Tompkins v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 64 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 68 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 governs the filing of postconviction motions in capital cases. Rule 3.851(d)(1) generally prohibits the filing of a postconviction motion more than one year after the judgment and sentence become final. An exception permits filing beyond this deadline if the movant alleges that “the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant or the movant’s attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A).... Rule 3.851 also provides certain pleading requirements for initial and successive postconviction motions. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.851(e)(l)-(2). For example, the motion must state the nature of the relief sought, Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.851(e)(1)(C), and must include “a detailed allegation of the factual basis for any claim for which an evidentiary hearing is sought.” Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.851(e)(1)(D). Rule 3.851(f)(5)(B) permits the denial of a successive postconviction motion without an evidentiary hearing “[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.” A postconviction court’s decision regarding whether to grant a rule 3.851 evidentiary hearing depends on the written materials before the court; therefore, for all intents and purposes, its ruling constitutes a pure question of law and is subject to de novo review. See, e.g., Rose v. State, 985 So.2d 500, 505 (Fla.2008). In reviewing a trial court’s summary denial of”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Robert Joe Long v. State of Florida · 29 So. 3d 1034 - Grossman v. State

2. “First, in order to be considered newly discovered, the evidence "must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his counsel could not have known [of it] by the use of diligence." Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 183 So. 3d 342 - Robert Joe Long v. State of Florida · Robert Joe Long v. State of Florida

3. “Under federal law, a defendant is required to produce “new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that was not presented at trial” for a claim of actual innocence to be considered. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 , 126 S.Ct. 2064 , 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 , 115 S.Ct. 851 , 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995)). Moreover, that new evidence must establish that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” in light of all of the available evidence. Id. at 537, 126 S.Ct. 2064 , 547 U.S. 518 , 126 S.Ct. 2064 , 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327 , 115 S.Ct. 851 , 130 L.Ed.2d 808 ). “ ‘[Actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 , 118 S.Ct. 1604 , 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998). Moreover, the federal courts have required that defendants asserting actual innocence show that they have been diligent in presenting their claims. See Gildon v. Bowen, 384 F.3d 883, 887 (7th Cir.2004); Baker v. Norris, 321 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir.2003); David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 347 (1st Cir.2003); Flanders v. Graves, 299 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir.2002).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Perez v. State