¶1 (after stating the case). The objection must be taken to be directed not so much to the reception of the evidence as to its legal effect upon the question of the defendant's guilt, under his plea. If well taken, and the of-fence charged is one to which the limitation applies, the result would be an acquittal, unless saved by the proviso.
¶2 While we do not think the fact, were it true, that the implied sexual intercourse took place in secret, while the defamatory utterance was necessarily in the hearing of witnesses, (and therein, when accompanied with the specified intent, consists the criminal act charged,) brings the case within the operation of the proviso, it is clearly a malicious misdemeanor. Maliciousness in the act is an element necessary to its criminality, both as defined in the statute and as charged and found by the jury. The malice can be directed and entertained only towards the person of whom the false words are spoken, and clearly results from their unwarrantable utterance in the hearing of others. It involves an attempt “in a wanton and malicious manner ” (and herein lies the essence of the crime) to destroy the reputation of an innocent woman; and such would be the tendency, if not the effect, of the charge of unchasteness made against a virtuous woman.
¶3 We therefore sustain the ruling and affirm the judgment.
¶4 Affirmed.