Volume 99 — New York Supreme Court Reports

<p>Chattel mortgages — improperly filed,— a consideration of an antecedent debt does not malee a subsequent mortgagee a holder for value — Laws 1883, chap. 279, § 1.</p> <p>The statute relative to the filing of chattel mortgages will not, as against the holder of a prior unfiled chattel mortgage, avail a subsequent mortgagee whose mortgage was given to secure an antecedent debt of which the time of payment was not extended. Such a person is not a mortgagee “ in good faith ” within the meaning of the statute.</p> <p>In an action brought,for the conversion of personal property it appeared that on November 30, 1891, the defendants took a chattel mortgage to secure an antecedent debt from Thomas Milward, then living in the town of Tompkins, and that they filed it in the town of Walton; that Milward subsequently removed to Walton, where the mortgage was refiled on December 1, 1892, and. on November 25, 1893; that on June 2, 1893, the plaintiff, without actual notice of the defendants’ mortgage, took and filed in the town of Walton a chattel mortgage @n the same property, given by Milward, then resident there, the consideration of which was an antecedent debt; that this mortgage was never refiled; that on July 18, 1894, the defendants took the property described in both mortgages and sold it to satisfy Milward’s indebtedness to them. Thereupon the plaintiff brought an action for conversion.</p> <p>Held, that the defendants had the better title;</p> <p>That the plaintiff was not a subsequent mortgagee in good faith who had parted with value, and, therefore, was not entitled to the protection of the statute.</p>

Appeal by George 0. Langdon, one of the legatees named in the will of Amon ~W. Langdon, deceased, from an order of the Surrogate’s Court of the county of Ontario, entered in said Surrogate’s Oourt on the 4th day of August, 1894, directing that proceedings to compel an accounting by said executor and trustee, and to compel the payment of the legacy mentioned in the will of the testator be dismissed.

Appeal by the .defendant, Alexander F. Gordon, as executor, etc., of John H. Gordon, deceased, from so much of an order of the County Court of Monroe county, entered in the office of the cleric of the county of Monroe on the 26th day of June, 1895, as imposed upon the defendant, as a condition for the granting of the motion to amend his answer herein, the requirement that he pay the plaintiff the amount of the plaintiff’s disbursements incurred in the action since the trial…

Appeal by tlie defendant, Tlie Empire State Telephone and Telegraph Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Cayuga on tlie 19th day of January, 1895, upon tlie verdict of a jury rendered after a trial at the Cayuga Circuit, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 18th day of June, 1895, denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon tlie minutes.

<p>Promise, to pay a party or to pay on its obligations a certain sum — pa/rol evidence of the statements and situations of the parties when a writing was made is competent to explain it — privity between the promisee and a third, person, its creditor'.</p> <p>In an action brought to recover upon a promise made to the Randolph Lumber Company by the defendants for the benefit, as alleged, of the plaintiff, it appeared that the defendants had indorsed for the Randolph Lumber Company, and for ■ that reason had claims against it amounting to §27,000; that the defendants wished to gain possession of the properly of the Randolph Lumber Company, consisting of mills and timber land; that at this time the Randolph Lumber Company was indebted to other parties, including the plaintiff, in the sum of $3,000; that the defendants agreed in writing to buy the property of the Randolph . Lumber Company, and to pay $30,000 for it “in cash or obligations owing by said Randolph Lumber Company.” It further appeared that the representative of the Randolph Lumber Company had insisted that the indebtedness of $3,000, of which the plaintiff’s claim was a part, should be paid, and there was evidence tending to show that the defendants had verbally agreed to pay it, and that, in reliance upon this promise, the representative of the Randolph Lumber Company had signed the written agreement.</p> <p>The referee, before whom the case was tried, admitted parol evidence upon the part of the plaintiff, tending to show that the expression “ obligations owing by said Randolph Lumber Company,” one of the means by which the vendees were permitted to make payment, was intended to cover the debt due the plaintiff, and that the agreement was that that debt should be paid by the defendants.</p> <p>Held, that the evidence was admissible;</p> <p>That, as the expression was vague, surrounding circumstances might be proved by parol, in order to show what particular obligations of the Randolph Lumber Company, if any, were mentioned by the parties, and were agreed to be paid;</p> <p>That the evidence did not tend to vary or contradict the written contract, but was admitted for the purpose of removing an ambiguity;</p> <p>That the agreement was not a contract of indemnity to the Randolph Lumber Company, but a promise to pay the debts of the Randolph Lumber Company, and that as the promisee was then indebted to the plaintiff, and the promise was made for the benefit of the plaintiff, he could recover upon it against the promisors.</p>