Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. City of Mesa’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

41 federal appellate · 5 district · 13 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 91 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Because our First Amendment jurisprudence recognizes a distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, government officials have to place a particular message into one or the other category for purposes of regulation. The potential difficulty of that categorization in itself does not render the regulations unconstitutional.... [T]he city officials can and must rely on judicial precedent to determine what is commercial speech ... [and] sufficient guidance in categorizing speech as commercial or noncommercial is provided by various decisions of the Supreme Court.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 757 F. Supp. 2d 989 - Charles v. City of Los Angeles · 165 F. Supp. 2d 403 - Infinity Outdoor, Inc. v. City of New York

2. “(1) The First Amendment protects commercial speech only if that speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. A restriction on otherwise protected commercial speech is valid only if it (2) seeks to implement a substantial governmental interest, (3) directly advances that interest, and (4) reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the given objective.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1728, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3259 Ackerley Communications of the Northwest Inc., a Corporation v. R.F. Krochalis, Director, Seattle Department of Construction and Land Use Department of Construction and Land Use, Seattle, an Agency of the City of Seattle, Washington City of Seattle, a Municipal Corporation · Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant v. R.f. Krochalis

3. “A zoning law effects a taking if (1) it does not substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest; or (2) it denies an owner economically viable use of his land. While no precise formula reveals when property has been taken, the determination “necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests.” ... [The appellants] focus on the so-called “nexus requirement” enunciated in [Nollan], The necessity for a nexus is a subpart of the requirement that a regulation “substantially advance” a legitimate state interest. The Court held in Nollan that if there is no nexus or connection between the effect of the regulation and the governmental interest sought to be achieved, the regulation does not advance the state’s interest. In Nollan , the state’s asserted interest was maintaining visual access to the beach for those on the street. The regulation required the Nollans to grant a lateral easement across the beachfront behind their house. As the Court observed, that easement obviously would not help those on the street see the beach. There thus was no “nexus” between the regulation and the goals sought to be achieved by the city.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Adams Outdoor Adv., Lp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Smithfield Township