Carson v. Hathaway

¶1OPINION

¶2This is an appeal from the trial court’s order modifying child support. Appellant, Yvonne Carson, contends that the court abused its discretion in ordering the modification. We affirm the trial court’s order.

¶3FACTS

¶4Charles Hathaway and Yvonne Carson were divorced by final decree on December 21, 1995. Hathaway and Carson were appointed joint managing conservators of the two children of the marriage with Hathaway having the exclusive right to establish the primary residence and domicile of the children. The trial court did not order child support. Instead, Hathaway and Carson were each ordered to pay all of the children’s expenses for the time each of them had possession of the children. In late 1997, both parties filed motions to modify the trial court’s possession and child support order. After a hearing, the trial court found material and substantial changes in circumstances since the previous order. The court continued the parties’ joint conservatorship of the children, ordered that there be no primary conservator, and ordered Carson to pay $232 per month in child support to Hathaway. The court did not order Hathaway to pay child support to Carson.

¶5DISCUSSION

¶6In her sole issue on appeal, Carson contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order Hathaway to pay reciprocal child support. When this court reviews modification of a child support order, we are mindful that the best interest of the child is always the trial court’s primary consideration.1 In sum, the trial court retains broad discretion in making the equitable decision of whether to modify a prior support order. A trial court’s order regarding child support will not be disturbed on appeal unless the complaining party can show a clear abuse of discretion.2 The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles, or, in other words, whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable.3

¶7Carson argues that the trial court acted arbitrarily by failing to order Hathaway to pay reciprocal child support. She maintains that the lack of reciprocal support in the trial court’s order is contrary to the child support guidelines found in the Family Code.4 We disagree. We find nothing in the guidelines, or elsewhere in the Family Code, requiring reciprocal support where, as here, the parties are made joint managing conservators in the absence of a primary conservator. Carson cites no such authority. Accordingly, the trial court’s failure to order reciprocal support does not deviate from the guidelines. *762Moreover, we do not find any indication in the record before us that the trial court otherwise abused its discretion.5

¶8Carson also requests that this court remand the cause to the trial court for entry of findings of fact in support of the alleged deviation from the guidelines. The Family Code requires the trial court to make findings only if the amount of child support ordered by the court varies from the amount computed by applying the percentage guidelines, if a party makes an oral request for findings during the hearing, or if a party makes a written request for findings not later than 10 days after the hearing.6 There is no showing on this record that the trial court’s order varied from the guidelines, or that Carson timely requested findings. Consequently, there was no need for the trial court to make the findings Carson requests for the first time on appeal.

¶9CONCLUSION

¶10We overrule Carson’s issue on appeal and affirm the trial court’s order.

¶11McCLURE, J., concurring