State v. Yamada’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 district · 21 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A “cardinal” canon of statutory construction is that this court “cannot change the language of the statute, supply a want, or enlarge upon it in order to make it suit a certain state of facts.” State v. Dudoit, 90 Hawai'i 262, 271 , 978 P.2d 700, 709 (1999) (quoting State v. Buch, 83 Hawai'i 308, 326 , 926 P.2d 599, 617 (1996) (Levinson, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting State v. Meyer, 61 Haw. 74, 78 , 595 P.2d 288, 291 (1979))). This is because “[w]e do not legislate or make laws.” Du-doit, 90 Hawai'i at 271 , 978 P.2d at 709 (citations omitted).... [S]ee also id. at 270 n. 8, 978 P.2d at 708 n. 8 (“[A]s Justice Ramil himself [has] aptly observed, as author of this court’s opinion in State v. Richie, 88 Hawai'i 19, 30 , 960 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1998), ‘[i]t is a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that, where the terms of a statute are plain, unambiguous and explicit, we are not at liberty to look beyond-that language for a different meaning. Instead, our sole duty is to give effect to the statute’s plain and obvious meaning.’” (Citations omitted.) (Some brackets added and some in original.)).”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. State v. Plichta · State v. Mueller

2. “[i]nasmuch as the statute's language is plain, clear, and unambiguous, our inquiry regarding its interpretation should be at an end”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Davis v. Four Seasons Hotel Ltd. · State v. Mainaaupo

3. “We review the circuit court’s interpretation of a statute due novo. State v. Pacheco, 96 Hawai'i 83, 94 , 26 P.3d 572, 583 (2001). Our statutory construction is guided by established rules: When construing a statute, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. And we must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose. When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinetiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists.... In construing an ambiguous statute, “[t]he meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning.” HRS § 1-15(1) [ (1993) ]. Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent. One ave- ’ nue is the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool. ... This court may also consider “[t]he reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it ... to discover its true meaning.” HRS § 1-15(2) (1993). Id. at 94-95, 26 P.3d at 583-84 (some citations and internal quotation marks added and some in original) (brackets in original). Coon v. City and County of Honolulu, 98 Hawai'i 233, 245 , 47 P.3d 348, 360 (2002).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Shinyama