State v. Crutcher’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 50 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 52 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It is generally recognized that an arrest is the taking, seizing, or detaining of the person of another (1) by touching or putting hands on him; (2) or by any act that indicates an intention to take him into custody and that subjects him to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest; or (3) by the consent of the person to be arrested. It is said that four elements must ordinarily coalesce to constitute a legal arrest: (1) an intent to arrest; (2) under a real or pretended authority; (3) accompanied by a seizure or detention of the person; and (4) which is understood by the person arrested. “We have defined an arrest in general terms as the detention of a known or suspected offender for the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime. Our cases make clear, as McChan states, that in ordinary circumstances ‘there is a detention only when there is a touching by the arrestor or when the arrestee is told that he is under arrest and submits [but][w]here there is no touching, the intention of the arrestor and the understanding of the arrestee are determinative, for in order for there to be an arrest in such case, there must always be an intent on the part of one to arrest the other and an intent on the part of such other to submit.’ Ordinarily, therefore, there can be no arrest where there is no restraint or where the person sought to be arrested is not conscious of any restraint. At least one court has concluded that an unconscious person cannot be subjected to a valid ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Belote v. State

2. “The dissent opines that the definition of “arrest” adopted in Robertson and reaffirmed in West is no longer accurate. Cited are a series of United States Supreme Court cases and Tennessee cases that the dissent claims establish a new definition of arrest, to wit: “an arrest occurs if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have understood that he or she was not free to leave.” This definition, however, fails to recognize the distinction between “seizure” and “arrest,” discussed above. A person may be seized without being placed under custodial arrest. None of the cases cited by the dissent deal with this precise issue. While we agree that the “reasonable person” standard is a factor in determining whether an arrest has occurred, just as it would be for any seizure, we believe more is required to establish a custodial arrest for purposes of a search incident to an arrest.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State v. Nidiffer

3. “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires a search warrant to contain a description of the place to be searched with such particularity that the searching officer may with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the intended place. Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits general warrants and T.C.A. § 40-6-103 requires search warrants to describe particularly the property and the place to be searched. This requirement is met if the description “particularly points to a definitely ascertainable place so as to exclude all others, and enables the officer to locate the place to be searched with reasonable certainty, without leaving it to his discretion.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State v. McCary