¶2Although I concur in the main opinion insofar as it affirms the property-division and child-custody awards, I agree with Judge Bryan that the child-support award should be affirmed and join his writing in that regard. I also agree with the main opinion insofar as it reverses the trial court's supervised-visitation award; however, I cannot concur fully in the rationale expressed in the main opinion. I have concluded that the trial court's requirement that the wife's visitation be supervised should be reversed based on slightly different reasoning.
¶3Although a trial court has a wide degree of discretion in visitation matters, see, e.g., Smith v. Smith,887 So.2d 257, 264 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003); Anonymous v.Anonymous, 620 So.2d 43, 44 (Ala.Civ.App. 1993), a trial court's decision on such matters may be reversed if the appellant demonstrates a clear and palpable abuse of that discretion. Smith, 887 So.2d at 264. The evidence in this case reflects that the restriction on the wife's visitation is aimed at preventing the wife's alleged paramour from being around the children; nothing in the record demonstrates a need to prevent the wife from being alone with the children out of concern for their safety. A less severe restriction on the wife's visitation, such as one requiring that the paramour not be present during visitation, would accomplish the result the trial court seeks and still allow the wife to exercise her visitation in a more normal and flexible manner. We have reversed restrictions on visitation that were considered more severe than necessary to protect the best interests of the children. Smith v. Smith, 887 So.2d at 264 (reversing a visitation restriction preventing any guests of the opposite sex unrelated by blood or marriage from being present during any period of overnight visitation when both parents lived with members of their respective extended family); and Smith v.Smith, 599 So.2d 1182, 1187 (Ala.Civ.App. 1991) (reversing a visitation restriction preventing the mother from allowing any male to whom she was not married or immediately related to be in her residence during visitation periods as being overly restrictive). Thus, I conclude that the trial court's judgment, insofar as it requires that the wife's visitation be supervised, is too restrictive and should be reversed on that basis.
¶5I concur with the main opinion insofar as it affirms the trial court's judgment on the issues of the failure to conduct a hearing on the mother's postjudgment motions, custody, and property division. However, I respectfully dissent regarding the issues of child support and visitation.
¶6Regarding the issue of voluntarily unemployment or underemployment, this court has previously stated: "A determination that a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed `is to be made from the facts presentedaccording to the judicial discretion of the trial court.'"Berryhill v. Reeves, 705 So.2d 505, 507 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997) (quoting Winfrey v. Winfrey, 602 So.2d 904, 905 (Ala.Civ.App. 1992)) (emphasis added). Furthermore, "[t]he determination of whether a parent paying child support is voluntarily underemployed or unemployed isdiscretionary with the trial court." Mitchell v.Mitchell, 723 So.2d 1267, 1269 (Ala.Civ.App. 1998) (citingGriggs v. Griggs, 638 So.2d 916 (Ala.Civ.App. 1994)) (emphasis added).
¶7In the present case, the evidence established that the wife was earning $8.00 an hour plus commission in her prior position. The wife was discharged from that position due to complaints her employer had received regarding the wife's poor customer service. Thus, that discharge was a result of her own behavior. The wife was thereafter unemployed for approximately five months. The wife then obtained employment shortly before trial; however, she was unable to work 40 hours a week, partly because she was unable to travel for her job due to a lack of transportation.
¶8Based on the foregoing facts, the trial court could have concluded that the wife was voluntarily underemployed. The trial court could have concluded that the wife's discharge was due to her own negligence in conducting her duties. See Van Houtenv. Van Houten, 895 So.2d 982, 987 (Ala.Civ.App. 2004) (affirming the judgment finding voluntary underemployment when a parent failed to comply with the requests of his employer and, as a result, was asked to resign).
¶9Furthermore, because the wife does not have transportation and is unable to work 40 hours a week at her present position, the trial court also could have concluded that the wife could have found employment earning minimum wage where she was not required to travel. See J.L. v. A.Y., 844 So.2d 1221, 1226 (Ala.Civ.App. 2002) (plurality opinion) (affirming the judgment finding voluntary underemployment and imputing an income of full-time minimum wage when a parent was a full-time student, working part-time earning minimum wage); and Romano v.Romano, 703 So.2d 374, 376 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997) (affirming the judgment finding that that parent was capable of working and imputing an income of minimum wage).
¶10Based on the foregoing reasons, I cannot conclude that the trial court's factual determination — that the wife had voluntarily forgone employment earning at least an income of minimum wage — was an abuse of discretion.
¶11I also dissent regarding the issue of visitation. I join Presiding Judge Thompson's writing regarding that issue. *499