provides that “unpaid taxes shall bear interest, after the first day of May, at the rate of one per cent per month until paid,” etc. not having gone into effect until the first day of July, 1879, can not be held to apply to taxes of 1878, and prior years.</p> <p>2. Independent of the rule which forbids the giving of statutes a retrospective operation unless an intention to that effect is clearly manifest, the clause of the Revenue act giving one per cent per month on unpaid taxes after May the first, being highly penal, can not be held to apply to back taxes, which necessarily consist of accumulated interest upon interest, not distinguishable from the taxes proper.</p> <p>3. Same—the one per cent per month for delay in payment is not interest, but only a penalty. That part of sec. 177, of the Revenue law, which requires the payment of one per cent a month on unpaid taxes, after May the first, is not interest, in the legal sense of that term, but is a penalty; and hence it is not in conflict with sec. 22, art. 4, of the constitution, which forbids the passing of any local or special law regulating the rate of interest on money.</p> <p>4. Statutes—retrospective operation not favored. Statutes, except those relating to remedies exclusively, will not be given a retrospective operation, unless the intention to make them so is manifest.</p> <p>5. Same—penal one, lo be strictly construed. Penal statutes are to be strictly construed, and are never to be extended by mere implication to either persons or things not expressly brought within their terms.</p> <p>6. Same—construed so as not to be in conflict with organic law. Courts will not so construe a statute as to render it unconstitutional, if any other reasonable construction can be placed upon it which will render it effectual and legal.</p>

<p>1. Fraudulent conveyance—giving preference to one creditor. A debtor in failing circumstances may prefer one creditor to the exclusion of others, when he does so in good faith and for a.valuable consideration, and the same rule applies to cases of a settlement by a husband upon his wife in payment of an indebtedness from him to her.</p> <p>2. Same—husband may prefer his wife in paying his debts. Under the principles deducible from the decisions of this court growing out of the legislation respecting married women and their separate property, the husband may prefer the wife (she being a creditor) to other creditors, provided the preference is based upon a valuable consideration and is made in good faith.</p> <p>3. Where a married woman actually loaned her husband money which she derived from her father and his estate, taking the husband’s notes for its repayment, and she did not know at the time of making the loans that, he was in failing circumstances, and he afterwards conveyed a tract of land to her, not worth any more at the time than the amount due from him to her, such conveyance was held valid as against creditors of the husband whose debts were contracted prior to the conveyance.</p> <p>4. Although a person may be credited upon the faith of his ownership of property, this will give the creditors no specific lien upon it., or prevent his subsequently selling and conveying, the same to a purchaser in good faith paying a valuable consideration for it, and a creditor may purchase whose debt may thereby be paid, although other creditors be left unpaid.</p> <p>5. Married women—common law disabilities changed by statute. Under the legislation of this State, the common law disabilities of married women are completely changed, and the common law rights of the husband in respect to his wife’s property have been abrogated. As respects her separate property, the husband and wife stand before the law as strangers.</p> <p>6. Same—she may make her husband her agent. A married woman may make her husband her agent to collect debts due her, to receive from others the income of her estate, and to manage and control it in her name, and under this principle his dealings with it will be presumptively in the character of agent.</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of DeWitt county; the Hon. Lyman Lacey, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Tax titee—who may acquire—as to party in possession, A party may lawfully purchase a tax title on land, acquired while he was in possession of the same, when he has no claim of title to the land when the taxes mature and the sale is made, and may assert the same against any one who assails his possession.</p> <p>2. There is a class of cases where the person in possession is not allowed to obtain any benefit by such a purchase, such as a tenant holding a lease, or a purchaser in possession under a contract for a deed, or a mortgagor. In such cases the party will be estopped from purchasing a tax title he has allowed to accrue while in possession, and thus defeat the title of the person Under whom he holds.</p>

<p>1. Decree—presumption that the evidence sustained the findings of the court. Where no bill of exceptions or certificate of evidence is found in the record of a chancery case, the propriety of the decree must be determined exclusively from the allegations of the bill, and the facts found by the court as stated in the decree, as it must be presumed the evidence was sufficient to sustain such findings. A court of review, where nothing appears to the contrary, will indulge in all reasonable presumptions to sustain the decree of the lower court.</p> <p>2. If a decree specially finds to he true every material fact in the bill, and contains no findings at all modifying the effect of the facts thus found, it will follow that if the facts charged in the bill are sufficient to sustain the decree, th^n the decree is not erroneous.</p> <p>3. Same—effect of finding a chattel mortgage was a valid lien before lien for taxes attached. Where the decree, upon a bill to enjoin the levy of a collector’s warrant upon personal property of the complainant, issued upon an assessment of the same against a former owner, finds that the mortgage under which the complainant claims was a valid lien on the property prior to the assessment, and delivery of the warrants to the collector, this will amount to a finding that the mortgage was properly acknowledged and recorded, or that possession must have been taken under it before it expired, the presumption being in favor of the finding of the court.</p> <p>4. Same—as to person not served. A bill to enjoin the sale of complainant’s personal property for taxes levied against a former owner, made the collectors of several counties defendants, among whom was the collector of Scott county, who, by mistake, was named as Coats. There being no service on him, an amendment was made to the bill in which the name of the collector of that county was correctly given, who appeared and answered, and the cause proceeded to final decree, without question as to the regularity of the proceedings. It was objected that the decree being joint, if erroneous as to any one defendant, must be reversed as to all. But the court did not regard that the decree was against Coats, it being intended to be against the collectors only, but held, that whether it was rendered against him or not, it could not, in the slightest manner, prejudice the other defendants.</p> <p>5. Chancery—papers—how incorporated in the record. A copy of a mortgage, and a stipulation of the parties that it might be used in evidence the same as the original, transcribed into the record, but neither of which is in any manner verified,Is insufficient, and does not make them a part of the record; and even if they were considered, the stipulation would not make the mortgage evidence or show it was offered in evidence and considered.</p> <p>6. Same—finding of fact not alleged, or defectively alleged. The findings of a decree, in reference to a matter about which there is no allegation whatever, can not be sustained; but this rule does not apply to cases where the facts found by the decree have been defectively stated in the bill. Therefore, a statement in a bill, of the making of a chattel mortgage, willfully warrant the court in finding it was a valid lien, in the absence of objection to the sufficiency of the allegation.</p> <p>7. Same—finding a mortgage a valid lien is not a mere question of law. A recital in a decree of foreclosure, finding the mortgage to be a prior valid lien, does not- render the decree’ erroneous, as finding a mere conclusion of law. The validity of a mortgage is frequently a mixed question of law and fact, and depending upon the existence or non-existence of other facts and circumstances.</p> <p>8. Taxes—not a lien on personal property until collector’ receives warrant. The statute makes a lien for the taxes assessed upon personal property only from and after the tax books are delivered to the collector, and this lien has no reference to the property originally assessed, but it attaches to ail the personal property of the tax-debtor. Therefore, if the person assessed on any article of personal property, executes a valid mortgage upon the same, or makes a valid sale thereof, before the tax books are received by the collector, the person holding under such mortgage or sale will hold the property free from any lien on the same for the taxes, and a levy upon and sale of the same for the taxes will be enjoined.</p> <p>9. Same—of the lien on land. The statute makes taxes assessed upon real property a lien thereon from and including the first day of May in the year they are levied until the same are paid. The tax on each tract is kept separate and distinct from the taxes on every other tract, and such tax becomes a debt, not only against the owner, which may be recovered in a personal action, but also a charge upon that particular tract of land and no other tract.</p>

<p>1. Forfeiture—person who may enforce. A son received a conveyance of an eighty and forty acre tract of land from his parents, with a condition that he was to pay them a certain sum during their joint lives, and one-half thereof to the survivor for life, with a clause in the deed authorizing them or either of them to declare a forfeiture for non-payment, and he afterwards conveyed the eighty acre tract to another in consideration of the undertaking on the part of the second grantee to fulfill the same conditions to his grantor’s parents in proportion to the land conveyed to him, in which last deed it was provided that a failure to pay such sum of money, etc., should work a forfeiture of the title, and operate against the grantee therein the same as far as it would have done against the grantor, and the second grantee having refused to pay the same to the grantor’s parents, the latter paid it, and filed his bill to have the deed declared forfeited, to which the court sustained a demurrer: Held, that the contract, being between the complainant and defendant only, the former alone could insist upon the forfeiture after the payment by him to save his other tract, and that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer, and that the complainant, at least, was entitled to have the sum paid by him decreed a lien upon the land.</p>

C. B. Smith, Judge, presiding. Appellant filed his bill in chancery, against William Derby, superintendent of schools of Logan county, and a number of other persons, to foreclose a mortgage executed by William Hoggatt to William Elder and George W. Hoggatt, to indemnify them as sureties on a note for $2161.20, given to one Morrill. It is conceded that Elder had paid this note. This mortgage covered the lots in controversy.

<p>1. Bnii of exceptions—filing in time, without signature of judge, is not suffix dent. A draft of the evidence, etc., filed in the clerk’s office within the time limited for the filing of a bill of exceptions, but without the signature of the judge who tried the case, is no bill of exceptions, and when not presented to and signed by the judge until after the expiration of the time allowed for filing the same, and being then filed as of the date of signing, it will be properly stricken from the record in the appellate court.</p> <p>2. Same—when may 'be filed after time limited. If a party presents his bill of exceptions to the judge trying the ease, for his signature, within the time prescribed for filing the same, he having done all that he can, will not be prejudiced by the non-action or refusal of the judge to sign it until after the date fixed has expired.</p> <p>3. Same—necessity therefor—presumption. Every reasonable presumption will he indulged in support of the action of a court of general jurisdiction. Exceptions to the decisions of courts at the trial can only be saved for review in an appellate court by bill of exceptions. In the absence of a bill of exceptions it will be presumed that the evidence was sufficient to warrant the action of the court in respect thereto.</p>

the Appellate Court for the Third District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Morgan county; the Hon. Cyrus Epler, Judge, presiding.

Owen T. Beeves, Judge, presiding. This was'a bill filed in the McLean circuit court by Carrie Beale, widow of Abner Beale, and by Charles A. Beale and Lilly Beale, minor children of Abner Beale, by their next friend, to set aside a sale made under a decree obtained on the foreclosure of a school mortgage executed by Abner Beale and wife to the appellants, given to secure a loan of §400 of school funds, on the ground that there was not a proper release of the homestead in the…

<p>Win—power of executors to sell and convey real estate. A testator, by the sixth claaise of his will, directed his property to be equally divided between his children and the children of a deceased child or children, as a class, and he so devised it, and in the ninth clause empowered and directed his executors to make the division, and allot and distribute the several equal parts by writing, under their hands and seals, to the persons entitled thereto, and in the tenth clause declared that, “for the purpose of carrying out any of the provisions of this my will, I give to my executors hereinafter appointed, full power and authority to convey in fee simple absolute, or otherwise, in their discretion, all or any portion of my real estate, and to execute and deliver all proper deeds and instruments in writing therefor:” Held, that by the tenth clause the executors were fully empowered to sell and convey any of the testator’s real estate, as they might deem advantageous to the estate and to a proper division,—the power to convey by all proper deeds, etc., implying a power to sell.</p>

<p>Criminal law—of the arraignment. The mention in the record of a criminal prosecution, of the prisoner’s presence in court, and that he was called upon t.o plead to the indictment., and pleaded not guilty, shows sufficiently an arraignment, under our practice. The ancient formality is disused in our practice. The furnishing of a copy of the indictment will answer the purpose of reading the same to the defendant.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law—burden of proof—doubt as to guilt. An instruction on the trial of one for murder, that “it is-a rule of law that the burr den of proving the defendant guilty is upon the prosecution, and if the jury are unsatisfied from the nature and character of the evidence, or from a want of evidence, as to whether the deceased came to his death at the hands of the defendant, or from other cause, or from other hands, they will find the defendant not guilty,” announces a correct principle of law, and if applicable to the facts in evidence, upon which a doubt might reasonably arise in the minds of the jury, as to the truth of the testimony implicating the accused, or whether he was not at another place when the homicide, if any, took place, it is error to refuse it.</p> <p>2. Same—confession uncorroborated. Where the evidence, on a trial of one charged with murder, fails to establish the corpus delicti, the jury can not convict the accused upon his mere confession, made out of court, uncorroborated by any facts and circumstances showing the truth of such confession, but it is otherwise when the corpus delicti is proved by other evidence in the case. ,</p>

<p>1. Degree of evidence required in civil actions. In an action of ejectment to recover a narrow strip of land separated from the plaintiff’s land by a division fence, made under a verbal agreement between the plaintiff’s grantor and the defendant, where the defence turned mainly upon whether the agreement in question in respect to the division line between the several premises as a boundary line, had been sufficiently established, it was held error to instruct the jury for the plaintiff that the defendant must establish liis claim to the land, so far as it was based upon such agreement, by a clear preponderance of the evidence.</p> <p>2. Whether' an agreement has been made and acted upon by two owners of adjoining lauds, that a division fence should be the dividing line between their respective premises, is a question of fact for the jury, to be decided by the preponderance of the evidence, the same as in any other disputed question of fact.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of McLean county; the Hon. Owen T. Reeves, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Weit oe Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Sidney Smith, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. Charles S. Zane, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Morgan county; the Hon. Cybus Epleb, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Landlord and tenant—attornment after recovery, for possession, is valid. Where a tenant, after the sale of the demised premises, attorns to the purchaser, but after a judgment against him for the recovery of possession in favor of his original landlord, in an action of forcible detainer, paid such landlord’s attorney one month’s rent, and agreed with such landlord to deposit all subsequent rents in the bank, the arrangement, whether fairly made or not, will amount to a valid attornment to the former landlord, and creates the relation of landlord and tenant between them.</p> <p>2. Trust deed—when payment by original grantor does not extinguish the debt or discharge lien. Where the owner of real estate, after having given a deed of trust thereon to secure the payment of a loan to him, conveyed the premises to another,.subject to the incumbrance, which the purchaser expressly agreed to assume and discharge, and he conveys to another, and he to a third purchaser in the same way: Held, that each of the subsequent purchasers became an original promisor for the payment-of the incumbrance, and accepted the place of an originaPmortgagor as to the condition of his title, and the original debtor became virtually a surety for the payment of the debt to the creditor, and had the right to pay the same when due, if he chose, without cancelling the debt as to them, or releasing the lien, and after such payment by him, to become the purchaser at the trustee’s sale.</p>

<p>1. Former adjudication—final settlement of an estate. A final report and settlement of an estate by an executor, pursuant to notice, which are approved by the probate court and the executor discharged, will be conclusive upon creditors of the estate who appeared and contested his claims, and such settlement can not be opened on bill in chancery to impeach the same for mere errors on the part of the probate court.</p> <p>2. Administration—reviewing final settlement for fraud. The failure of an executor to account for cattle inventoried and appraised as assets of an estate, and giving the same to the widow as her separate property, and charging commissions on an uncollected and worthless note, will not be regarded such a fraud as will authorize a court of equity to review the final settlement of the estate, and correct the judgment of the probate court. If such items are claimed as just credits, it is not fraud, and their allowance amounts to an error, only, at the most.</p> <p>3. Same—where property inventoried is claimed by another. Where an executor allows the widow of the testator to retain cattle inventoried by him as assets of the estate, as being her sole and separate property, the fact as to the ownership of the cattle becomes a proper question for the probate court to decide on-the final settlement of the estate, and where the executor is not charged with the same it will be presumed that the matter was presented to and adjudicated by that court.</p>

<p>1. Police regulations in cities—power to prevent the erection and repair of buildings of combustible materials. ■ The delegation of legislative power to a city to prohibit the erection, placing or repairing of wooden buildings within limits prescribed by ordinance, without permission, and to direct and prescribe that all buildings within the limits prescribed shall be made or constructed of fire proof materials, and generally to define and declare what shall be nuisances, and to authorize and direct the summary abatement thereof, etc., is within the competency of legislative power, and authorizes the passage of an ordinance prohibiting the erection, or repairing of any building within the fire limits, with combustible materials, and providing for the summary abatement or removal of the same.</p> <p>2. Same—what may be interdicted in populous towns or cities. TJnwholesome trades, slaughter houses, operations offensive to the senses, the deposit of powder, the application of steam power to propel cars, the buildin» with combustible materials, and the burial of the dead, may be prohibited in the midst of dense masses of population, on the general principle that every person ought so to use his property as not to injure his neighbor, and that private rights must be subservient to the general interests of the community.</p> <p>3. An ordinance of a city passed in pursuance of legislative authority, establishing fire limits, and declaring a wooden roof put on a building thereafter within the fire limits, to be a nuisance, and requiring the city marshal, under an order from the mayor, to remove the same, is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the Stqte, and has the force and effect of a statute, when set up in justification by the marshal in removing such a roof.</p> <p>4. Same—summary abatement without previous trial by jury. As the summary abatement of nuisances is a remedy which has ever existed in the law, its exercise can not be regarded as in conflict with constitutional provisions for the protection of the rights of private property, and giving a trial by jury. Formal legal proceedings and trial by jury are not appropriate, and have never been used in such cases.</p> <p>5. The law making power is the sole judge whether the necessity exists for the summary abatement of public nuisances, and when, if at all, it will exercise the right to enact such laws, but the enactment must be a reasonable police regulation, made in good faith for the public good.</p> <p>6. Ordinance—construed as to the abatement of a nuisance. Where an ordinance of a city declares the erection, enlargement or repairing of a wooden building with materials not fire-proof, a nuisance, and directs the city marshal to “ remove or tear down such building, or such part thereof as may be necessary,” and a building is repaired in violation of its terms, by putting on a new roof of wooden and combustible materials, it will be held to authorize the removal of the whole roof thus put on the building.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Morgan county; the Hon. Cyrus Epler, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Party—plaintiff in suit on insurance policy. Where a life policy of insurance contains an express promise and agreement to pay the sum. insured to the “assured, bis executors, administrators or assigns, ninety days after due notice and proof of the death” of the assured, the executrix of the assured is the proper party to bring suit upon the same, and a subsequent provision in the policy that the sum insured is for the express benefit of the wife of the assured and their children, will not change the rule.</p> <p>2. Practice—consideration of questions of fact. In case of a suit on a policy of iusurance coming to this court through the Appellate Court, no question of fact can be considered. Where the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in the Appellate Court, it implies a finding of the facts the same way as the jury did, and this court has no rightful authority to find the facts differently.</p> <p>3. Interest—on life insurance. Interest is recoverable on the amount of a life insurance policy from the time it is due and payment is refused.</p> <p>4. Insurance—effect of false answers in application made by agent of ike insurers. Where the assured makes a full and complete statement of all facts that materially affect the risk, and the agent of the company, acting in its behalf in preparing the application, of his own accord writes false answers to the usual questions propounded, to be signed by the applicant, with the advice to him that the omitted facts are immaterial, and the assured, in good faith, r .opts the application as prepared, the company will be estopped from denying its liability on the policy after receiving premiums, when loss may occur.</p> <p>5. Instruction—presumption as to how understood. It will be presumed that the jury understood instructions as they commonly impress the mind.</p> <p>6. Error will not always reverse. Entire accuracy in expressing the law in instructions is not to be expected in every case, and it is a rule of general application that every slight error that may appear, will not be a sufficient warrant for reversing the judgment.</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Morgan county; the Hon. Cyrus Epler, Judge, presiding.

Writ oe Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on appeal from the County Court of Jersey county; the Hon. Robert A. King, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Adams county; the Hon. B. F. Berrean, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Taxes—assessment of property must he made by the proper persons designated by law. Under section 1, art. 9, of the constitution, an assessment for taxation must be made by the person or persons to be elected or appointed in the manner the General Assembly shall direct, and not otherwise. Therefore, an assessment made by a person or persons not authorized by law is void, and no judgment can be rendered for the taxes levied on such assessment.</p> <p>2. Same—Slate Board must assess railroad track and rolling stock of railway companies. Under the Revenue law, the exclusive power to assess railroad track and rolling stock of railway companies, is conferred upon the State Board of Equalization, and therefore an assessment of property used as railroad track, by the local township assessor, is void.</p> <p>Brief for the Plaintiff in Error.</p> <p>3. Same—what is railroad track within the meaning of the Revenue law. Land held and in actual use by a railroad company for side-tracks, switches and turnouts must be regarded, within the meaning of the Revenue law, as a part of the right of way of the company notwithstanding it may have machine shops, depots, round-houses, and other superstructures thereon, necessary for the successful use of the road.</p> <p>4. In this case two lots of a railway company contained about 32 acres after deducting a strip 100 feet wide running through them occupied as the main track. The 32 acres were covered by tracks used all the time for the purpose of running cars and engines over them, and for switching cars, making up trains, loading and unloading cars, and for various other purposes in the transaction of the company’s business. It was also used for car shops, machine shops, blacksmith shops, foundry, round-houses, freight depot, stock yards, paint shops, etc.: Held, that the whole of the lots constituted a part of the company’s right of way, and its railroad track, and as such could not legally be assessed by the local township assessors. But land can not be regarded as right of way merely because one or even two side tracks may he constructed upon it. The land must be, in fact, appropriated for the purpose of the right of way.</p>

<p>Conveyance—sufficiency of proof of delivery. On bill to supply a lost deed for land, the proof clearly showed tire signing and acknowledgment of a deed for the land by a brother, who afterwards died, to the complainant, hut the proof of its delivery was not satisfactory, that fact being in issue by the pleadings, and the person drawing the deed and taking its acknowledgment testified that he delivered it to the grantor and had no knowledge of its ever being delivered to the grantee. A boy who worked for the grantor testified that on their return home after the execution and acknowledgment, the grantor called the complainant’s attention to the deed and delivered it. to him. The deed was never recorded or taken into the grantee’s care for safe keeping, but was left with other papers of the grantor in a drawer in his private room. One of the defendants, who visited the grantor shortly before his death, testified that the deceased took the deed from his drawer and destroyed it. The evidence was, that the grantee was not to pay anything for the land: Held, that the evidence was not sufficient that the deed was ever delivered, and that the grantor had the right to change his intention to make a gift of the land at any time before delivery of the deed, and to destroy the same.</p>

Charles S. Zane, Judge, presiding. Bill in equity was filed by the town of Virden, in Macoupin county, George Tuttle, William H. Burch, Peter Mayer, John J. Wilkins, John J. Cox and Guy M. Chedister, voters and tax-payers of said town, against the Auditor of Public Accounts and Treasurer of the State of Illinois, the county clerk and county treasurer of Macoupin county, the town collector of the town of Virden, the Jacksonville, Northwestern and Southeastern Railway Co., and…

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. Charles S. Zane, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Murray F. Tuley, Judge, presiding.</p>

S. M. Moore, Judge, presiding. This was a suit in chancery, instituted in the Superior Court of Cook county for the purpose of enforcing the liability of the stockholders in the “ Bank of Chicago,” for the debts of the bank, and to subject the assets of the bank to the claims of creditors. Certain of the creditors, Avho Avere parties to the suit, appealed from the decree of the trial court to the Appellate Court for the First District, where the decree was affirmed.

Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Jackson county; the Hon. Monroe C. Crawford, Judge, presiding. On the 8th- of November, 1866, Stephen S. Hall, being in possession of the property in controversy,—the south-east quarter, and the south half of the north-east quarter of section 16, in township 8 south, range 1 west, in the county of Jackson,—conveyed the same to Wm.

<p>Writ op Error to the County Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. Frederick H. Pieper, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ of Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county. Presser was indicted in the Criminal Court of Cook county, on the charge that he “did unlawfully belong to and parade with an unauthorized body of men with arms, who had associated themselves together as a military company and organization without having any license from the Governor of the State of Illinois, and not then and there being a part of nor belonging to the regular organized volunteer militia of this State or the…

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District. This was a prosecution instituted in the county court of White county, against Smith, upon the charge of resisting an officer. A trial in the county court resulted in the conviction of the defendant, whereupon the court imposed a fine of $15, and sentenced the defendant to imprisonment in the county jail for one hour.

Writ op Error to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District; the Hon. Tazewell B. Tanner, presiding Justice, and the Hon. James C. Allen and Hon. George W. Wall, Justices;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Jasper county; the Hon. John H. Halley, Judge, presiding. Joseph Leitzelmann died in March, 1874, leaving a widow, Hannah Leitzelmann, and the following children: Maggie Boos, Sophia Goeppner, and Joseph Leitzelmann, Jr., his only heirs at law.

Tazewell B. Tanner, presiding Justice, and the Hon. James C. Allen, and Hon. David J. Baker, Justices;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county, the Hon. William H. Snyder, Judge, presiding.

This suit was originally instituted in the circuit court of Saline county, and subsequently removed, on change of venue, to Perry county.

C. S. Conger, Judge, presiding. This was a bill in chancery, filed by Singleton B. Allen, assignee in bankruptcy of James B. Seeders, to have set aside a certain conveyance made to Mary L. Seeders, the wife of the bankrupt. It appears, Charles S. Walker died intestate, possessed of the land in controversy, leaving two heirs, Orlando Walker, and Mary L. Walker, who intermarried with James B. Seeders.

35T. M. Laws, Judge, presiding. This was an action instituted in the circuit court by Virginia Roberts against John W. Richmond to recover upon the breach of an alleged promise of marriage. The plaintiff claimed that the actual engagement to marry, between herself and Richmond, was made about the month of August, 1874.

S. P. Shope, Judge, presiding. This was an action on the ease, by the appellee against the appellant, brought in the circuit court of Brown county, to recover for personal injury alleged to have resulted from negligence on the part of the appellant.

S. P. Shops, Judge, presiding. This was an action of replevin, brought by Benjamin Strauss against Henry L. Anderson, Foster Carroll and James Williamson, for a lot of wheat raised upon the south-west quarter of section 1, and the south half of the north-west quarter of section 1, township 6 south, range 5 west, in Pike county, Illinois.

<p>1. Municipal corporation—no power to purchase al tax sale. A municipal corporation, in the absence of any enabling statute, has no authority of law to become the purchaser of lands or lots at a tax sale, and acquire a title by complying with the statute in respect to such sales. The general power to buy and hold real estate does not authorize such a purchase.</p> <p>2. Same—general incorporation act does not apply to cities under special charters. Sec. 159 of the act to provide for the incorporation of cities and villages, confers no power on cities and villages, organized under special charters, to become purchasers at tax sales.</p> <p>3. Same—powers are limited. Municipal corporations are creatures of the statute, and can only exercise such powers as are expressly conferred, or such as arise by implication from powers expressly granted.</p> <p>4. Same—power to acquire and hold real estate. A power in a charter of a city to acquire and hold real estate must be understood as authorizing purchases made in the ordinary way, and only for corporate purposes, and a grant of power to purchase real property for particular purposes, it seems, is a limitation on the powers of such corporations, and will exclude, by necessary implication, all purchases for mere speculation or profit.</p> <p>5. Under a general grant of power to buy and hold real property, a municipal corporation may buy and hold such property, within the corporate limits, as may be necessary for corporate purposes, and it may even buy and hold real estate beyond the corporate limits, for the location of cemeteries, pest houses, and other purposes connected with the sanitary condition of the municipality.</p> <p>6. Same—who may avoid act in excess of power. Where a general authority exists in a municipal corporation to buy real estate for any purpose, the vendor in such case may not afterwards avoid his contract by insisting his deed is void because the corporation may have exceeded its powers in making such purchase.</p> <p>7. Where a city bids off real property at a tax sale, and acquires a deed for the same, having no authority to do so, the law will not assist the'city because the purchase is illegal, nor the land owner because he owes the taxes on the property, and ought in conscience to pay them.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Livingston county; the Hon. Franklin Blades, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. Chakles S. Zane, Judge, presiding.</p>

Clark W. Upton, Judge, presiding. The complainant, Eliza Collins, filed her original bill in the circuit court of Kane county, April 22, 1872, which was amended September 7, 1874, stating, among other things, that she was married to Thomas Collins on July 4, 1842, and lived with him until May, 1857; that on February 19, 1858, she obtained a decree of divorce; that on the 3d day of December, 1859, she filed another bill to enforce a former decree in respect to alimony, and…

Writ of Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph E. Gary, Judge, presiding. Charles Higgins and Jerry Whalen were indicted, tried and convicted upon a charge of robbery.

John A. Jaaieson, Judge, presiding. Clarissa Emery exhibited her bill, on the equity side of the Superior Court of Cook county, against Ozro W. Clapp and Julia I. Emery, administrators of the estate of David W. Emery, deceased, alleging therein, among other things, that she is the widow and sole devisee of William S. Emery, deceased, late of Wilkesbarre, Pa., who died about November 16, 1871; that said William S. Emery left property, credits and assets, amounting to about…

This is a petition for a mandamus, filed by the relator against Stookey, treasurer of St. Clair county. The facts upon which the right sought to be enforced rests, are stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District ;—heard in that court on error to the Superior -Court of Cook county; the Hon. Samuel M. Moore, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ op Error to the Circuit Court of Kane county; the Hon. Hiram H. Cody, Judge, presiding. The complainant and defendant were married in Hew York, in the fall of 1836, and came to Kendall county, Illinois. When they came to this State they had but little property. The wife had been a teacher, and from her earnings had laid up some money. Shortly after their arrival here, they bought a claim to SO acres of land, taking the title in the name of the wife.

Franklin Blades, Judge, presiding. This was an action on the case, by Charlotte C. Rogers against the village of Fairbury, to recover damages for a personal injury sustained from a fall from the sidewalk over a ditch or drain. The negligence on the part of the city, as claimed, was the maintaining of a crossing of the ditch of so narrow a width as to be dangerous, from’which plaintiff fell, in the night time, in February, 1877, using due care at the time.

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard.in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. John G. Rogers, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. William H. Barnum, Judge, presiding. This was a suit in chancery, instituted in the court below, by Marian A. Johnson, Helen M. Peck, Catharine R. Moody, Orrin C. Moody, John T. Russ and Lucy T. Russ, against Egbert Johnson and Albert P. Johnson. The purpose of the bill was to obtain a partition of certain real estate of which it is alleged the parties were tenants in common.

<p>1. Deed of trust—who is the parly secured. Where a deed of trust is given by the maker of a promissory note payable to his own order, to secure its payment, the maker of the trust deed can not be treated as a mortgagee. The note being operative and binding only after indorsement, the indorsee becomes the mortgagee, the same as if the note had been made payable to him in the first instance.</p> <p>2. Same—innocent purchaser under, protected. Where a trustee’s deed, made upon a sale under a valid deed of trust, shows the sale to have been made in strict conformity with the power contained in the trust deed, and the purchaser has had no notice of any irregularities in the sale, his title will be protected, as respects any such irregularities, if any there were, as that of an innocent purchaser.</p> <p>3. Recording daw—record not notice to a prior grantee or incumbrancer. A mortgagee is not chargeable with notice of what the records of deeds and mortgages disclose subsequent to the making and recording of his mortgage. The registry laws have exclusive application to subsequent purchasers and creditors.</p> <p>4. Mortgage—sale in inverse order of alienation. Where several tracts of land are included in the same mortgage, and there have been subsequent sales by the mortgagor, a purchaser from the mortgagor desiring that the sales under the mortgage shall be made in the inverse-order of alienation, must give actual notice of his rights before any sale is made under the mortgage. After the sale has been made without such notice having been given, he can not have any relief in respect to which tracts shall be first sold.</p> <p>5. A prior mortgagee is not bound, before selling or releasing any property embraced in the mortgage, to examine the records, to ascertain whether any one will be affected by his action. The junior mortgagee or subsequent purchaser must give actual notice of his interests to the prior mortgagee, if he intends to insist that the property shall be sold in the inverse order of alienation, or insist that a release of a part of the property is a discharge of the mortgage indebtedness pro tanto, and to the extent of the value of the part released.</p> <p>6. Measure oe damages—on dissolving injunction. Where the purchaser of land under a deed of trust, after serving notice on the occupants for possession, is restrained by injunction from interfering with the possession, the measure of damages on dissolution of the injunction will be the rental value of the property during the period the injunction was in force.</p>

<p>Writ op Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Sidney Smith, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ op Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. John G. Rogers, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Taxation by municipal cobpobations—limitations in special charters— effect of acts of 1878, 1877 and 1879. The act of 1872, conferring power upon, cities and villages to assess and collect taxes, and defining the manner in which this power shall be exercised, as originally adopted has no application to towns and cities organized under special charters.</p> <p>2. The act of 1877, entitled “An act in regard to the assessment and collection of municipal taxes,” was intended to provide a uniform system for the assessment and collection of taxes in cities and towns, without regard to whether they were incorporated under special charters or the general incorporation law, but it does not operate as a repeal of the provisions of special charters imposing limitations on the power of taxation.</p> <p>3. The act of May 28, 1879, amending the act of 1872, in respect to taxation by cities and villages, limiting the power to two per cent upon the aggregate valuation of the taxable property, does not interfere with pre-existing limitations in special charters upon the taxing power, but was intended simply to provide a uniform limitation in cases where none had theretofore existed, as, in cities, etc., organized under the general law.</p>

Weit of Error to the Appellate Court for the Second District,-—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Knox county j the Hon. Arthur A. Smith, Judge, presiding.

Writ oe Error to the Appellate Court for the First District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph E. Gary, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Witness—credibility. A witness must be contradicted on a material point in his testimony to authorize the rejection of his evidence as being unworthy of belief on the ground that he has been contradicted; and to reject all of a witness’ testimony, on account of false statements, he must have knowingly and intentionally sworn falsely as to some material point in the case.</p> <p>2. Instruction—when great accuracy required. Where the evidence is conflicting and inharmonious, it is indispensable that the jury should be accurately instructed.</p> <p>3. Same—as to matters of fact., It is not proper to instruct the jury as to matters of fact, as, that there are matters about which the friends and relations “ would be most likely to be knowing,” or that a man is liable to be frightened and stunned by being accused of crime, etc., or to tell the jury to estimate the probabilities whether one accused was liable to make inaccurate statements under the circumstances.</p>

Writ oe Error to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hou. John A. Jameson, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Dedication—must be clearly proved. A dedication of private property to public uses will not be held to be established, except upon satisfactory proof, either of an actual dedication, or of such acts or declarations as should equitably estop the owner from denying such intention to dedicate.</p> <p>2. Where every act of the owner relied on to show a common law dedication of a part of a lot for a street, is susceptible of an explanation consistent with the theory there was no such dedication, and every act of the owners has been in resistance of the claim of an easement, the court can not find in favor of such dedication.</p> <p>3. Same—land owner not bound by acts of strangers. The owner of real estate is not bound by the acts of others in respect to the property, done without his direction and not at his instance. The making of a plat by a stranger to the title, showing a dedication of a part of a lot for a street, and the building of a fence indicating the same thing, not shown to have been built by or for the owner, is no evidence against him of a dedication.</p> <p>4. Same—evidence in rebuttal of presumption. Where a common law dedication of a part of a lot for a street is claimed from the acts of the city in grading the ground, and those of the owner, subsequent to proceedings to condemn the lands necessary for the street, the record of such proceedings, although failing to show a condemnation of the property in question, is proper evidence to rebut any presumption of a dedication, and as explaining the conduct of the parties.</p> <p>5. Same—building sidewalk as evidencing. The building of a sidewalk by the owner of a lot on the same, so as to show ground left for a street, made while the lot was in the adverse possession of another, and in obedience to the requirements of an ordinance, and under the mistaken belief that a part of the lot had been condemned, is not evidence sufficient to show a common law dedication by the owner.</p> <p>6. Same—adjusting an assessment, no evidence of. The compromising with a city in respect to the amount of a special assessment upon a lot, whereby the owner pays less than the sum assessed, is not evidence of an intention to dedicate any part of the lot for a street, where such compromise is made pending a suit between the lot owner and the city to recover the part claimed to be dedicated.</p>

George W. Stipp, Judge, presiding. ¡ This was a bill by Edward A. Howland, a son of Henry Allen Howland, to enjoin a sale under a power in a mortgage' given by Henry Allen Howland. The mortgage was given to Elizabeth Bryan, with power of sale in the sheriff of LaSalle county.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. Mason B. Loomis, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>This was a petition filed in this court for a writ of mandamus, based upon an agreed statement of facts.</p>

Writ oe Error to the Appellate Court for the First District ;—heard in that court on error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas A. Moran, Judge, presiding. This was an action of assumpsit, brought by Benjamin E. DeYoung against Frank E. Wallace and Albert Paul Smith, administrators of the estate of John S. Wallace, deceased.

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. William H. Baknum, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Murray ¡F. Tuley, Judge, presiding.</p>