Weber v. Heaney’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

25 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Congress’ intent is the touchstone of our analysis of whether [the federal law] preempts the [state statute]. Congress’ intent may be “explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.” When Congress has not spoken expressly, a state law is preempted if it conflicts with federal law or if federal law “occupies a legislative field,” indicating that Congress intended to leave no room for the states to supplement the federal law. When Congress has spoken expressly, however, the preemptive scope of a federal law is governed entirely by the express language. ‘When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a ‘reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority,’ ‘there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions’ of the legislation.””

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Shirley · No. 03-3307

2. “(a) The provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, and rules and regulations issued thereunder, supersede and preempt any provision of State law with respect to election to Federal office. (b) Federal law supersedes State law concerning the— (1)Organization and registration of political committees supporting Federal candidates; (2) Disclosure of receipts and expenditures by Federal candidates and political committees; and (3) Limitations on contributions and expenditures regarding Federal candidates and political committees. (c) The Act does not supersede State laws which provides for the— (1) Manner of qualifying as a candidate or political organization; (2) Dates and places of elections; (3) Voter registration; (4) Prohibition of false registration, voting fraud, theft of ballots and similar offenses; or (5) Candidate’s personal financial disclosure.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Jude · Hooker v. Thompson

3. “We also question whether the limitations are truly voluntary. Contributors may receive a refund from the state when they contribute to a candidate who has agreed to limit campaign expenditures, which will enhance that candidate’s fund raising ability. If a candidate agrees to limit expenditures and then does not abide by the limits', the candidate suffers substantial penalties. Additionally, candidates who do not agree to be bound by the spending limits are penalized because their opponents who have agreed to the limits will still receive public financing, but will not be bound by their agreement. The Minnesota law is not a carrot enticing candidates to comply; as a proponent of the bill boasted, it is “a real heavy club.” Minnesota Congressional Campaign Reform Act, 1990: Hearing on S. 577 before the Subcommittee on Elections and Ethics, 76th Legis. (Mar. 1, 1989) (statement of Senator Marty).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez