981 So. 2d 734 - State v. Carter’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

17 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and La. Const. art. 1, § 20 prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive punishment. "`[T]he excessiveness of a sentence becomes a question of law reviewable under the appellate jurisdiction of this court.'" State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280 (La.1993) (quoting State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 764 (La.1979)). Nevertheless, the trial court is given wide discretion in imposing a sentence, and, absent a manifest abuse of that discretion, we will not deem as excessive a sentence imposed within statutory limits. State v. Pyke, 95-919 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/96) , 670 So.2d 713 .... The only relevant question for us to consider on review is not whether another sentence would be more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its broad discretion in sentencing a defendant. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957 , cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043 , 117 S.Ct. 615 , 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996). State v. Davenport, 07-254, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/3/07), 967 So.2d 563, 565 .”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 998 So. 2d 935 - State v. Whitfield · 997 So. 2d 905 - State v. Zeno

2. “[United States v.] DeBerry [ 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir.1973),] teaches that in a typical “controlled delivery” case, the validity of the seizure is determined as of the time the drugs are first seized, not as of the time they are retaken. Having taken proper dominion over the drugs and kept them under close surveillance, the government is deemed to be in constructive possession of them, even though, for purposes of identification, they are delivered to another. Other Circuits are in accord. See, e.g., United States v. Bulgier, 618 F.2d 472, 478 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843 , 101 S.Ct. 125 , 66 L.Ed.2d 51 (1980); United States v. An drews, 618 F.2d 646, 654 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 , 101 S.Ct. 84 , 66 L.Ed.2d 26 (1980); United States v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308, 1312-13 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Issod, [ 508 F.2d 990, 993 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 , 95 S.Ct. 1578 , 43 L.Ed.2d 783 (1975) ]; see also United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 890 (1st Cir.1976). This means, says the Supreme Court, that “[n]o protected privacy interest remains in contraband in a container once government officers lawfully have opened that container and identified its contents as illegal.” Illinois v. Andreas, [ 463 U.S. 765, 771 , 103 S.Ct. 3319, 3324 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983) ]. Of course, in order for a controlled delivery to accomplish its intended purpose, there must be an factual delivery to a defendant and sufficient exercise of dominion by him to demonstr”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 85 So. 3d 821 - State v. Pittman

3. “I agree with you [defense counsel], that specific intent is part of criminal conspiracy; however, I think the jury instructions I submitted to both you and Mrs. Jump indicate that — they had 19both criminal intent and specific intent — which I think is required by law to have both of them in the jury instructions. And my definition of specific intent is — specific intent is that state of mind which' exists when the circumstances indicate a defendant actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. And on page four of the instructions, it says that it is un — when I give a definition. “The defendant in this case is charged with conspiracy to distribute schedule II controlled substance, to wit: methamphetamine.” It says it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally to conspire, so I would think, in my opinion, that that definition of specific intent is within that definition of knowingly and intentionally to conspire. Therefore, I’m not going to add additional definition of specific intent is — an additional jury instruction to say specific intent is an element of criminal conspiracy because I think it is already in there. So, I’m — deny your ... request. ...”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Casaday