Circuit split · criminal procedure
Whether de minimis uses of force incidental to a lawful Terry stop require probable cause under the Fourth Amendment, or whether reasonable suspicion suffices.
1 federal appellate case on this question, each acknowledging the disagreement in its own words.
- United States v. Zapata18 F3D 971
First Circuit Court of Appeals · March 24, 1994
“Given both the persuasiveness and the prevalence of these precedents, we join the Seventh Circuit in rejecting the notion that an unheralded dictum in Hodari worked a sea change in the law by imposing a probable cause requirement for all de minimis uses of force, including those incidental to legitimate Terry stops.” — Joins other circuits
Empirical analysis of this case →
The other side of the split
Decisions the acknowledging court(s) named as the opposing or joined side, quoted in the acknowledging opinion's own words.
- Joined by · 8th Cir.United States v. Willis967 F.2d 1220
“Willis, 967 F.2d 1220 , 1223 (8th Cir.1992) (holding, post-Hodari, that patting down a suspect does not automatically convert a Terry stop into a de facto arrest); Tom v.” — United States v. Zapata, acknowledging the split
- Joined by · 7th Cir.Tom v. Voida963 F.2d 952
“Voida, 963 F.2d 952 , 958 (7th Cir.1992) (similar; handcuffing of suspect does not automatically convert Terry stop into de facto arrest).” — United States v. Zapata, acknowledging the split
What the split turns on
- Anchor precedents:
- Hodari499 U.S. 626
- Doctrines & tests:
- Terry stop ·
- de facto arrest ·
- totality of the circumstances
- Constitutional provisions:
- Fourth Amendment
Cases are grouped by the legal question they announce a split on, classified from the court's own acknowledgment sentence. Verified acknowledgments only. Counter-side decisions are extracted from the acknowledging opinions' own text and linked only when the citation resolves in this corpus. See all circuit splits.