Rowland v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

31 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(a)(i) That there has been an intervening decision of the Supreme Court of either the State of Mississippi or the United States which would have actually adversely affected the outcome of his conviction or sentence or that he has evidence, not reasonably discoverable at the time of trial, which is of such nature that it would be practically conclusive that had such been in- trodueed at trial it would have caused a different result in the conviction or sentence; or (ii) That, even if the petitioner pled guilty or nolo contendere, or confessed or admitted to a crime, there exists biological evidence not tested, or, if previously tested, that can be subjected to additional DNA testing that would provide a reasonable likelihood of more probative results, and that testing would demonstrate by reasonable probability that the petitioner would not have been convicted or would have received a lesser sentence if favorable results had been obtained through such forensic DNA testing at the time of the original prosecution. (b) Likewise excepted are those cases in which the petitioner claims that his sentence has expired or his probation, parole or conditional release has been unlawfully revoked. Likewise excepted are filings for post-conviction relief in capital cases which shall be made within one (1) year after conviction.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 199 So. 3d 715 - Vincent N. Creppel v. State of Mississippi

2. “[w]e specifically have provided that 'an indictment must state the name of the victim of an offense where that is an element of the offense , and a failure to state it, or a material variance between statement and proof is fatal, but an immaterial variance is not.' " Rowland , 98 So.3d at 1039 (quoting Burks v. State , 770 So.2d 960 , 963 (Miss. 2000) (emphasis in Rowland ) ). The Court continued: A capital-murder indictment that fails to identify the victim of the underlying crime does not contain sufficient facts to fairly inform the defendant of the charge against which he must defend and to enable him to plead double jeopardy in the event that he is separately punished or later prosecuted for the underlying felony; in other words, the identity of the victim of the underlying felony is an element of the offense of capital murder that must be stated in the capital-murder indictment. Rowland , 98 So.3d at 1039 . Startlingly, this analysis evaporated in Carson . Yet, "for double jeopardy purposes, the facts alleged must be sufficient to distinguish the charged crime from other crimes.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Abdur Rahim Ambrose v. State of Mississippi

3. “[T]he applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not'.... A single act may be an offense against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 150 So. 3d 114 - Charles Douglas Owens, II v. State of Mississippi