Schenekl v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The enforcement provision authorizes detention only for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the registration and safety requirements. See Tex. Paeks & Wild.Code Ann. § 31.124. The intrusion is minimal in scope because the search may only be directed at the safety items listed in the statute. Further, while the boat must carry several safety and registration items, only a brief visual inspection is necessary to determine compliance. Therefore, the scope and length of the seizure favor a finding that the intrusion is minimal.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Schenekl v. State · 139 N.C. App. 96 - State v. Pike

2. “Finally, we consider the discretion given law enforcement. The Act’s enforcement provision applies to “all vessels on public water,” and a stop may be made at any time. Tex. Parks & Wild. Code Ann. § 31.004 (Vernon Supp. 1999). Under the statute, there are no restrictions on a law enforcement officer’s discretion. This unfettered discretion conflicts with the Supreme Court’s repeated insistence, when construing the Fourth Amendment, that “the discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent.” See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661 , 99 S. Ct. at 1400 (and cases cited therein). Thus, the level of intrusion, otherwise minimal, is heightened by the lack of restraint on a law enforcement officer’s discretion. This does not, however, render the intrusion unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Although the level of intrusion is escalated by the lack of restraint on the discretion of individual law enforcement officials, it does not rise to an unreasonable level. The reduced expectation of privacy in a boat, the brevity of the encounter, and the lack of alternative means render the level of intrusion reasonable under the circumstances. Balancing the State’s substantial interest in recreational water safety against the intrusion involved, the enforcement provision of the Act does not authorize searches and seizures that violate the Fourth Amendment. . . .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 139 N.C. App. 96 - State v. Pike

3. “[s]ome of the required safety equipment [of a boat] is not capable of outward observation. For example, life jackets and fire extinguishers may be secreted and are also readily detachable. It may well be impossible to observe from a distance that a boater is not carrying the proper number of life jackets or a fire extinguisher. Additionally, though required numbering on the boat is evidence of proper registration, there is no safety inspection on which registration is contingent. Thus, unlike license plates [and inspection tags] on a car, the numbers on a boat do not indicate compliance with safety requirements. Further, fixed checkpoints [available to highway patrolmen] are not a viable alternative. As the Supreme Court noted in Villamonte-Marquez , “vessels can move in any direction at any time and need not follow established ‘avenues’ as automobiles must do.” 462 U.S. at 589 , 103 S. Ct. at 2580 . Boats are thus not susceptible to fixed checkpoints on the water. Also, because safety items such as life jackets and fire extinguishers are readily detachable, a checkpoint at a dock or boat ramp would be ineffective in determining whether a boater complied with safety requirements while actually on the water. [Thus,] [t]here appear to be no other means as effective as the seizures authorized by the Act [the state’s statutes].”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 139 N.C. App. 96 - State v. Pike