997 So. 2d 707 - State v. Sera’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The state bears the burden of proof when a defendant files a motion to suppress evidence obtained without a warrant. La. C. Cr. P. art. 703(D). The entire record is reviewable for determining the correctness of a ruling on a motion to suppress. A trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress is afforded great weight and will not be set aside unless a preponderance of the evidence clearly favors suppression. State v. Pena, 43,321 (La.App.2d Cir.7/30/08), 988 So.2d 841 . The authority and limits of the Fourth Amendment apply to investigative stops of vehicles. The stopping of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Pena, supra. The standard for evaluating a challenge to a routine warrantless stop for violating traffic laws is the two-step formula articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Pena, supra. The court must determine whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether |sit was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Terry v. Ohio, supra; State v. Pena, supra. For a traffic stop to be justified at its inception, an officer must have an objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic violation, occurred or is about to occur, before stopping the vehicle. State v. Pena, supra. When determining whether an investigatory stop was justified ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 36 So. 3d 1060 - State v. Snelling