981 P2D 1065 - West v. Buchanan

¶1OPINION

FABE, Justice.

¶2I. INTRODUCTION

¶3Carmen West appeals the superior court’s dismissal of her personal injury action on statute of limitations grounds. Although West initially sued the wrong person on the last day available under the statute of limitations, she substituted Hiltrud Buchanan as the named defendant within the period allowed by court rule for service of the complaint. Because we conclude that West’s amended complaint substituting Buchanan as defendant should relate back to the time of its initial filing, we reverse.

¶4II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

¶5On June 17, 1993, Carmen West was involved in a traffic accident with Hiltrud Buchanan, who was driving a car owned by William Bembry. That summer, West retained counsel, who began negotiating on her behalf with Allstate Insurance, the insurer of the Buchanan/Bembry vehicle. The headings on Allstate’s negotiation letters referred to “our insured: William Bembry.”

¶6By June 1995 West and Allstate had failed to reach a settlement agreement. On June 16, 1995, the last day available under the applicable statute of limitations, West filed a complaint against Bembry. West sent the complaint and summons to Bembry by certified mail on June 19, 1995, and Bembry received them on June 22,1995.

¶7About three months later, on September 25, 1995, West moved to amend her complaint to substitute Buchanan as the defendant. Bembry opposed on the ground of futility, arguing that the statute of limitations would bar the amended complaint since it could not properly “relate back” to the original filing. Superior Court Judge Ralph R. Beistline granted the motion to amend, reasoning that notice of the claim could be imputed to Bembry because he was “apparently in a close relationship” with Buchanan and that Buchanan “was a permissive user of his automobile.” Judge Beistline also relied on the fact that “[njegotations were on-going to resolve the claim,” concluding that it was “clear that the parties understood that a claim existed arising out of this accident.”

¶8Buchanan,, now the named defendant, filed an answer and a Notice of Change of Judge. The case was reassigned to Superior Court Judge Niesje J. Steinkruger. Buchanan then moved for summary judgment based on West’s failure to file within the applicable period of limitations. Judge Steinkruger granted Buchanan’s motion for summary judgment “based upon the Statute of Limitations.” Implicit in this holding was Judge Steinkruger’s determination that West’s amended complaint did not relate back to the date of her original complaint. West moved for reconsideration, but Judge Steinkruger denied this motion. West appeals.

¶9III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10The issues on review involve questions of law. We review such questions de novo.1 We are not bound by the lower court’s decision, but have the duty to “adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.” 2

¶11IV. DISCUSSION

¶12A. Buchanan’s Notice of Change of Judge Was Timely.

¶13West first suggests that Buchanan’s Notice of Change of Judge was untimely. This contention is without merit. Alaska Civil Rule 42(c)(3) provides, in part:

Where a party has been served or enters an action after the case has been assigned to a specific judge, a notice of change of judge shall also be timely if filed by the party before the commencement of trial *1067and within five days after a party appears or files a pleading in the action.

¶14West argues that because the amendment to her complaint related back to the time of its initial filing, Buchanan should not have been permitted to peremptorily challenge Judge Beistline. But West’s contention rests on a false premise. West asserts that “Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 42(c)(1) aggregates both Bembry and Buchanan as a single party.” This interpretation is incorrect. Civil Rule 42(c)(1) explains only that “[t]wo or more parties aligned on the same side of an action ... shall be treated as one side for purposes of the right to a change of judge.” (Emphasis added.) In its discussion of the timeliness of peremptory challenges, Civil Rule 42(c)(3) explicitly refers to parties, not sides. Moreover, the position West advocates would require Buchanan to have peremptorily challenged Judge Beistline before she was made a party to the action.3 To adopt West’s assertion would eliminate the right of persons in Buchanan’s position to peremptorily challenge a judge. The decision to allow Buchanan to peremptorily challenge Judge Beistline was correct.

¶15B. Judge Steinkruger Did Not Err in Declining to Follow the Law of the Case.

¶16Although Judge Beistline concluded that the statute of limitations did not bar amendment of the complaint because the amendment would properly relate back to the date the complaint was filed, the case was then reassigned to Judge Steinkruger, who viewed this issue differently. In granting Buchanan’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, Judge Steinkruger implicitly held that West’s amended complaint would not relate back to the date her complaint was originally filed, thus overruling Judge Beistline’s earlier decision. West suggests that Judge Steinkruger erred by failing to follow the law of the case.4

¶17 Stepanov v. Gavrilovich5 provides guidance on this issue. In Stepanov, we explained that the law of the case doctrine “expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided.”6 This practice is not an absolute rule of law. Rather it is a matter of “sound judicial policy.” 7 We recognized the power of one trial-court judge to overrule another, in the proper exercise of judicial discretion.8 And, “[wjhile this power is not to be used lightly,” 9 we observed that it is “entirely reasonable for a judge whose responsibility it is to try a case to reconsider and reverse an earlier ruling if convinced that that ruling was erroneous.”10 Judge Steinkruger was within her discretion to reconsider whether West’s amended complaint would properly relate back to the date her complaint was originally filed.

¶18C. West’s Amendment Substituting Buchanan as Defendant Relates Back to the Initial Filing of the Complaint.

¶19In order to determine whether West’s amended complaint, which substituted Hil-trud Buchanan as the defendant, relates back to the original complaint, we must interpret the language of Alaska Civil Rule 15(c). -This provision sets forth the criteria for an amendment to relate back to the filing of the original pleading. The rule states:

Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the *1068original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against the party to be brought in by amendment, that party (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.[11]

¶20In determining how to interpret a particular rule, we are guided by the purpose of the rule.12 The purpose of Rule 15(c) is remedial: The rule is meant to liberalize the rules of pleading and to “allo[w] amendments for clarification and/or correction of the original complaint without being barred by the statute of limitations.”13 And the purpose of statutes of limitations is to protect defendants from the injustices that may result from the prosecution of stale claims.14

¶21With these goals in mind, we turn to the issue before us: whether Buchanan, as the party who was brought in by amendment, received notice of the institution of the action and knew,- or should have known, that she was the proper defendant “within the period provided by law for commencing the action against [her].”15 Buchanan suggests that because the lawsuit was filed on the last day available under the statute of limitations, and she did not learn of it that day before the statute expired, the amendment substituting her as a party cannot relate back to the original complaint.

¶22Buchanan argues that our decision in Adkins v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc.16is dispositive of this issue. In Adkins, Adkins had timely filed suit against Standard Oil and others for personal injuries. After the statute of limitations ran, Adkins attempted to amend his complaint to add Nabors, arguing that this was permitted by Rule 15(c).17 Adkins’s position was that notice of the underlying facts of the action was the same as notice of the institution of the action.18 Relying on a federal court’s interpretation of the word “action” in the analogous federal rule,19 we rejected this claim:

Under this interpretation, any knowledge that Nabors may have had concerning Adkins’ injury is irrelevant. Adkins must prove that Nabors actually knew of his suit against Standard prior to the limitations period. Adkins filed suit on July 20, 1977. The limitations period expired on August 9, 1977. In order for the amendment to relate back, Nabors must have learned of the lawsuit during this twenty-day period.[ 20]

¶23Thus, we interpreted the notice provision of Civil Rule 15(c) to require notice of the law*1069suit, as opposed to mere notice of the facts underlying the action.21

¶24We disagree that Adkins controls this case. Adkins focused on the interpretation of the term “action” as used in the phrase “notice of the institution of the action,” rather than the phrase “within the period provided by law for commencing the action against [the party].” And contrary to the dissent’s assertion,22 we did not determine in Adkins that “the period provided by law for commencing the action” refers to the limitations period. Thus, Adkins did not address a situation, such as this, in which the substituted defendant learned of the plaintiffs cause of action after the statute of limitations had run but before expiration of time for service on the original defendant.

¶25Moreover, after we decided Adkins, we suggested in Siemion v. Rumfelt23that notice within the time for service could be adequate under Rule 15(c). In Siemion, we decided that a complaint against Jeffrey Rumfelt’s father could be amended to include Jeffrey because of our view that “Jeffrey Rumfelt received sufficient notice of the subject claim” and our “belie[f that] it is reasonable to infer that Jeffrey had notice of the institution of the suit within the same time he ivould have known had he been a properly named defendant.”24

¶26While Civil Rule 15(e) is not a model of clarity, we conclude that the language “within the period provided by law for commencing the action” must be interpreted to encompass, when the complaint is timely filed, the reasonable time for service of process permitted by the rule for a named defendant. The rule’s language combines the separate concepts of commencement of an action with notice of the institution of the action. But an action may be filed and thus commenced without imparting notice to the defendant. Notice is usually given by service, which may take place as long as 120 days after filing.25 As a result, a properly named defendant may not receive notice of an action until 120 days after the statute of limitations runs. We can think of no reason why the rule would require the added defendant to receive notice earlier than a named defendant who is sued on the last day of a limitations period. Thus, we conclude that Rule 15(c) refers to the process of commencing an action, rather than merely filing a complaint; that process includes both timely filing and timely service.

¶27We note that the prevailing interpretation of Rule 15(c)’s federal counterpart is not a bar to our decision today. In Schiavone v. Fortune,26 the United States Supreme Court construed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(3) to require notice to the intended defendant within the time for filing a complaint under the applicable limitations period.27 The Schiavone court stated that the “plain language” of the Rule dictated its result even though “there is an element of arbitrariness here.”28 But as one commentator has noted, the “disputed language is anything but plain, much less clear.”29 Justice Stevens, joined by two other justices, came to a different conclusion than the Court’s majority when interpreting the same “plain language”:

The language ... does not, however, refer to the statute of limitations. Rather, it describes “the period provided by law for commencing the action against him” (emphasis added). As I have noted, that period includes two components, the time for commencing the action by the filing of a complaint and the time in which the action “against him” must be implemented *1070by the service of process. If the party is sufficiently described in the original complaint to avoid any possibility of prejudice to the defendant, I see no reason for not construing the Rule to embrace both components of the period provided by law for bringing a timely action against a particular defendant.[30]

¶28Furthermore, as even the dissent acknowledges,31 commentators have heavily criticized this result.32 As one commentator explains, the Schiavone decision is troubling for several reasons:

The majority’s decision effectively vitiates the purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in general and of Rule 15(c) in particular.... Moreover, the Schiavone Court’s interpretation is clearly not in accord with Rule 8(f) in that the construction of Schiavone’s pleading cannot, in any light, be seen as accomplishing substantial justice.

... [Finally,] [i]f a complaint against a particular defendant must be filed within the limitations period to survive Rule 15(c) scrutiny, as the Court seems to suggest, there is no need for the relation-back doctrine at all where the changing of a party is involved.[33]

¶29Finally, other state courts, when faced with interpreting state rules analogous to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(3) in the aftermath of Schiavone, have not felt constrained to follow the Schiavone decision with “blind devotion.”34 As the Arizona Supreme Court explained, “[i]t would be foolish indeed to interpret such a rule so narrowly as to allow its use only in those cases in which it was not needed because the statute of limitations had not yet run.”35

¶30Because we are not bound by a decision of the -United States Supreme Court when interpreting a state rule of civil procedure and because we find these critiques of Schiavone persuasive, we decline to follow the Schiavone rationale. As long as a claim is filed within the time permitted by the applicable statute of limitations and served within the time permitted for service, the purposes of both Rule 15(c) and our statutes of limitations are satisfied.36 As Justice Stevens stated in his dissent in Schiavone:

The principal purpose of Rule 15(c) is to enable a plaintiff to correct a pleading error after the statute of limitations has run if the correction will not prejudice his adversary in any way. That purpose is defeated — and the Rule becomes largely superfluous — if it is construed to require the correction to be made before the statute has run.[37]

¶31 *1071Our interpretation of Rule 15(c) better serves the rule’s purpose than a reading that would preclude the relation back of an amendment where the intended defendant receives notice that is timely but that comes after the deadline for filing the complaint. We note that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) has been amended to substitute “within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him” with “the period provided by Rule 4[ ] for service of the summons and complaint.”38 We regard this as further evidence both of the purpose of the rule and that our interpretation is faithful to the achievement of this purpose.

¶32We thus conclude that West has met the requirements of Rule 15(c): She has proved that Buchanan received notice of the institution of the action and knew or should have known before expiration of the period for commencement of the action that Buchanan was the proper party in the suit. In this case, Buchanan received notice identical to Bembry’s. Although West’s complaint named Bembry as the driver, both Bembry and Buchanan knew that Buchanan was the driver. According to Buchanan, she accompanied Bembry to pick up the certified letter containing the complaint. Upon reading the complaint, both Bembry and Buchanan should have found it obvious that the complaint mistakenly named Bembry rather than Buchanan.

¶33Given these circumstances, to say that Bembry received timely and adequate notice but Buchanan did not would seem little more than senseless formalism. Thus, it was error for the superior court to dismiss West’s action against Buchanan on statute of limitations grounds.

¶34V. CONCLUSION

¶35Because we hold that West’s amended complaint substituting Buchanan as defendant related back to the time of its initial filing, we REVERSE the superior court’s dismissal of West’s action against Buchanan and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶36. See Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n. 6 (Alaska 1979).

¶37. Id.

¶38. AS 22.20.022, by its terms, permits only “a party or a party’s attorney” to peremptorily challenge a judge.

¶39. West also refers us to Civil Rule 77(k), which deals with the time limits within which motions may be reconsidered. This reference is off-point. The motion for summary judgment considered by Judge Steinkruger did have an issue in common with the motion to amend considered by Judge Beistline. But Judge Steinkruger did not reconsider the motion to amend. Civil Rule 77(k) is inapplicable.

¶40. 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979).

¶41. Id.at 36 (quoting Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444, 32 S.Ct. 739, 56 L.Ed. 1152 (1912)).

¶42. Id.

¶43. See id.

¶44. Id. at 36.

¶45. Id.

¶46. Alaska R. Civ. P. 15(c) (emphasis added).

¶47. See, e.g., Van Alen v. Anchorage Ski Club, Inc., 536 P.2d 784, 787 (Alaska 1975) ("We have repeatedly stated that Alaska's discovery rules should be given a liberal interpretation in order to effectuate the underlying purpose of those rules.”).

¶48. Lawrence A. Epter, An Un-Fortune-Ate Decision: The Aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Eradication of the Relation — Back Doctrine, 17 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. 713, 718 (1990) (discussing the federal counterpart to Alaska Civil Rule 15); see also Laurie Helzick, Note, Looking Forward: A Fairer Application of the Relation Back Provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), 63 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 131, 140 (1988) ("Relation back was developed in order to liberalize the rules of pleading for the plaintiff without contravening the policies behind the statute of limitations.”) (discussing the federal counterpart to Alaska Civil Rule 15).

¶49. See Pedersen v. Zielski, 822 P.2d 903, 907 (Alaska 1991).

¶50. Alaska R. Civ. P. 15(c).

¶51. 609 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1980).

¶52. See id. at 17-18.

¶53. See id. at 20-21.

¶54. See id.At the time of Adkins, the federal rule was virtually identical to Alaska’s Rule 15(c). Compare Alaska R. Civ. P. 15(c) with Fed. R.Civ.P. 15(c) (1991) (amended 1991).

¶55. Id. at 21.

¶56. See id. at 21.

¶57. See Dissent at 1073.

¶58. 825 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1992).

¶59. Id. at 900 (emphasis added).

¶60. See Alaska R. Civ. P. 4(j).

¶61. 477 U.S. 21, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 91 L.Ed.2d 18 (1986).

¶62. See id. at 30-31, 106 S.Ct. 2379.

¶63. Id.

¶64. Epter, supra note 13, at 735 ("If the Court’s characterization of this language were accurate, Schiavone would never have been decided by the Supreme Court: the conflicting and inconsistent interpretation of that language is precisely what led to the grant of certiorari.”).

¶65. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 37, 106 S.Ct. 2379 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

¶66. See Dissent at 1074-75.

¶67. See, e.g., Robert D. Brussack, Outrageous Fortune: The Case for Amending Rule 15(c) Again, 61 S. Cal. L.Rev. 671, 672-73 (1988); Epter, supra note 13, at 727-35; Helzick, supra note 13, at 148-49.

¶68. Epter, supra note 13, at 731-33.

¶69. Ritchie v. Grand Canyon Scenic Rides, 165 Ariz. 460, 799 P.2d 801, 805 (1990); see also Brown v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 669 So.2d 92, 95-97 (Miss.1996) (noting that Mississippi courts were "not bound to blindly apply the observation or interpretation [of Rule 15] by the federal court”); Hughes v. Water World Water Slide, Inc., 314 S.C. 211, 442 S.E.2d 584, 586 (1994) (declining to follow Schiavone even though South Carolina had not adopted the 1991 amendment to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) setting the time allowed for changing the defendant in accord with federal law rather than state statutes of limitations).

¶70. Ritchie, 799 P.2d at 808.

¶71. Although the dissent complains that we are deciding this issue on a ground not argued by the parties, Buchanan challenged Judge Beistline's reliance on our suggestion in Siemion that a complaint may be amended to include a defendant who has “had notice of the institution of the suit within the same time he would have known had he been a properly named defendant.” Moreover, the applicability of the Schiavonerule to this case was argued at length by Buchanan in her brief to this court. And as the Schiavonedissent and the commentators who criticize the Schiavonemajority opinion recognize, a properly named defendant may not receive notice of an action until service, which under both the Alaska and Federal Rules may take place as long as 120 days after filing. Thus, although the parties do not specifically refer to Civil Rule 4(j) in their briefs, its applicability to the issue before us is manifest.

¶72. Schiavone, 411 U.S. at 38, 106 S.Ct. 2379 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

¶73. Compare Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) with Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) (1991) (amended 1991).

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