Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

99 Ill. App. 451

Richey v. Guild

Appellate Court of Illinois

Decided January 16, 1902

Appellate Court of Illinois · decided 1902-01-16

<p>1. Parties — Appeals by Persons Not Originally Parties. — Where a person is not a party to a suit in chancery as originally commenced, but subsequently appears, files his answer and is recognized by the court below as a party to the suit, an appeal by him from an order entered in the suit is properly allowed.</p> <p>2. Receivers — Appointment of, in Foreclosure Suits. — In a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage, a receiver will not be appointed unless it is made to appear that the mortgaged premises are insufficient security for the debt, and the individual personally liable for it is insolvent.</p>

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently May 1930

1 state decisions

Relies on Haas v. Chicago Building Society

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Order appointing a receiver reversed · Decided 1902-01-16

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Mr. Justice Sears

¶1delivered the opinion of the court.

¶2It is urged by the learned counsel for appellee that this appeal should be dismissed, because appellant was not a party defendant to the suit when the order appealed from was entered, and therefore had no right to appeal. We think this motion should not be granted. It is true that when the order was entered appellant was not a party to the suit. But he afterward filed his answer and was recognized by the court below as a party to the suit, in that the court granted his prayer for an appeal (which was superfluous, as this appeal is from an interlocutory order), and made a certificate of the evidence at his instance. By these acts the court recognized appellant as a party to the suit.

¶3The formal and correct procedure would have been for appellant to have moved for an order making him a party defendant to the suit and permitting him to answer the bill. But this formal procedure was evidently dispensed with by the court below, which permitted appellant to answer the bill, by which answer he shows that he is the owner of the equity of redemption in the mortgaged property, and also permitted him to have a certificate of the evidence made.

¶4The time when a defendant appears, whether before or after the entering of an interlocutory order, is of no consequence as affecting his right to appeal from such order. We are therefore of opinion that the motion to dismiss the appeal should be denied.

¶5The remaining question is as to the propriety of the order appointing a receiver.

¶6It does not appear from the abstract that the trust deeds here in question provide for the appointment of a receiver before foreclosure. The evidence heard upon the application consists only of the' unverified bill of complaint and the affidavits noted in the foregoing statement of facts.

¶7From all this it appears that the persons who are personally liable for the mortgage debt, so far from being insolvent, are amply able to respond for that debt.

¶8The value of the mortgaged premises is a matter of dispute, but eight affidavits against two, estimate its value at much'more than the mortgage debt. Upon this showing, we are of opinion that no receiver should have been appointed. Haas v. C. B. Society, 89 Ill. 498.

¶9In that case the Supreme Court said, referring to a receivership:

“ Such action will not be taken, however, unless it be made to appear that the mortgaged premises are an insufficient security for the debt and the person liable personally for the debt is insolvent. A combination of these two things seems to be required in all cases we have,examined.”

¶10This announcement was in relation to a receivership after foreclosure sale, and when a deficiency existed, but it applies with greater force to an interlocutory receivership, when it appears without dispute that the persons who are individually liable for the mortgage debt are amply able to respond for the same. The order is reversed.

/99/illapp/451 · .json · Public domain