986 F. Supp. 2d 345 - Straker v. Jones’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) Custody The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who ... (B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii),(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title [ie. specified offenses including controlled substance offenses]; ... when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense. (2) Release The Attorney General may release an alien described in paragraph (1) only if the Attorney General decides ... that release of the alien from custody is necessary [for certain witness protection purposes], and the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding—”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Lora v. Shanahan · Antoniou v. Shanahan

2. “Here, the BIA has determined that “released” in § 1226(c)(1) “refer[s] to the release of an alien from a restrictive form of criminal custody involving physical restraint.” The BIA noted that the “ ‘when released’ language of [§ 1226(c) ] ... is modified by the subsequent clause[]: ‘without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.’ ” It reasoned: “The natural reading of the words ‘released on’ within the context of these clauses of [§ 1226(c)(1) ] suggests that Congress is referring to the release of an alien from a restrictive form of criminal custody involving physical restraint to a less restrictive form of criminal custody without physical restraint.” The BIA stated that its reading of “released” to connote termination of a physical restraint was further supported by “[t]he reference in the last clause of the sentence to the possibility that the alien may be returned to a criminal custody status involving physical restraint.” Further supporting this construction, the BIA noted that, throughout § 1226, “the use of the words ‘release’ or ‘released’ ... consistently appears to refer to a form of physical restraint.” In addition to its usage in § 1226(c), the BIA examined the “[t]he use of the term ‘release’ in the provisions relating to the release of an alien on an immigration bond,” including § 1226(a). In these contexts, too, the BI”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 15 F. Supp. 3d 478 - Lora v. Shanahan

3. “DHS argues that an alien’s release after an arrest made as part of the process that later leads to a qualifying conviction under § 1226(c)(1)(B) is a “release” within the meaning of the statute. But the statute’s plain language makes that construction unsustainable. In mandatory terms, the statute requires that DHS “shall take into custody any alien who ... is deportable by reason of having committed any [covered] offense ... when the alien is released.” And the four categories of aliens listed in § 1226(c)(1)(B) all refer to aliens who have been convicted of covered offenses. The statute’s text thus naturally fits the paradigm in which the alien (1) is convicted of an offense enumerated in § 1226(c)(1)(B), (2) serves a prison sentence for such a conviction, and thereafter (3) is released to DHS. But, by definition, an alien who is (1) arrested, (2) released, and only later (3) convicted of and sentenced for a covered offense, is not and cannot be eligible to be taken into DHS custody pursuant to the mandatory detention statute at the moment of his release. That is because, at that point, the alien’s guilt or innocence as to the qualifying offense remains sub judi-ce. The same analysis holds under § 1226(c)(1)(C). An alien who is arrested and released prior to his conviction cannot come within that provision, which provides for mandatory detention upon release “on the basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year,” bec”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 15 F. Supp. 3d 478 - Lora v. Shanahan