99 Conn. App. 230 - State v. Rivet’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[I]n cases in which the entire definition of intent was improperly read to the jury, the conviction of the crime requiring specific intent almost always has been upheld because a proper intent instruction was also given. [In those cases] [t]he erroneous instruction, therefore, was not harmful beyond a reasonable doubt.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 181 Conn. App. 167 - Cator v. Commissioner of Correction · 185 Conn. App. 1 - State v. Ruiz-Pacheco

2. “[I]ntent is the status in a person's mind. It is the act of an intellect.... [I]ntent is required for the commission of the crime. Intent is defined in the statutes. It binds you and me. And [ General Statutes § 53a-3 (11) ] states that a person acts intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense when his conscious objective is to cause a result or to engage in such conduct. Murder is the unlawful taking of the life of another with an intent to take that life. The person charged with that offense must act intentionally, the intent to take a life at the time the life is taken, and it must be by the act of the person charged. Intentional conduct is purposeful conduct, rather than conduct that is accidental or inadvertent or unintentional conduct.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 181 Conn. App. 167 - Cator v. Commissioner of Correction

3. “It is axiomatic that the definition of intent as provided in § 53a-3 (11) 9 embraces both the specific intent to cause a result and the general intent to engage in proscribed conduct. It has become axiomatic, through decisional law, that it is improper for a court to refer in its instruction to the entire definitional language of § 53a-3 (11), including the intent to engage in conduct, when the charge relates to a crime requiring only the intent to cause a specific result.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 185 Conn. App. 1 - State v. Ruiz-Pacheco