¶1
¶2There was evidence adduced indicating that plaintiff in pursuing his regular duties descended in the elevator to the basement and extinguished the lights and brought the elevator back to the first floor. After mailing his letter he proceeded with his usual employment for the purpose of taking a passenger to the fifth floor of the building, and doing his janitor work, scrubbing the halls, and taking the paper out of the rooms. The defendants had neglected to install the “head-stop.” The plaintiff was projected into a concrete pit, to his permanent injury.
¶3Plaintiff deposed thus:
¶4“Q. Were your duties completed at the time for the day? Did you have other work?
¶5*591“A. No, they wasn’t completed; I hadn’t did any work in the hall. I always mop the hall on every floor and take the paper ont, after I did the hauling. I used the elevator for that purpose.
¶6“Q. You would go from one floor to another with the elevator
¶7“A. Certainly.”
¶8This question was properly submitted to the jury by that part of the charge reading:
¶9“I further instruct you that if you find from the evidence in this case that plaintiff was on an errand for himself at the time he went to post a letter, and that he undertook to use said elevator in coming down to the main floor, and in coming up to the main floor for some purpose of his own, then he was acting outside the scope of his employment and your verdict should be for the defendants. …
¶10“If you believe he used the elevator to carry on his work as janitor and for the purpose of furthering his master’s business, then the court will say to you as a matter of law, that he was engaged in his master’s business, and would not be precluded from recovering on that account.”
¶11Defendants complain of the latter part of the charge quoted, contending there was no evidence from which to conclude that the plaintiff was using the elevator at the time to carry on his master’s business. If the jury believed the plaintiff’s story, they could fairly conclude that at the time of the injury Poole was proceeding with his regular work for defendants. This was for the determination of the jury. There being competent evidence supporting their finding in this respect, the question cannot be re-examined by this court. There was no error in denying the motions and submitting the case to the jury.
¶12*592
¶13“Now, it is a fact, isn’t it, that there is not an elevator in town that you can’t get in from the outside ? ”
¶14The Employers’ Liability Act, Section 6785, Or. L., requires all shafts, well, floor opening, and similar places of danger, to be closed, and that all persons having charge of, or responsible for, any work involving a risk or danger to employees or to the public shall use every device, care and precaution which is practical to use, for the protection and safety of life and limb, limited only by the necessity of preserving efficiency, without regard to cost. Ordinary care, or that precaution used by others will not suffice to satisfy the mandate of the statute: Camenzind v. Freeland Furniture Co., 89 Or. 158, 173 (174 Pac. 139). There was no error in excluding the proffered testimony.
¶15
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¶17
¶18“If you find at the time of his alleged injuries that he was engaged in carrying on his master’s business, and that at said time was engaged in work involving risk and danger, then you are instructed as a matter *594of law, that it was incumbent upon the defendants to use every device, care, and precaution, which was practicable to use, for the protection and safety of life and limb, limited only by the necessity for preserving the efficiency of the structure, machine, or other apparatus or device, and without regard to additional cost of suitable material, safety appliances or devices. ’ ’ .
¶19Taking the instruction with the other part of the charge, there could have been no misunderstanding on the part of the jury as to the practicability or necessity of the device mentioned.
¶20
¶21In Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136, we read as follows:
¶22“In actions of this description the defendant is liable for the natural and probable consequences of his negligent act or omission. The injury must be the direct result of the misconduct charged; but it will not be considered too remote if, according to the usual experience of mankind, the result ought to have been apprehended.
¶23“The act of a third person, intervening and contributing a condition necessary to the injurious effect of the original negligence, will not excuse the first wrongdoer, if such act ought to have been foreseen. The original negligence still remains a culpable and direct cause of the injury. The test is to be found in the probable injurious consequences which were to be anticipated, not in the number of subsequent events and agencies which might arise.”
¶2421 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2 ed.), 491, paragraph b, reads:
¶25“An act or omission may yet be negligent and of a nature to charge a defendant with liability, al*595though no injuries would have been sustained, hut for some intervening cause, if the occurrence of the latter might have been anticipated.”
¶26See 1 Shearman & Redfield on Law of Negligence (6 ed.), Section 34; also, Colorado Mortgage Co. v. Rees, 21 Colo. 435 (42 Pac. 42).
¶27The question whether the accident was the direct result of the neglect of the defendants to repair the elevator door was properly submitted to the jury. It was for that tribunal to determine from the evidence in this case whether the injury was the reasonably probable consequence which was to be anticipated on account of the negligence of the defendants. If an independent cause intervene between the negligence of the defendants and the injury, and such intervening cause and its consequences are sucll as, in the natural course of events, should have been anticipated or foreseen, then the defendants are liable. It was for the jury to say, from the facts and circumstances of the case, whether the defendants could have anticipated or foreseen that persons would naturally tamper with the elevator, if the door were left in a condition to he easily opened, and thereby arrange a dangerous trap for the operator: 1 Thompson’s Com. on Law of Negligence, § 62; Watson, Damages for Personal Injuries, § 58; Colorado Co. v. Giacomini, 55 Colo. 540 (136 Pac. 1039, L. R. A. 1915B, 364).
¶28The case was fairly tried and passed upon by the jury. There was competent evidence to support the verdict. Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. Affirmed.