Ex Parte Essary’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 28 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “the conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably result.”

   11 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Shaw v. City of Selma · Day, LLC v. Plantation Pipe Line Co.

2. “"Although the evidence indicates that Essary knowingly entered the intersection, there is nothing from which the trier of fact could infer that, in moving his vehicle through the intersection, Essary's state of mind contained the requisite consciousness, awareness, or perception that injury was likely to, or would probably, result . Indeed, the risk of injury to Essary himself was as real as any risk of injury to the plaintiffs. Absent some evidence of impaired judgment, such as from the consumption of alcohol, we do not expect an individual to engage in self-destructive behavior. See Griffin Lumber Co. v. Harper , 252 Ala. 93 , 95, 39 So.2d 399 , 401 (1949) ('There is a rebuttable presumption recognized by the law that every person in possession of his normal faculties in a situation known to be dangerous to himself, will give heed to instincts of safety and self-preservation to exercise ordinary care for his own personal protection. It is founded on a law of nature and has [as] its motive the fear of pain or death. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Wetherington , 245 Ala. 313 (9), 16 So.2d 720 [ (1944) ].'). "The facts here presented do not establish any basis from which to conclude that Essary was not possessed of his normal faculties, such as from voluntary intoxication, rendering him indifferent to the risk of injury to himself when crossing the intersection if he collided with another vehicle. Nor is the act as described by [the plaintiff] so inherently reckless that we mig”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Green v. Markovitch · Thomas v. Heard

3. ““On the evening of May 22, 2002, Es-sary was driving west on McPherson Landing Road in Tuscaloosa County. Essary reached the intersection of McPherson Landing Road and Highway 69, where a stop sign obligates the westbound traffic on McPherson Landing Road to stop and yield to traffic traveling north and south on Highway 69. There are no stop signs halting traffic traveling on Highway 69. As Essary proceeded through the intersection, his vehicle collided with a vehicle traveling north on Highway 69 that was being driven by Latrice Burrell and occupied by Irene Banks and Loretta Pratcher. “On August 31, 2004, Burrell, Banks, and Pratcher sued Essary and his automobile insurer in the Hale Circuit Court to recover damages for negligence, wantonness, and trespass. The case was later transferred to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. “Essary moved for a summary judgment, asserting that the negligence claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that his conduct did not constitute either wantonness or a trespass. Essary supported his motion with, among other things, his deposition and the depositions of Burrell and Banks. Essary testified in his deposition that he did not see Burrell’s vehicle when he entered the intersection. Bur-rell’s deposition testimony indicated that Essary made a ‘rolling stop’ at the intersection and that he then pulled out in front of the vehicle she was driving. Essary argued in his motion for a summary judgment that “ ‘the evidence indicates at”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Garrison v. Sturm, Ruger & Co. · 73 So. 3d 1257 - Mandella v. Pennington