99 F. Supp. 2d 358 - Rivera v. Apfel’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “There is no suggestion in the legislative history that section 423(g) was intended to affect the general equity powers of the district courts. The holding of Doughty and Taylor , that section 423(g) somehow manifested a Congressional intent to divest the courts of normal equitable powers with regard to interim disability compensation has no better support than the hoary maxim: Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the expression of a particular must mean the exclusion of the general. Expressio unius is a maxim to guide statutory interpretation; it is not a rule of law, and it is not an excuse to avoid hard analysis. Neuberger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 311 U.S. 83, 88 , 61 S.Ct. 97 , 85 L.Ed. 58 (1940); Westnau Land Corp. v. U.S. Small Business Administration, 1 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir.1993). If a remedy as fundamental as equity is to be forbidden by law, the law must be specific and clearly so intend. It cannot be a by-product of a statute intended to solve a particular problem arising from a particular practice. See, e.g., Day v. Schiueiker, 685 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir.1982), rev’d on other grounds, Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104 , 104 S.Ct. 2249 , 81 L.Ed.2d 88 (1984) (authority to award interim benefits derives from district court’s “inherent powers to fashion a remedy”); Davila v. Shalala, 848 F.Supp. 1141 , 1145 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (Broderick, J.); Saltares v. Boiuen, 711 F.Supp. 162, 165 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (Kram, J.); Weiser v. Secretary of Department of Health and Human Ser”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 122 F. Supp. 2d 1001 - Hoffman v. Apfel

2. “SSA’s administrative procedures have stretched unreasonably long and have been deficient and wasteful. The Congressional policy of awarding disability payments to minor children during their minority, early in their disability, has been thwarted, and can best be served by awarding interim benefits. Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for remand, joined by defendant, is granted (see 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g)). Pending final deter mination by the Commissioner, the Commissioner shall provide Plaintiff with the level of benefits he would receive were he successful in his application, subject to recoupment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 404 if it is ultimately determined that the benefits paid were not due.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 122 F. Supp. 2d 1001 - Hoffman v. Apfel

3. “This case, unlike Heckler v. Day and unlike Doughty and Taylor , does not present an issue of judicial intrusion in the administrative process. I am asked to decide only if interim benefits may be awarded where the interest of justice makes such an order appropriate and necessary. My order does not establish any time period, short or long, within which SSA must proceed. There is no reason to believe that my award of interim benefits will require SSA to proceed more expeditiously than would otherwise be the case. Indeed, an award of interim benefits may allow SSA to take the time necessary to conduct a full eviden-tiary review.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 122 F. Supp. 2d 1001 - Hoffman v. Apfel