Juniper Development Group v. Kahn’s Empirical Analysis
993 F.2d 915 · 1993
Citation profile
25 federal appellate · 40 district · 4 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 169 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2019 · most notably United Technologies Corporation v. Browning-Ferris Industries Inc (1994), Monarch Life Insurance v. Ropes & Gray (1995)
25 federal appellate · 40 district · 4 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 11 U.S.C. § 101 (Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005) · 11 U.S.C. § 348 · 11 U.S.C. § 362 · 11 U.S.C. § 501 · 11 U.S.C. § 502 · 11 U.S.C. § 503 · 11 U.S.C. § 521 · 11 U.S.C. § 726
Relies on Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v. Wilderness Society · Runyon v. McCrary · Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers · In re Disbarment of Sacco · Idaho v. Wright
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 169 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[In this type of case] the proper allocation of the burdens of [persuasion] and production may be decisive. A proof of claim which comports with the requirements of Bankruptcy Rule 3001(f) constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claim. The interposition of an objection does not deprive the proof of claim of presumptive validity unless the objection is supported by substantial evidence. Once the [debtor] manages the initial burden of producing substantial evidence, however, the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion as to the allowability of the claim resides with the party asserting the claim [here, the government].”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“(a) a party’s ability to distinguish releases of hazardous material for which it bears responsibility from releases caused by others; (b) the amount of hazardous material involved; (c) the toxicity of that material; (d) the extent to which a party was involved in the -14-generation, transportation, treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous material; (e) the degree of care exercised by a party with respect to the hazardous material at issue; and (f) how cooperative the party has been with governmental officials to prevent any harm to the public health or environment.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[S]hould the bankruptcy court find that Juniper did not have notice or actual knowledge of the contamination at the time it purchased the facility in 1983, Jumper’s claim for past and future response costs should be estimated and allowed as administrative expenses entitled to priority. On the other hand, if Juniper did not take all appropriate steps to protect itself from CERCLA liability, its lack of diligence exposed it to the harsh consequences of strict, joint and several liability under CERCLA. In that event, Juniper’s claim would be subject to the section 502(e)(2) ‘fixing’ requirement and Juniper would not be entitled to administrative expense priority with respect to any allowable CERCLA claim.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.