United States v. Davis’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[W]e would be reluctant to hold that the court has a continuing power on his own initiative to grant what the defendant has not the right to go into open court and ask. To approve the practice followed in this case would almost certainly subject trial judges to private appeals or application by counsel or friends of one convicted. We think that expiration of the time within which relief can openly be asked of the judge, terminates the time within which it can properly be granted on the court’s own initiative. ... * ⅜ ‡ ... The trial judge is given power by the Rules to entertain motions for new trial within five days after verdict and may extend that time for so long as he thinks necessary for proper consideration of the course of the trial. But extension of that time indefinitely is no insurance of justice. On the contrary, as time passes, the peculiar ability which the trial judge has to pass on the fairness of the trial is dissipated as the incidents and nuances of the trial leave his mind to give way to immediate business. It is in the interest of justice that a decision on the propriety of a trial be reached as soon after it has ended as is possible, and that decision be not deferred until the trial’s story has taken on the uncertainty and dimness of things long past.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Johnson v. State

2. “As in Smith, it is argued here that because the literal language of the rule limits the time for making a post-verdict motion, the rule does not limit the power of the district court to act on its own motion. Acceptance of this position would indefinitely extend the power of the district courts to act, a result soundly rejected by the Court in Smith and Robinson. While the double jeopardy concerns present in Smith do not exist in this case, the other reasons advanced by the Court for its strict construction of Rules 33 and 45 apply equally here: the Court’s reluctance to construe Rule 33 in a way that would deprive the district court of the power to act on a motion made by “the person most concerned,” yet permit action by the court on its own initiative; the need to avoid subjecting judges to continuing private appeals regarding convictions; the availability of post-conviction relief to address the risk of miscarriage of justice; and the need to avoid the uncertainty and confusion that would necessarily result from delayed decisions.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Johnson v. State

3. “Rule 45(b) prohibits the court from extending the time for taking any action under Rule 29 and Rule 33 in a manner inconsistent with those rules.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. United States of America v. Chucks Emuegbunam