Singleton v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Det. O’Brien observed Padilla reach underneath his jacket and shirt and adjust a weighty object concealed at the center of his waistline. From his police experience-which included eight to ten arrests of armed individuals observed to make the same movement, and the regular sight of his fellow officers adjusting concealed firearms carried by them in the same fashion, Det. O’Brien recognized Padilla’s gesture as consistent with the adjustment of a concealed firearm. Viewing the gesture “through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training,” it was reasonable to infer that Padilla was carrying a gun in his waistband. Padilla maintains that the gesture was ambiguous because the dimensions of the adjusted object could not be seen through his clothing. However, after watching two in-court demonstrations of the gesture, the magistrate judge concluded that it was “a distinctive gripping motion, as if holding and adjusting (first up and then down) something comparable in size, shape, and heft to a handgun.” Padilla also contends that he could have been adjusting an innocuous item, such as a cell phone, a key ring or a belt buckle. Yet Det. O’Brien testified that the adjustment was not consistent with any of the innocent explanations proposed by defense counsel at the suppression hearing, and the magistrate credited this testimony. Even if the gesture were consistent with conceivable innocuous adjustments, its “distinctive” co”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Jeremy P.

2. “even though not a demanding standard, to be “reasonable” the suspicion must be based on facts that would have led another officer to have a similar suspicion. Moreover, to be “articulable,” there must be specific evidence—not merely conclusions—that led the officer to suspect criminal activity in a particular circumstance. These two requirements are not only the minimal safeguard of a person’s constitutionally protected freedom to go about without coercion or seizure, but also are necessary for meaningful judicial evaluation of police action. We, therefore, look closely at the evidence presented and the trial court’s assessment of that evidence, understanding that each case must be evaluated on its own merits, and that “case matching” is of limited utility under a totality of the circumstances analysis.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Jeremy P.

3. “including the time of day, flight, the high crime nature of the location, furtive hand movements, an informant's tip, a person's reaction to questioning, a report of criminal activity or gunshots, and viewing of an object or bulge indicating a weapon.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Deandre J. Posey v. United States