Whether a traffic stop ostensibly made for a minor traffic violation but actually pretextual—undertaken to investigate for contraband—can validly serve as the basis for a subsequent search under the Fourth Amendment

The other side of the split

Decisions the acknowledging court(s) named as the opposing or joined side, quoted in the acknowledging opinion's own words.

• Declined to follow · 10th Cir.United States v. Guzman864 F.2d 1512

  “Jeffus also contends that the stop was “prolonged” and “beyond the scope of a traffic stop,” again relying on Guzman.” — United States v. Jeffus, acknowledging the split

• Declined to follow · 11th Cir.United States v. Smith799 F.2d 704

  “Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726 (4th Cir.1993), where we declined to adopt the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ standard in Guzman and Smith and, instead, adopted the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits’ standard that any traffic stop, which is legally justified at its inception, is constitutionally valid for the purpose of a search later conducted on probable cause.” — United States v. Jeffus, acknowledging the split

• Joined by · 7th Cir.United States v. Trigg878 F.2d 1037
• Discussed · 4th Cir.United States v. Rusher966 F.2d 868

  “In Rusher, however, we found it unnecessary to pronounce the Fourth Circuit’s standard because the stop there was legal under either standard.” — United States v. Jeffus, acknowledging the split

• Joined by · 4th Cir.United States v. Hassan El5 F.3d 726

  “Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726 (4th Cir.1993), where we declined to adopt the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ standard in Guzman and Smith and, instead, adopted the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits’ standard that any traffic stop, which is legally justified at its inception, is constitutionally valid for the purpose of a search later conducted on probable cause.” — United States v. Jeffus, acknowledging the split

What the split turns on

Doctrines & tests:

'reasonable officer' standard

Constitutional provisions:

Fourth Amendment