Rey v. Gd Lafferty Rey’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 12 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The Massachusetts courts sometimes have held that the party to be bound need not have signed each component part of an integrated agreement where it is the “sense” of the transaction, as supported by reliable indicia in the writings which were signed by the party to be bound, that a unitary transaction was contemplated by the parties. See Chase Commercial Corp. v. Owen, 32 Mass.App.Ct. 248 , 588 N.E.2d 705 (1992) (holding that non-signatory guarantor was bound by jury trial waiver contained in loan and security agreements, though guarantee agreement contained no such waiver, where "the three documents were parL of one transaction”); see also Gilmore v. Century Bank & Trust Co., 20 Mass.App.Ct. 49, 50 , 477 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (1985) (holding that non-signatory trustee could recover for breach of workout agreement, even though not a party to its terms, based on "sense” of agreement, and "such factors as simultaneity of execution, identity of subject matter and parties, cross-referencing, and interdependency of provisions”).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Desmond v. State Bank of Long Island (In Re Computer Engineering Associates, Inc.)

2. “[Licensee] did not present sufficient evidence to enable a finding that [Licensor's] actions with respect to [the product] were 'unreasonable' "). The Court agrees that placing the burden on IGT would effectively alter the contract and IGT's right of approval. H5G contends that this framework would effectively give IGT "a presumption of acting with 'reasonableness.' " Def. Opp'n. at 5. However, IGT's proposal does not afford it a presumption of reasonableness. It merely places the burden on the party opposing the status quo, i.e. the initial reasonableness determination. Once H5G proffers evidence suggesting that IGT acted unreasonably to avoid liability, IGT would need to respond and contest that assertion. E. Requirements of Fairness, Good Faith, and Non-Arbitrariness H5G contends that the term "objectively reasonable”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. IGT v. High 5 Games, LLC

3. “may ... be appropriate where a particular “new use” was completely unforeseeable and therefore could not possibly have formed part of the bargain between the ' parties at the time of the original grant. Obviously, this method may be less appropriate in arm’s-length transactions between sophisticated parties involving foreseeable technological developments; in such situations, narrow construction license grants may afford an unjustifiable windfall to the licensor, who would retain blanket rights to. analogous “new uses” of copyright material notwithstanding the breadth of the bargained-for grant.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 838 F. Supp. 153 - ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Westminster Music, Ltd.