¶1Appellant pled nolo contendere to the counts of forgery (uttering a forged bill), possession of forged notes or bills, an attempted scheme to defraud, and possession of a forged, stolen or fictitious driver’s license — all third-degree felonies. See §§ 881.09; 881.08; 817.034(4) & 777.04; 322.212(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). On his Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet, appellant scored twenty “total sentencing points,” corresponding to a mandatory nonstate prison sanction under section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes (2011). Nevertheless, that section authorizes the trial court to impose a prison sentence if it makes written findings “that a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public.” § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2011). The trial *635court did so in appellant’s case and imposed a sentence of twenty-four months’ imprisonment. Now, on appeal, appellant contends his prison sentence violates Ap-prendi
¶2REVERSED and REMANDED with directions.
¶3. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).
¶4. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004).
¶5. Jonesinvolved circumstances which, in all relevant aspects, were identical to those in the instant case.
¶6. But see Jones 71 So.3d at 176 (Thomas, J., concurring in result only).
¶7. Jonescites to Shull v. Dugger, 515 So.2d 748, 750 (Fla.1987) (holding in a case involving an upward departure under the sentencing guidelines “a trial court may not enunciate new reasons for a departure sentence after the reasons given for the original departure sentence have been reversed by an appellate court”), but compares Jackson v. State, 64 So.3d 90 (Fla.2011) (holding that a trial court may again impose a downward departure sentence under the Criminal Punishment Code on remand where the appellate court reverses the grounds for the initial departure). See Jones 71 So.3d at 176.