981 So. 2d 1259 - Singleton v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In Ey, the court recognized that a rule contrary to the rule it was adopting had previously been applied by district courts. 982 So.2d at 625 . On that basis, the court determined to “deem [Ey’s] motion timely filed as to [the misadvice] claim.” Id. Here, a similar circumstance exists, and Singleton’s claim is likewise deemed timely filed. See also Green [v. State], 944 So.2d [208, 219 (Fla.2006)] (stating that “in the interest of fairness, defendants whose cases are already final will have two years from the date of this opinion in which to file a motion comporting with the standards adopted today”).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 13 So. 3d 70 - Flint v. State · 997 So. 2d 481 - MacK v. State

2. “We have concluded that such gain time misadvice claims present circumstances that fall within the scope of the time limitation exception under rule 3.850(b)(1) for claims predicated on “facts [that] were unknown to the mov-ant or the movant’s attorney and [that] could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” In these cases, we have related the accrual of the postconviction claims to the time when the authorities provided information to the defendant that belied the earlier advice of counsel. See, e.g., Galindez, 909 So.2d at 598 (stating “that the triggering event for the two-year period in which to file a rule 3.850 motion is not the date of the judgment in the criminal proceeding in which the prisoner pleaded, but the date on which the [Department of Corrections] informed the prisoner of the gain time forfeiture and that the DOC determination of gain time constituted newly discovered information within the meaning of rule 3.850(b)(1)”). Recently, however, the supreme court in Ey v. State, 982 So.2d 618, 624 (Fla. 2008), rejected the view that in postcon-viction cases alleging misadvice of counsel, “the clock begins to run when a defendant discovers that the advice was erroneous.” The Ey court specifically considered the timeliness of “a claim that counsel erroneously advised a defendant about the [potential] effect of his [guilty] plea on the subsequent sentence imposed in another case for a crime committed before the plea was entered.” Id. at 623 . The ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 1 So. 3d 284 - Chandler v. State

3. “The defendant asserting a claim that counsel gave erroneous advice concerning parole eligibility can ... readily determine the legal error which is the basis for the postconviction claim.... [T]he claim of misadvice does not depend on “facts” that “could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence” and the [newly discovered evidence] exception in rule 3.850(b)(1) from the two-year time limitation on the filing of postconviction claims is therefore not applicable.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 13 So. 3d 70 - Flint v. State