(a) Findings Congress finds the following:
(1) The President has declared his view that the United States should provide significant assistance to Afghanistan so that it is no longer a haven for terrorism.
(2) The delivery of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance from the international community is necessary for the safe return of refugees and is critical to the future stability of Afghanistan.
(3) Enhanced stability in Afghanistan through an improved security environment is critical to the functioning of the Government of Afghanistan and the traditional Afghan assembly or Loya Jirga process, which is intended to lead to a permanent national government in Afghanistan, and also is essential for the participation of women in Afghan society.
(4) Incidents of violence between armed factions and local and regional commanders, and serious abuses of human rights, including attacks on women and ethnic minorities throughout Afghanistan, create an insecure, volatile, and unsafe environment in parts of Afghanistan, displacing thousands of Afghan civilians from their local communities.
(5)
(A) On July 6, Vice President Haji Abdul Qadir was assassinated in Kabul by unknown assailants.
(B) On September 5, 2002, a car bomb exploded in Kabul killing 32 and injuring 150 and on the same day a member of Kandahar Governor Sherzais security team attempted to assassinate President Karzai.
(6) The violence and lawlessness may jeopardize the Loya Jirga process, undermine efforts to build a strong central government, severely impede reconstruction and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and increase the likelihood that parts of Afghanistan will once again become safe havens for al-Qaida, Taliban forces, and drug traffickers.
(7) The lack of security and lawlessness may also perpetuate the need for United States Armed Forces in Afghanistan and threaten the ability of the United States to meet its military objectives.
(8) The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, currently led by Turkey, and composed of forces from other willing countries without the participation of United States Armed Forces, is deployed only in Kabul and currently does not have the mandate or the capacity to provide security to other parts of Afghanistan.
(9) Due to the ongoing military campaign in Afghanistan, the United States does not contribute troops to the International Security Assistance Force but has provided support to other countries that are doing so.
(10) The United States is providing political, financial, training, and other assistance to the Afghan Interim Authority as it begins to build a national army and police force to help provide security throughout Afghanistan, but this effort is not meeting the immediate security needs of Afghanistan.
(11) Because of these immediate security needs, the Government of Afghanistan, its President, Hamid Karzai, and many Afghan regional leaders have called for the International Security Assistance Force, which has successfully brought stability to Kabul, to be expanded and deployed throughout the country, and this request has been strongly supported by a wide range of international humanitarian organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, Catholic Relief Services, and Refugees International.
(c) Implementation of strategy
(1) Initial report Not later than 60 days after December 4, 2002, the President shall provide the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate with
(A) a strategy for meeting the immediate and long-term security needs of Afghanistan in order to promote safe and effective delivery of humanitarian and other assistance throughout Afghanistan, further the rule of law and civil order, and support the formation of a functioning, representative Afghan national government, including an update to the strategies submitted pursuant to Public Law 107206; and
(B) a description of the progress of the Government of Afghanistan toward the eradication of poppy cultivation, the disruption of heroin production, and the reduction of the overall supply and demand for illicit narcotics in Afghanistan in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
(2) Implementation of strategy Every 6 months after December 4, 2002, through January 1, 2010, the President shall submit to the congressional committees specified in paragraph (1) a report on the implementation of the strategies for meeting the immediate and long-term security needs of Afghanistan, which shall include the following elements
(A) since the previous report, the progress in recruiting, training, and deploying an Afghan National Army and police force, including the numbers and ethnic composition of recruits; the number of graduates from military and police training; the numbers of graduates retained by the Afghan National Army and police forces since the previous report; the numbers of graduates operationally deployed and to which areas of the country; the degree to which these graduates are assuming security responsibilities; whether Afghan army and police units are establishing effective central governmental authority over areas of the country, and which areas; and the numbers of instances of armed attacks against Afghan central governmental officials, United States or international officials, troops or aid workers, or between the armed forces of regional leaders;
(B) the degree to which armed regional leaders are cooperating and integrating with the central government, providing security and order within their regions of influence, engaging in armed conflict or other forms of competition that are deleterious to peace, security, and the integration of a unified Afghanistan under the central government;
(C) the amount of humanitarian relief provided since the previous report to returnees, isolated populations and other vulnerable groups, as well as demining assistance and landmine survivors rehabilitation; and the numbers of such persons not assisted since the previous report;
(D) the steps taken since the previous report toward national reconstruction, including establishment of the ministries and other institutions of the Government of Afghanistan;
(E) the numbers of Civil Affairs Teams working with regional leaders, as well as the quick impact infrastructure projects undertaken by such teams since the previous report;
(F) efforts undertaken since the previous report to rebuild the justice sector, including the establishment of a functioning judiciary, a competent bar, reintegration of women legal professionals and a reliable penal system, and the respect for human rights; and
(G) a description of the progress of the Government of Afghanistan with respect to the matters described in paragraph (1)(B).
(e) United States policy relating to international peacekeeping and security operations It shall be the policy of the United States to make every effort to support the expansion of international peacekeeping and security operations in Afghanistan in order to
(1) increase the area in which security is provided and undertake vital tasks related to promoting security, such as disarming warlords, militias, and irregulars, and disrupting opium production; and
(2) safeguard highways in order to allow the free flow of commerce and to allow material assistance to the people of Afghanistan, and aid personnel in Afghanistan, to move more freely.