Volume 98 — Oklahoma Reports

<p>Where an insurance policy provides: “That in the event of the failure to produce said inventory (after loss) the policy shall be null and void,” such clause means that such inventory must be produced if it is within the power of the assured so to do, and that he is charged with responsibility for its loss and his consequent liability, to produce it in all cases where such loss is the result of a wrongful, fraudulent, or negligent act on his part.</p> <p>2. Same — Direction of Verdict for Plaintiff.</p> <p>Record examined, and held, that order of I,he trial court directing a verdict was proper under the pleadings, evidence, and admissions in this cause. Held, further, that claim of insurance company of nonliability as a matter of law is not supported by any evidence, and that under all of the testimony and admissions, it was proper for the trial court to direct a verdict for plaintiff.</p> <p>(Syllabus by Lyons, O.)</p>

Error from District Court, Stephens County; Cham Jones, Judge. Action by Mary A. Daniels (revived in the name of Royal S. Hoxie, as executor of will of Mary A. Daniels, deceased) against Abel N. Bunch and others. From the judgment, plaintiff brings error.

Action by Stan lard Paving Company against St. Loi|is-San Franciscjo Railway Company, before the Corporation Commission, wherein the State was a party. From an order fixing rates and compelling reparation, the railway company appeals.

Error from District Court, Lincoln County; Hal Johnson, Judge. Action by William Sporn against Birt Chase and Nannie Chase et al., to recover upon certain promissory notes and to foreclose two mortgages. Decree for plaintiff, and defendants Birt Chase and Nannie Chase appeal.

<p>1. Action — Prematurity in Part — Waiver of Objection — Cure by Judgment.</p> <p>Wihere a cause of action founded upon a demand which was due and unpaid at the commencement of the action is joined by a petition with another cause of action founded upon a claim which was not due at the time of the commencement of such action, the court' may render judgment for the amount which was not due at the time the action was brought but subsequently fell due and was unpaid when the judgment was rendered. The proper practice in such a case is for the ifiaintiff to sue only for the amount due and then subsequently when the other amount becomes due, to file a supplemental petition, asking judgment therefor also. But where no objection is made to (he form of the pleadings, it is not erroneous to render judgment on the petition f< r the entire amount, although part was not due when the petition was filed.</p> <p>2. Same — Refusal of Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict.</p> <p>In such a case the defect is in the form of the petition and should be raised by timely motion directed specifically to -the cause of action founded upon the demand not due, and the defendant failing to raise the question of defect in (he form of the petition, and by incorporating in his answer a plea designated as a plea in abatement which in effect alleges that all claims upon which plaintiff seeks to recover in his petition are not due, waives such defect in the form of the petition and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is properly overruled.</p> <p>3. Judgment — Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict.</p> <p>Under section 5140, Rev. Laws 1910, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury may be rendered by the court where upon statements in the pleadings one party is entitled by law to judgment in his favor, although a verdict has been found against such party; but the court cannot render judgment notwithstanding a verdict where upon the statements in the pleadings one party is not entitled to a judgment.</p> <p>(Syllabus by Foster, C.)</p> <p>Commissioners’ Opinion,</p>

Error from District Court, Caddo County; Cham Jones, Judge Action by the Farmers’ Union Exchange of Stecker, Oklahoma, a corporation, against Ambers H. Gregory and American Surety Company, to recover on an indemnity bond. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

Error from District Court, Tulsa County; Yaljean Biddison, Judge. Action by Robert Paul Ridley, a minor, by Anna Hawks, mother and next friend, against United Sash & Door Company, a corporation, and Roy S. Williams, for personal injuries. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff appeals.

<p>1. Municipal Corporations — Valid Purchase of Merchandise — Effect of Diverting Funds.</p> <p>If_a valid contract for the sale of merchandise or eruipment is entered into with a municipal corporation in accordance with the requirements of the law, it will not be invalidated by any subsequent diversion of the funds provided by the corporation for meeting the payments required by the contract.</p> <p>2. Same — Effect of Provision for Payment in Installments.</p> <p>If_the contract is entered into in conformity with all legal requirements and the municipal corporation has then provided funds for meeting the charges created by the contract, the fact that the contract may provide for the payment of the contract price in several monthly installments thereafter does not invalidate the contract. If the contract is legal in every respect and the municipal corporation has then provided funds to meet.the charges created by the contract, the contract may provide for cash payment upon the installation of the machinery and equipment, or it may provide for the payments in several monthly installments to commence at some future date.</p> <p>3. Same — Action on Contract — Burden of Proof of Invalidity.</p> <p>If the plaintiff sues upon a contract for material and equipment furnished a municipal corporation and proves the contract and performance in accordance with the contract for which the debt was created, it makes a prima facie case for the plaintiff, and the burden of proof is on the municipal corporation to prove that tlie debt was illegally contracted.</p> <p>4. Same — Judgment Sustained.</p> <p>Record examined; held, to support judgment.</p> <p>(Syllabus by Stephenson, C.)</p> <p>Commissioners’ Opinion,</p>

<p>Error from District Court, Pittsburg County; I-Iarve L. Melton, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Elbingor Shoe Mfg. Company, a corporation, against S. Jabara. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>1. Appeal and Error — Time for Objections —Sufficiency of Petition.</p> <p>If the petition in general terms describes an oral contract upon which recovery is based, although subject to motion to make more definite and certain, if not challenged in the trial court, will be sufficient to support judgment in favor of the plaintiff.</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error — Questions of Fact— Verdict.</p> <p>In the submission of an issue of fact to the jury, by proper instruction, if there is any competent testimony that reasonably lends to support the verdict of the jury, the cause will not be reversed on appeal.</p> <p>3. Judgment Sustained.</p> <p>3Record examined: held, to support the verdict in favor of the plaintiff.</p> <p>(Syllabus by Stephenson, C.)</p> <p>Commissioners’ Opinion,</p>

<p>1. Indians — Jurisdiction of Heirship Proceeding — Case Followed.</p> <p>The syllabus in Homer v. Lester, 95 Okla. 284, 219 Pac. 392, is adopted as the syllabus of this ease and is controlling in this case.</p> <p>2. Same — Reversal of Judgment.</p> <p>Record examined; held, to be insufficient to support judgment for defendants in error.</p> <p>(Syllabus by Stephenson, C.)</p>

<p>Appeal and Error — Failure to Serve Case-Made on Party — Dismissal.</p> <p>Where a reversal is sought upon a case-made, such case-made or a copy thereof must be served on each adverse party or his attorney. A failure to serve such case_-made upon one of such parties, who might be prejudicially affected by a modification or reversal of the judgment, defeats the jurisdiction of this court, and requires a dismissal of the appeal.</p> <p>(Syllabus by Estes, C.)</p>

<p>Error from District Court, Noble County; J. W. Bird, Judge.</p> <p>Action by I-I. C. Smith against W. II. Voss. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Brokers — Action for Commission — Inadmis-, sibility of Other Contracts.</p> <p>In an action by a real estate broker to recover a certain sum which he alleges defendant agreed to pay him as commission for procuring a purchaser for a certain farm owned by the defendant, it is er-. ror to admit evidence of the terms of contract between the defendant and other’ real estate agents for the purpose of impeachment or for any other purpose, in the absence of any evidence tending to show any connection between plaintiff’s contract and the contracts of defendant with, such other parties.</p> <p>(Syllabus by Poster, C.)</p>

<p>Witnesses — Testimony as to Transactions With Persons Since Deceased.</p> <p>Under section 588, Comp. Stat. 1921, no party to a civil action shall be permitted to give testimony in his own behalf, in respect to any communication or transaction such party had with a deceased person, when the adverse party to the action is the executor, administrator, heir at law, next of kin, surviving partner or assignee of such deceased person, where the party seeking to testify in his own behalf has acquired title to the cause of' action immediately from such deceased person.</p> <p>(Syllabus by Jarman,' C.)</p>

<p>Error from District Court, Oklahoma County; Geo. W. Clark, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Victoria Bush and Frank A. Bush against the Missouri State Life Insurance Company and Aetna Building Association. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs bring error.</p>

<p>1. Trial — “Exception.”</p> <p>An “exception” is an objection taken to a decision of the court or judge upon a matter of law.</p> <p>2. Same — Time for Exceptions.</p> <p>The party objecting to a decision must except at the time the decision is made, and time may be given to reduce the exception to writing, but not beyond the term.</p> <p>3. Exceptions, Bill of — Failure to Reduce Exceptions to Writing At Term.</p> <p>Where no time is asked or granted for reducing exceptions to writing at the time the decision excepted to is made, there is no authority for signing and allowing a bill of exceptions and making it a part of the record proper after the expiration of the term.</p> <p>(Syllabus by Jarman,C.)</p> <p>Commissioners’ Opinion,</p>

Error from District Court, Tulsa County; A. C. Hunt, Judge. Action by Missouri Military Academy, a corporation, against W. T. Brady and Rachel C. Brady, to recover balance due for board, tuition, and' incidental expenses of Henry Brady, son of the defendants. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

Error from District Court, Woods County: Arthur G. Sutton, Judge. Action by Kavanaugh & Shea, a partnership, against SR. L. Benton, in which Farmers’ State Bank of Alva and Dimmiek & Kletke, partners, each intervened. Judgment for plaintiffs, and intervener, Farmers’ State Bank of Alva, appeals.

<p>1. Contracts — Oral Negotiations Superseded by Writing.</p> <p>The execution of a contract in writing supersedes all the oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its terms and subject-matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument, in the absence of accident, fraud, or mistake of facts.</p> <p>2. Fraud — Failure of Evidence.</p> <p>Record in the instant case examined, and held, rhat no proof of positive or actionable fraud is shown by the evidence introduced, and that the trial court erred in not directing the jury to return a verdict in favor of defendant upon the evidence.</p> <p>(Syllabus by Foster, C.)</p>

Error from District Court, Payne County; C. C. Smith, Judge. Action by the Parker-Gordon Cigar Company, a corporation, against Wood & Company, a corporation, for recovery of $619.50 with’ interest on an open account for merchandise. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings error.

<p>1. Appeal and Error — Review — Sufficiency of Evidence.</p> <p>The evidence is sufficient .to sustain a judgment if there is any evidence whatever reasonably tending to prove either directly or immediately or by permissible inference the essential facts.</p> <p>2. Witnesses — Scope of Cross-Examination.</p> <p>The cross-examination of a witness should be confined to matters concerning which the witness has been examined in chief, but he may be asked any question which reasonably tends to explain, contradict, or discredit his testimony.</p> <p>3. Judgment Sustained.</p> <p>Record examined, and held, that the judgment of the trial court is reasonably supported by the evidence in the case.</p> <p>(Syllabus by Pinkham, C.)</p> <p>Commissioners’ Opinion,</p>

<p>Error from District Court, Caddo County; Will Linn, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Dave Hill against the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, a corporation, for damages. Judgment for defendant, a,nd plaintiff. appeals.</p>

Error from District Court, Pittsburg County; Harve L. Melton, Judge. Action by Myrtle L. Lakey, administra-trix of the estate of Samuel 0. Lakey, deceased, against the North McAlester Coal Company, a corporation, for damages for personal injury. Judgment for defendant sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence. Plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal and Error — Record Proper — Motions and Rulings.</p> <p>Motions presented in the trial court, the 'ruling thereon, and exceptions thereto are not properly a part of the record, and can only be presented and preserved for review on appeal to the Supreme Court by incorporating the same in the bill of exceptions or case-made.</p> <p>(Syllabus by Ruth, C.)</p>

<p>1. Appeal and Error — Questions of Fact— Verdict.</p> <p>The jury are the triers of the facts, and the sole and exclusive judges of the weignt of evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, and where there is conflicting evidence, or evidence reasonably tending to support the verdict, the same will not be disturbed by this court on appeal.</p> <p>2. Negligence — Question of Fact.</p> <p>The question of negligence is one of fact, for the determination of the jury.</p> <p>3. Negligence — Parties Defendant — Joint Tort-Feasors.</p> <p>AYhere an injury is the product of the combined negligence of several persons, such persons are jointly and severally liable to the person injured, and suit may be instituted against one or all of the wrongdoers.</p> <p>(Syllabus by Jones, C.)</p> <p>Commissioners’ Opinion,</p>

<p>1. Appeal and Error — Complaint of Favorable Error.</p> <p>An instruction which is in favor of a party to the action and in no wise prejudices his rights is not subject to complaint for error on his part.</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error — Sufficiency of Exceptions — Instructions.</p> <p>To review the action of the trial court in giving instructions, it is necessary that th<* exceptions to the instructions as given be signed by the trial judge, as provided by section 542, Comp. Stat. 1021.</p> <p>3. Fraud — Sufficiency of Evidence.</p> <p>The record examined, and held, the evidence sufficient to go to the jury on the issue of fraud as to the item “other personal property.”</p> <p>4. Witnesses — Impeachment for Truth and Veracity.</p> <p>The inquiry of impeachment for truth and veracity as to place is where the witness has his residence, whether permanent or temporary, and exhibits his conduct.</p> <p>(Syllabus by Threadgill, C.)</p> <p>Commissioners’ Opinion,</p>

<p>Error from District Court, Garvin County; Geo. S. March, Judge.</p> <p>Action by John J. Pettigrew et al. against Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>1. Mines and Minerals — Invalidity of Quitclaim Deed to Placer Mining Rights.</p> <p>The placer mining laws of the United States are not applicable to the state of Oklahoma, and where a quitclaim deed shows upon its face that the only interest the grantor has in the land sought to be conveyed is that thereafter to he acquired by reason of his previous location of a placer mining claim, such deed is void.</p> <p>2. Deeds — Insufficient Description of Land.</p> <p>If the description of the land sought to be conveyed is so indefinite as to create a doubt about what property is intended to be conveyed, it must be construed most strongly against the grantor.</p> <p>3. Specific Performance — Defense by Grantee — Insufficient Deed.</p> <p>In a suit for specific performance the grantee will not be required to aecept a deed which contains no adequate description of the land sought to he conveyed.</p> <p>(Syllabus by Ray, C.)</p> <p>Commissioners’ Opinion,</p>

Error from District Court, Logan County; C. C. Smith, Judge. Action in ejectment by H. M. Adams against i)be known and unknown heirs of Ann E. McKinney, deceased, and others, for possession of real estate, located in the City of Guthrie, and to quiet title thereto. Judgment for defendants; plaintiff appeals.

<p>1. Bills and Notes — -Right to Joint Judgment Against Makers — Suretyship.</p> <p>AVhere in an action upon a promissory note against several makers a joint judgment is proper upon the facts conclusively established by the pleadings of the respective parties, the right of the payee to such judgment cannot be affected by the request of some of the makers for a finding by the court as to which of the makers signed the note as principal, and which as sureties, pursuant to the provisions of section 721, Comp. Slat. 1921.</p> <p>2. Same — Determination of Suretyship — Issues — Evidence.</p> <p>A determination in such action by the court, upon request, that some of the defendants signed the note as principals and some as sureties, pursuant to the provisions of section 721, Comp, Stat. 1921, does not arise upon any pleadings filed in the case, and only the introduction of testimony is necessary to justify such findings.</p> <p>(Syllabus by Foster, C.)</p>

<p>1. Oil and Gas — Damages to Adjacent Land —Petition.</p> <p>Where plaintiff’s petition alleges in effect that defendant carelessly and negligently permitted deleterious substances to escape from his oil well and flow out over plaintiff’s land, destroying portions thereof for agricultural purposes, and occasioning a fire which destroyed valuable timber and meadow grass, it states a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, and is sufficient to withstand general demurrer.</p> <p>2. Same — Measure of Damages — Evidence.</p> <p>Evidence offered on the part of plaintiff to show loss and damage to property which tends to show the actual value of the property immediately before the injury and its actual value immediately afterwards is competent to go. to the jury for the purpose of determining the amount of plaintiff’s loss and damage.</p> <p>3. Same — Instruction.</p> <p>An instruction upon the measure of dam ages to plaintiff’s property which advises the jury that the damage, if any, is the differ ence between the actual value of the property immediately before the injury and the actual value of the same property immediately after the injury, is proper.</p> <p>4. Torts — Right of Recovery Against One of Several Joint Tort-Feasors.</p> <p>Where several parties, acting together or acting independently of each other, purposely or carelessly and negligently do such acts as to do injury resulting in damage to another. such injured party may maintain an action against all or against any one or more less than all of such parties for the entire amount of ..damage done; and where such injured party brings action for the damage done against one of such parties, it is not error for the court to instruct the jury that if they find from the evidence that the defendant, along with others, did the injurious acts resulting in .damage, the plaintiff may recover from the one sued the-entire amount of damage sustained by reason of such acts,</p> <p>5. Judgment Sustained.</p> <p>Record examined, and held, that no substantial error appears therein prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff, in error, and that (he judgment should be affirmed.</p> <p>(Syllabus by Shackelford, 0.)</p> <p>Commissioners’ Opinion,</p>

<p>Error from District Court, Tulsa County; Albert T. Hunt, Judge.</p> <p>The parties will he referred to as they appear in the court below. The plaintiff, the Independent Torpedo Company, a corporation, on the 1st day of April, 1920, entered into a written contract with the defendants Charles T. Abbott and Forest C. Welch, copartners, as agents of Ida B. Lew-kowitz, in which the plaintiff agreed to buy from the said defendant Ida P. Lew-kowitz the following described real estate in the city of Tulsa, to wit, lot 1 in block 2, Grandview Place addition to the city of Tulsa, according' to the recorded plat of said addition. The contract entered into between the parties is as follows:</p> <p>“Received from The Independent Torpedo Company, $1,500, to apply on the purchase price of lot numbered one (1) block numbered two (2), Grandview Place addition to Tulsa, Okla., according to the recorded plat thereof.</p> <p>“The, full price of said property being $15,-000 on the following terms: A further sum of $11,000 to be paid on presentation of a warranty deed showing the property to he free and clear of all encumbrances, excepting an existing mortgage of $2,500.</p> <p>“The transaction to he closed and the property free and clear with the exception of the above mortgage within 80 days from date. The abstract of title to be brought down to date.</p> <p>“It is hereby agreed and understood that the above mentioned mortgage is to be paid off on or before June 10th, and the owner agrees to stand all the interest on said mortgage above 6 per cent.</p> <p>“If the title is not good and cannot be made good within a reasonable time the above $1,500 to be returned to the purchaser.</p> <p>“Abbott & Welch by</p> <p>“Chas. T. Abbott.</p> <p>“The Independent Torpedo Co.</p> <p>“By C. K. Abbott.</p> <p>“I approve of the above sale on this 1st day of APi'ili 1920, and agree to give Abbott & AVelch the usual commission of 5% on the first five thousand and 2%% on the balance.</p> <p>“Ida B. Lewkowitz, Owner</p> <p>“By I. B. L.”</p> <p>It will be observed from this contract that the plaintiff put up with Abbott and Welch, who were representing Ida B. Lew-kowitz, the sum of $1,500 as part payment of the purchase price of said real estate, the purchase price agreed on being $15,000 and plaintiff was to pay the further sum of $11,000 on presentation of a warranty deed showing the property to be free and clear of all^ incumbrances except an existing mortgage for $2,500, the transaction to be closed within 30 days from the date of the contract. Plaintiff claims that the contract entered into is void because it was never executed by Ida B. Lewkowitz in such manner as to become a binding contract for the sale of the real estate, and to bind the said defendant to perform the same because she did not sign said contract with her own signature, nor authorize the signing of same according to law. Plaintiff further alleges that the deed of dedication, in pursuance of which the said addition was dedicated and platted, provided, among other things, that no apartment 'house should be built upon any part of the said addition for a period of ten years; that the bouse upon the above described lot is an apartment bouse, and was ouilt witbin tbe ten year period, and without the consent of other purchasers of lots in the said addition; that the title was further defective in that one Mr, Zeigler, was occupying one of the apartments in the building located upon the above described lot at the time of the attempted sale, and had placed upon record a memorandum in writing, claiming some right in and to the above described premises, and the possession thereof adverse to the said Ida B. Lew-kowitz. That said Zeigler refused to vacate the said premises, and is now in possession of the same and litigation has followed and is now pending between the defendant Ida B. Lewkowitz and the said Zeigler for the possession of the said premises; that said defendants were neither able to give plaintiff possession of the said premises within the period of 30 days nor within a reasonable time, nor were they able to furnish plaintiff a good and sufficient title to the above described premises as provided in their alleged agreement. Plaintiff further states that the said contract should be by order of the court held null and void and of no effect; and that the plaintiff herein should have and recover of and from the defendants the sum of $1,500, with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent, per an-num from May l, 1920, and costs.</p> <p>The defendants demurred to the petition of the plaintiff generally and specifically. Said demurrer was overruled by the court and thereafter the defendants filed separate answers. The defendant Ida B. Lewkowitz says that Abbott and Welch were her authorized agents for the purpose of negotiating a sale of her property, described in plaintiff’s petition, and that she, by and through her said agents, entered into a good and binding contract for the sale of said property to the plaintiff, as alleged in its petition, which contract she duly ratified and at all times acted upon the same, with the full intention to be bound by it, and carried out said transaction as set forth in said contract; that on the 3rd day of August, she and her husband executed a warranty deed to said premises, and on said day made a tender and offered to deliver said deed to plaintiff for the full purpose and intention of conveying the plaintiff the fee simple title to the said property, but that plaintiff refused to accept said deed and refused to carry out its part of said contract, which tender was made prior to the institution of this suit. She alleges that she has been ready and willing to carry out said contract, but that plaintiff has wholly failed to carry out the contract on its part. She admits that the plaintiff paid her agents, Abbott and W.elch, for her use as a part of purchase price of her said property, the sum of $1,500, and that she at all times has been willing to accept said money as part of the purchase money and fully abide the terms of said contract, according to the terms and conditions of said contract and agreement, and now tenders into court the warranty deed, above mentioned, to plaintiff if it will accept same under the terms and conditions of said agreement and contract. She further alleges that in order to remove the objection that the house was an apartment house, she procured a waiver frcm the owner of said addition of any objections to said house as an apartment building, and denies generally all other allega tions of plaintiff’s petition.</p> <p>The. defendants Abbott and Welch answer jointly, admit entering into the contract of sale as the agent of Ida B. Lewkowitz, and that they received $1,500 from the plaintiff for the use of the defendant Ida B. Lew-kowitz, which was to be applied as a part of the purchase price, and they are now holding the same for the completion of said transaction as the money of Ida 15. Lewkowitz; that they were at the time engaged in the real estate business and had been for a long time prior thereto, and tha-t they had full power and authority from the said Ida B. Lewkowitz to enter into the said contract. The plaintiff filed a reply to each of said answers which is in the nature of a general denial. On the 23rd day of January, 1921, the case was tried before the court and a jury and after plaintiff introduced its evidence, defendants demurred to plaintiff’s evidence, which demurrer was overruled, and defendants refused to proceed further, and the court directed a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount sued for. Motion for new trial was filed and overruled, time taken to prepare and serve case-made, and the case was appealed to this court.</p>

<p>I. Trial — Directing Verdict — Question of Ratification of Agent’s Acts.</p> <p>Where there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the question of ratification of an officer’s or agent’s unauthorized acts or contract, but it is disputed or is such that different inferences may be reasonably drawn therefrom, the question is one of fact for the jury to determine under proper instructions from the court, and it is error to withdraw the question from them by instruction or direction of verdict. But where the facts are established or undisputed and are unequivocal in character', whether they amount to ratification is a question of law for the court.</p> <p>2. Trial — Instructions—Conformity to Issues.</p> <p>In determining the scope of its instructions, the court must keep in mind the issues as made by the pleadings in the cause; and the general rule is that all instructions must be confined to those issues and the evidence in support thereof, and that no instruction should be given which tenders an issue that is not supported by the pleadings or which deviates therefrom in any material respect.</p> <p>(Syllabus by Pinkham, O.)</p>