Douglas v. Babcock’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “We have fundamental concerns with the reasoning in Lewis v. Grinker, and its applicability to the case before us. The Second Circuit in Lewis , instead of focusing on applying the applicable law as written by Congress, instead sought to determine what it deemed Congress’s broader “intent.” [Lewis, 965 F.2d] at 1208. We do not believe our proper judicial role is to divine Congress’s unlegislated intent, or to make the statutes comport with what we believe Congress’s preferred policy to be, or what it ought to be. Rather, this court must apply the law as written, even when a result is produced that we may personally question. The perceived legislative history of the relevant statutes should not be allowed to trump duly enacted laws even if the “unenacted” legislative policy, intent, or history is clear_ We decline to follow the approach of Lewis .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Haynes v. Missouri State Division of Family Services · 111 F. Supp. 2d 142 - Lewis v. Grinker

2. “Unfortunately, Congress has not written its Medicaid prenatal care statute concerning a pregnant woman’s duty to identify the father as clearly as it has written its legislative history. The evidence of legislative intent is clear and unmistakable; the statute itself is at best opaque, at worst incomprehensible. The legislative history of the 1990 Amendment clearly states that the statute changes the law in order to allow pregnant women in poverty to be eligible for prenatal medical care even though they cannot ... or will not identify the father____ The [House] Report then makes it abundantly clear that it is changing the old rule which denies eligibility for non-cooperating pregnant women---- Without this statement of purpose in the legislative history, an accurate analysis of the statute is almost impossible, for the convoluted statutory language is a puzzling jumble of words, exceptions, exceptions to exceptions, and exceptions to exceptions to exceptions, requiring ... “an eye-glazing examination of a labyrinthine maze of sections, and seemingly infinite subsections, of the Medicaid Act.” Certainly the “plain-meaning” rule has no application here.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 888 F. Supp. 485 - Perry v. Dowling

3. “in order to be eligible for medical assistance, a Medicaid applicant is required to assist the state by assigning any support and medical payment rights to the state, cooperating with the state in establishing the paternity of any minor child born out of wedlock for whom the applicant is legally responsible, and cooperating with the state in identifying and pursuing any third parties who may be liable to pay for medical care.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 888 F. Supp. 485 - Perry v. Dowling