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← 994 F. Supp. 2d 906 - In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation

994 F. Supp. 2d 906 - In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation’s Empirical Analysis

2014

Citation profile

2
cited by 2 later decisions
1
states following
January 2017
most recently cited

1 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on University of Texas v. Camenisch · State of Louisiana Francis v. Resweber · Baze v. Rees · Michigan Coalition of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog · Alkire v. Irving

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[McGuire] possesses physical and medical characteristics that increase his risk of obstructive sleep apnea. This proclivity toward obstruction means that following the administration of midazolam and hydromorphoné, his breathing will be suppressed, he will experience a consequent rise in the amount of carbon dioxide in his system, he will experience a need or sensation to breathe, and he will suffer an obstruction that he will be unable to mitigate through physical manipulation or otherwise. This in turn will lead him to experience ‘“air hunger,” which Waisel characterized as a terrifying inability to obtain a breath to satisfy the ventilatory drive. Waisel testified that this will result because the ventila-tory depressant effects, of the protocol will occur prior to the pain relief or sedative effects. Stated most simply: McGuire asserts that there will be up to a 5-minute window before the drugs alleviate his awareness'of air hunger and that he will suffer air hunger during this time period.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The recent history of this litigation and its. .often frustrating' factual developments can be found in the following Opinion and Orders, which this Court expressly incorporates herein by reference: In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation (Phillips), No. 2:11-cv-1016, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159680 , 2013 WL 5963150 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2013); In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation (Hartman), 906 F.Supp.2d 759 (S.D. Ohio 2012), In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation (Wiles), 868 F.Supp.2d 625 (S.D. Ohio 2012), In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation (Lorraine), 840 F.Supp.2d 1044 (S.D. Ohio 2012), Cooey (Brooks) v. Kasich, Nos. 2:04-cv-1156, 2:09-cv-242, 2:09-cv-823, 2:10-cv-27, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128192 , 2011 WL 5326141 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 4, 2011), and Cooey (Smith) v. Kasich, 801 F.Supp.2d 623 (S.D. Ohio 2011).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““[T]he Constitution does not allow the federal courts to act as a best-practices board empowered to demand that the states adopt the least risky execution protocol possible.” Cooey (Biros), 589 F.3d at 220-21 .' Instead, this Court’s “rightful function [is] as a constitutional check on the ‘wanton infliction of pain’ by the state.” Id. at 233 (quoting Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 , 67 S.Ct. 374 , 91 L.Ed. 422 (1947) (plurality opinion)).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.