991 So. 2d 285 - Fuller v. Fuller’s Empirical Analysis
2008
Citation profile
13 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Auth. Sewer Serv., Inc. · Horton ex rel. Wiginton v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad · Lucky v. Roberts · 726 So. 2d 632 - Sampson v. Cansler · Sumlin v. Sumlin
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“' " Section 30-2-5, Ala. Code 1975, discusses the residency requirements for a plaintiff in a divorce action when the defendant is a nonresident of Alabama and states: " ' " 'When the defendant is a nonresident, the other party to the marriage must have been a bona fide resident of this state for six months next before the filing of the complaint, which must be alleged in the complaint and proved.' " ' "If the residency requirements are not met, then a trial court does not have jurisdiction over the marital res and any judgment entered is void. Seymour v. Seymour , 597 So.2d 1368 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) ; Chavis v. Chavis , 394 So.2d 54 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981). For the purposes of § 30-2-5, residence is the same thing as domicile. Seymour v. Seymour , supra. 'Domicile is defined as residence at a particular place accompanied by an intention to stay there permanently, or for an indefinite length of time .' Nora v. Nora , 494 So.2d 16 , 17 (Ala. 1986). A person's domicile continues until a new one is acquired. Id. " " ' Fuller v. Fuller , 991 So.2d 285 , 290 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008). "[T]he burden is on the party who asserts a change of domicile to prove it.”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage““ ‘In Kirtland, v. Fort Morgan Auth. Sewer. Serv., Inc., 524 So.2d 600 (Ala.1988), this Court held that a trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a defendant’s motion to set aside a default judgment, but that that discretion is not boundless. The trial court must balance two competing policy interests associated with default judgments — judicial economy and the defendant’s right to defend on the merits. Kirtland, 524 So.2d at 604 . These interests must be balanced under the two-step process set out in Kirtland . “ ‘Under Kirtland , the trial court must first presume that cases should be decided on the merits whenever it is practicable to do so.... Second, the trial court must apply a three-factor analysis in determining whether to set aside a default judgment: it must consider “1) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; 2) whether the plaintiff will be unfairly prejudiced if the default judgment is set aside; and 3) whether the default judgment was a result of the defendant’s own culpable conduct.” Kirtland, 524 So.2d at 605 .’ “[Sampson v. Cansler, 726 So.2d 632 ,] 633 [ (Ala.1998) ]. An analysis under the Kirtland factors is one requiring a balancing approach that weighs the factors against one another. Sumlin v. Sumlin, 931 So.2d 40, 45 (Ala.Civ.App.2005). Also, all three factors must be considered, but there is no requirement that all three factors be resolved in favor of the movant in order to set aside a default judgment. Id.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage“"The implicit finding that the wife refused service of process is sustainable on the record, as discussed above. However, we note that, pursuant to our Kirtland analysis, the wife advanced the reasonable explanation that she had not received service of process, had not refused service of process, and had acted promptly in seeking relief from the default judgment. In Fries Correctional Equipment, Inc. v. Con-Tech, Inc. , 559 So.2d 557 (Ala. 1990), our supreme court applied a Kirtland analysis to reverse a trial court's judgment denying a motion to set aside a default judgment. In Con-Tech, Inc. , the supreme court acknowledged that there was a finding of refusal to accept service, but it noted that, because the claims were so much in dispute, the movant's 'avoidance of service might be grounds for imposition of costs or other sanctions, but should not be grounds for a refusal to set aside such a large default judgment.' 559 So.2d at 563 ."”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Wise v. Wise
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.