Moore v. Brown’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Moore contends that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment because she was entitled to pre- and post-judgment interest on the December 6, 1991 installment judgment. The law in effect on the date that the trial court ordered Brown to pay $15,441 in child support arrearages allowed for prejudgment and post-judgment interest on child support arrearage judgments. See Act of June 16,1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 467, 1991 Tex.Gen. Laws 1693 (amended 1993 & 1995) (current version at Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.264, 157.265 (Ver non 1996)); Act of May 17, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 107, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 518 , 518-19, repealed by Act of June 19, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1008, § 6, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3601 , 3602; State v. Johnican, 830 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ). However, the trial court did not order Brown to pay any interest, pre-or post-judgment. Even if Moore was entitled to pre- and post-judgment interest on the unpaid child support, as of December 6, 1991, the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify its December 6, 1991 installment judgment seven years later. The trial court lost its plenary power sometime in early 1992, and the court’s attempt to modify the December 6, 1991 installment judgment after plenary power expired would be void. See Lundy [v. Lundy ], 973 S.W.2d [687,] at 688 [(Tex.App.—Tyler 1998, pet. denied) ]; Ex parte Balazik, 631 S.W.2d [198,] at 200 [ (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1982, no writ) ].”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. in the Interest of Lee Children

2. “We agree that the jurisdiction conferred by section 157.269 enables the trial court to enforce its judgment for arrearage. However, Moore argues that the retained jurisdiction authorized by section 157.269 is tantamount to continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, and thereby allows the trial court to modify the previously entered judgment because Brown has not yet paid every installment required by the judgment. We are not persuaded. Nothing in section 157.269 suggests that the Legislature intended to vest the trial court with continuing exclusive jurisdiction to later modify an earlier judgment that awarded a specific amount of past-due child support. We must presume that in drafting a statute, the Legislature has a sound purpose for including or excluding relevant provisions. Because section 157.269 does not state that the trial court maintains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, we will not imply it absent clear legislative intent.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re Dryden