Whether the 'use of physical force' element of a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines requires intentional use of force (a mens rea of intent) rather than mere recklessness or negligence

The other side of the split

Decisions the acknowledging court(s) named as the opposing or joined side, quoted in the acknowledging opinion's own words.

• Joined by · 10th Cir.United States v. Lucio-Lucio347 F.3d 1202
• Joined by · 7th Cir.Bazan-Reyes v. INS256 F.3d 600
• Discussed · 5th Cir.United States v. Chapa-Garza262 F.3d 479

  “Chapa-Garza, 262 F.3d 479 , 482 (5th Cir.2001), used an earlier Webster's dictionary synonym explication of "use” to buttress his claim that "without question, force may be used accidentally.” The dissent observed that "Webster’s list of synonyms specifies 'USE is general and indicates any putting to service of a thing, usu.” — United States v. Vargas-Duran, acknowledging the split

• Declined to follow · 8th Cir.United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez335 F.3d 793

  “Gonzalez-Lopez, 335 F.3d 793 , 799 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that “the definition of crime of violence contained in § 2L1.2(b)(1) does not contain a volitional element”); United States v.” — United States v. Vargas-Duran, acknowledging the split

• Declined to follow · 9th Cir.United States v. Bonilla-Montenegro331 F.3d 1047

  “Bonilla-Montenegro, 331 F.3d 1047 , 1051 (9th Cir.2003) (finding that designation of an offense as a crime of violence does not require the intentional use of force; recklessness will suffice).” — United States v. Vargas-Duran, acknowledging the split

What the split turns on

Statutes:

§ 16(a) ·

§ 16(b)