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← 990 SW2D 263 - Busby v. State

Busby v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1999

Citation profile

40
cited by 40 later decisions
4
states following
April 2019
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 36 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 40 later decisions — most recently April 2019 · most notably Paulson v. State (2000), Busby v. Dretke (2004)

2 federal appellate · 36 state decisions

230199920002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Rakas v. Illinois · New York v. Belton · Ake v. Oklahoma

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The Fourth Amendment requires an arrest warrant only when the arrest occurs in the suspect’s home. Anderson v. State, 932 S.W.2d 502, 506 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), ... (citing New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 , 110 S.Ct. 1640 , 109 L.Ed.2d 13 ... (1990)). Appellant was not arrested in his home but on a public highway. As for appellant’s statutory challenge, we find that the warrantless arrest was legitimately made under Article 14.04. That article, known as the felony/escape rule, states: Where it is shown by satisfactory proof to a peace officer, upon the representation of a credible person, that a felony has been committed, and that offender is about to escape, so that there is no time to procure a warrant, such peace officer may, without a warrant, pursue and arrest the accused. Article 14.04. Although we have held that the felony/escape rule is not satisfied merely by proof that a suspect travels from one place to another, we have also stated that “[t]he escape requirement is obviously met where the suspect has previously fled.” Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d [244, 259 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) ] (citing Fearance v. State, 771 S.W.2d [486, 510 (Tex.Crim.App.1988)) ].”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Article 31.04 has remained unchanged since Cockrum [v. State, 758 S.W.2d 577, 582-83 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1072 , 109 S.Ct. 1358 , 103 L.Ed.2d 825 (1989)] was decided in 1988 and was reaffirmed ... in 1994. Moreover, the State may well have relied upon our interpretation in Cockrum in determining how to proceed on the venue motion. Hence, even if we believed that appellant’s interpretation necessarily followed from the language in Article 31.04 (which we do not), we would find that the interests underlying the doctrine of stare decisis are weighty enough, in the present case, to adhere to our decision in Cockrum”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[o]rdinarily, that presumption cannot be overcome absent evidence in the record of the attorney's reasons for his conduct”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.