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← 984 F.2d 850 - Diaz v. Shallbetter

Diaz v. Shallbetter’s Empirical Analysis

984 F.2d 850 · 1993

Citation profile

44
cited by 44 later decisions
July 2017
most recently cited

22 federal appellate · 1 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 44 later decisions — most recently July 2017 · most notably Moore v. State of Indiana D (1993), Lundy v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc. (1994)

22 federal appellate · 1 district ·

350199320002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2074 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1988

Relies on Wilson v. Garcia · Linkletter v. Walker · Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond · Guaranty Trust Co. v. York · Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[Proposed rules of the Supreme Court] shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is [transmitted to Congress] unless otherwise provided by law. The Supreme Court may fix the extent such rule shall apply to proceedings then pending, except that the Supreme Court shall not require the application of such rule to further proceedings then pending to the extent that, in the opinion of the court in which such proceedings are pending, the application of such rule in such proceedings would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former rule applies.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[Old] Rule 15(c) created an anomaly. A plaintiff who filed a timely complaint has 120 days to serve the defendant with process. So a person properly named in . the complaint might not know until four months after the running of the period of limitations that he was a defendant. But if the plaintiff mistook the defendant’s name, correction after the period of limitations would not relate back, and the suit would be untimely, even though the plaintiff served the proper person before the 120 days were up. A defendant served 10 days after the period of limitations would prevail if the original complaint contained a misnomer, while a defendant in the dark for 120 days could not plead the statute of limitations if the complaint identified him.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “changes in statutes do not apply to pending cases unless the legislature so commands, explicitly.”). 2 . Given that the theory of the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint is that the Defendants intentionally poisoned them' with PCBs, see First Amended Complaint at ¶ 1, and that the Act only applies to”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.