Sanchez v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

35 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “the statute requires intent on the part of the perpetrator that the conduct be of a sexual nature, not merely that the recipient perceive the conduct as sexual. To intentionally subject someone to a sexual advance, for example, the actor must be intending a sexual advance. To use the Court of Appeals’ examples, a wink or a smile would not fall within the statute unless the perpetrator intended the wink or smile to be a sexual advance (or a request for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature). Moreover, because the statute requires that the perpetrator intentionally subjects the victim to “unwelcome” sexual conduct, the perpetrator must necessarily be aware [know] that the sexual conduct is in fact unwelcome to be liable under the statute.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Sanchez v. State · Sanchez v. State

2. “The statute requires that the perpetrator not only intentionally subject a victim to the specified unwelcome sexual conduct (sexual advances, request for sexual favors, etc.), the perpetrator must also intend that submission to the conduct is made a term or condition of a person’s exercise of any right, privilege, power, or immunity. In other words, the culpable mental state applies to both (1) the sexual conduct, and (2) the quid pro quo.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Sanchez v. State · Sanchez v. State

3. “Given the structure of the statute and its apparent purposes, we find that the statute does not require the perpetrator to intend that the conduct be unwelcome. He may in fact wish that the conduct were welcomed by the recipient, but he intentionally subjects the recipient to unwelcome sexual conduct when he intends sexual conduct that he knows is unwelcome. This is so because the sexual nature of the conduct flows from the actor, but the unwelcome nature of the conduct flows from the recipient. Despite the fact that unwelcome describes a recipient’s state of mind, that statute uses "unwelcome” as an adjective to describe the nature of the conduct. Hence, the perpetrator intends conduct which is unwelcome, but he does not necessarily intend the conduct to be unwelcome.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Sanchez v. State