Circuit split · habeas corpus
Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2)'s relation-back provision applies to amendments to pleadings in collateral attacks on a conviction (e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motions).
1 federal appellate case on this question, each acknowledging the disagreement in its own words.
- Ellzey v. United States324 F3D 521
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals · March 31, 2003
“So although our opinion leaves in its wake a conflict among the circuits about the application of Rule 15(c)(2) to collateral attacks, this conflict was created by other circuits’ inattention to Johnson rather than by our decision today.” — Split of authority
Empirical analysis of this case →
The provision at issue
28 U.S.C. § 2255 — Federal custody; remedies on motion attacking sentence
“(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. (b) Unless the motion and the files and records …”Read the full section →
The other side of the split
Decisions the acknowledging court(s) named as the opposing or joined side, quoted in the acknowledging opinion's own words.
- On the other sideHicks
“Decisions such as Hicks, Thomas, and Pittman do not explain why Rule 15(c)(2) has one meaning for most civil litigation, and a different meaning for a collateral attack.” — Ellzey v. United States, acknowledging the split
- On the other sideThomas
“Decisions such as Hicks, Thomas, and Pittman do not explain why Rule 15(c)(2) has one meaning for most civil litigation, and a different meaning for a collateral attack.” — Ellzey v. United States, acknowledging the split
- On the other sidePittman
“Decisions such as Hicks, Thomas, and Pittman do not explain why Rule 15(c)(2) has one meaning for most civil litigation, and a different meaning for a collateral attack.” — Ellzey v. United States, acknowledging the split
- DiscussedJohnson
“We do not see how it would be possible to follow Hicks, Thomas, and Pittman, or similar cases elsewhere, without overruling our opinion in Johnson, which held that amendments to the pleadings in collateral attacks should be treated like amendments to the pleadings in other civil suits, and that the articulation of a new legal theory therefore is not a new claim.” — Ellzey v. United States, acknowledging the split
- DiscussedBrannigan
“(The decisions from other circuits, which read “claim” to mean “legal theory,” also are hard to reconcile with our decision in Brannigan.) Our understanding of Rule 15(c)(2) just permits and does not compel a district judge to accept the amended complaint; amendment still must be appropriate under the criteria of Rule 15(a), which permit the district judge to consider the goals of the aedpa.” — Ellzey v. United States, acknowledging the split
- DiscussedRodriguez
“Thus in Rodriguez we held that a district judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to allow an amendment to the pleadings to add a contention based on Apprendi.” — Ellzey v. United States, acknowledging the split
What the split turns on
- Doctrines & tests:
- Rule 15(c)(2) relation-back provision ·
- Rule 15(a) amendment standard ·
- second or successive collateral attack (requires prior appellate approval) ·
- certificate of appealability — substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right
Cases are grouped by the legal question they announce a split on, classified from the court's own acknowledgment sentence. Verified acknowledgments only. Counter-side decisions are extracted from the acknowledging opinions' own text and linked only when the citation resolves in this corpus. See all circuit splits.