¶1The note upon which this action is based is the contract of the corporation. The defendant is not a party to that contract; and the plaintiff does not seek, by this suit, to charge him upon any statute liability as a stockholder. Responsibility for the amount of the note is sought to be established through a by-law of the corporation, to which the defendant had attached bis signature. This by-law, with others, was adopted in 1831. To become a member of the association it was requisite to subscribe the by-laws. It does not appear that the defendant’s signature was attached for any other purpose than to constitute him a member of the corporation. It does not appear, and is not alleged, that the plaintiff lent his money upon the faith or credit of the individual pledge contained in the by-law ; nor that the by-law was in any manner made known to him, or to the public, as the basis of such credit.
¶2The office of a by-law is to regulate the conduct and define the duties of the members towards the corporation and between themselves. So far as its provisions are in the nature of contract, the parties thereto are the members of the association, as between themselves ; or the corporation upon the one side, and its individual members upon the other. The right of any third party, stranger to the association, to establish a legal claim through such a by-law, must depend upon the general principles *71applicable to express contracts, as laid down in Mellen v. Whipple, 1 Gray, 317, and the subsequent decisions in Field v. Crawford, 6 Gray, 116, and Dow v. Clark, 7 Gray, 198. No action can be maintained by such third party unless he can bring his case within some of the recognized exceptions to that general rule. A pledge like the one in question, if made for the purpose of enabling the corporation to obtain a loan upon the faith of it, and used for that purpose, may perhaps give a right of action against the subscribers in favor of a party who has been induced to advance money upon its credit. This seems to be implied strongly by the decision in the case of Trustees of Free Schools in Andover v. Flint, 13 Met. 543, inasmuch as the plaintiff in that case appears to have failed to recover upon a similar claim merely for the reason that the defendant had not signed the by-law. But no such facts are shown to exist in the present case. The plaintiff not only is no party to the contract contained in the by-law, but he fails to show any privity between himself and the defendant in relation to the subject matter, or to the consideration, of his demand. Judgment must be rendered accordingly for the defendant.