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Circuit split · criminal sentencing

Whether applying 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) (authorizing a new term of supervised release after revocation) to defendants whose underlying conviction predated the subsection's effective date violates the Ex Post Facto Clause

2 federal appellate cases on this question, each acknowledging the disagreement in its own words.

  1. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals · August 13, 2003

    “The enactment of § 3583(h), however, resulted in yet another circuit split: whether application of § 3583(h) to cases involving a conviction preceding the subsection’s effective date violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.” — Acknowledges a circuit split
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  2. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals · October 30, 1998

    “Analysis Shorty argues that we should overturn our prior decision in Withers, in which we held that § 3583(h) does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, in light of the split among the circuits as exemplified by United States v.” — Acknowledges a circuit split
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The provision at issue

18 U.S.C. § 3583 — Inclusion of a term of supervised release after imprisonment
“(a) In General.— The court, in imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for a felony or a misdemeanor, may include as a part of the sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment, except that the court shall include as a part of the sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release if such a term is required by statute or if the defendant has been convicted for the first time of a domestic violence crime as defined in section 3561(b). (b) Authorized …”
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The other side of the split

Decisions the acknowledging court(s) named as the opposing or joined side, quoted in the acknowledging opinion's own words.

  • Joined by · 7th Cir.United States v. Withers128 F.3d 1167
    “III.Analysis Shorty argues that we should overturn our prior decision in Withers, in which we held that § 3583(h) does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, in light of the split among the circuits as exemplified by United States v.” — United States v. Shorty, acknowledging the split
  • On the other side · 4th Cir.United States v. Lominac144 F.3d 308
    “Lominac, 144 F.3d 308 (4th Cir.1998) (holding that application of § 3583(h) to a defen *314 dant convicted before Congress enacted the provision violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because its application increases the amount of punishment the defendant could receive for the original offense).” — United States v. Shorty, acknowledging the split
  • On the other side · 9th Cir.United States v. Collins118 F.3d 1394
  • DiscussedJohnson v. United States529 U.S. 694
    “In Johnson, the Court also addressed the issue Congress had attempted to resolve by enacting § 3583(h) in the first place: whether “a district court revoking a term of supervised release in favor of reimprisonment may require service of a further term of supervised release following the further incarceration.” Id.” — United States v. Russell, acknowledging the split

What the split turns on

Statutes:
18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) ·
§ 3583(e)(3)
Doctrines & tests:
Ex Post Facto Clause ·
plain error doctrine

Cases are grouped by the legal question they announce a split on, classified from the court's own acknowledgment sentence. Verified acknowledgments only. Counter-side decisions are extracted from the acknowledging opinions' own text and linked only when the citation resolves in this corpus. See all circuit splits.