¶1concurring.
¶2Our precedents and those of the United States Supreme Court are replete with examples of constitutionally permissible police intrusions which do not depend for their reasonableness on a law enforcement motive. Firemen, police officers, and other public officials may enter buildings to save lives, prevent personal injury, or stop the destruction of private property. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Janicek v. State, 634 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Bray v. State, 597 S.W.2d 763 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). They may take possession of private property left in public places if it poses a threat of injury or causes inconvenience to other citizens. They may inspect and catalog seized property to assure its safe-keeping and to protect themselves from claims of misconduct. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Delgado v. State, 718 S.W.2d 718, 721-22 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). They may examine the premises of private businessmen to ensure compliance with public health and safety regulations. None of these governmental intrusions is made primarily for the purpose of enforcing penal statutes, yet all are considered to be reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes when undertaken in a reasonable manner. Clearly, the constitutional propriety of a search or seizure does not depend upon suspicion of a crime. The legitimate role of government in our society includes more than just the enforcement of its penal statutes.
¶3I would emphasize that the right of the people to be free, except under extraordinary circumstances, from official intrusions into their personal lives and from official interruptions of their free movement in society is fundamental to our form of government and to our way of life. Under no circumstances should a search or seizure be considered *439reasonable unless the reason for it is of such social importance that it outweighs the degree of individual embarrassment or inconvenience likely to result. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); Bray, 597 S.W.2d at 769. This is a balancing test. It is not a bright-line rule for each conceivable set of facts to which it applies. But it does set a standard to be observed by all agents of the government, including law enforcement officers and the courts responsible for overseeing the legality of their conduct.
¶4With these comments, I join Judge Price’s concurring opinion.