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← 992 F.2d 714 - Hill v. Shelander

Hill v. Shelander’s Empirical Analysis

992 F.2d 714 · 1993

Citation profile

34
cited by 34 later decisions
December 2017
most recently cited

13 federal appellate · 2 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 34 later decisions — most recently December 2017 · most notably Zorzi v. County of Putnam (1994), Estate of Starks v. Enyart (1993)

13 federal appellate · 2 district ·

250199320002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Anderson v. Creighton · Estelle v. Gamble · Mitchell v. Forsyth · Pierson v. Ray

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The contours of the constitutional right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand his conduct to violate that right.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Harlow has created a “conundrum,” however, in cases where the alleged constitutional violation requires a showing of intent. See Hansen [v. Bennett ], 948 F.2d [397] at 399 n. 4 [7th Cir.1991]; Elliott [v. Thomas ], 937 F.2d [338] at 344 [7th Cir. 1991], Although Harlow eschews an inquiry into subjective intent, in some eases, proof of the defendant’s mental state is an element of the constitutional violation. See Hansen, 948 F.2d at 399 n. 4; Elliott, 937 F.2d at 344;. Rakovich, 850 F.2d at 1210 . We have previously held that by eliminating the subjective component from the qualified immunity analysis, the Supreme court did not intend to “limit civil rights actions to those where state of mind was not a part of the substantive law.” Rakovich, 850 F.2d at 1210 (emphasis in original); see also Hansen, 948 F.2d at 399 n. 4; Elliott, 937 F.2d at 344. Rather, we have attempted to resolve the conundrum by developing a two-part qualified immunity inquiry: “ ‘(1) does the alleged conduct set out a constitutional violation? and (2) were the constitutional standards clearly established at the time in question?’ ” Rakovich, 850 F.2d at 1210 (quoting Wade v. Hegner, 804 F.2d 67 [,] 70 (7th Cir.1986)). The defendant’s subjective intent may be relevant to the first question, but no to the second. Id. Thus, despite Harlow’s focus on a purely objective inquiry, the plaintiff must be afforded an adequate opportunity to establish intent when it is an element of the alleged constitutional viol”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.