A C.S.L.R

Co. V. Evansville, 15 Ind. 395; Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 054, 18 L. Ed. 79. But, in cases very much discussed, it has been held by the United States supreme court that the power conferred upon a municipal corporation to borrow money or to incur indebtedness merely authorized it to issue the usual evidences of Indebtedness but not “to issue for sale, in open market, a bond, as a commercial security, with immunity, in the hands of a hona fide holder for value, from equitable defences;’’ Merrill V. Monticello, 138 U. S. 673, 11 Sup. Ct. 441, 34 L. Ed. 1069. This case, it is claimed, was plainly at variance with Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 654, 18 L. Ed. 79, and Mitchell V. Burlington, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 270, 18 L. Ed. 350, though it did not in terms overrule them. But that they were considered overruled by the later cases was expressly stated in Brenham v. Bank, 144 U. S. 173, 12 Sup. Ct. 559, 36 L. Ed. 390, which was re-argued, before eight Judges, by reason of the death of Bradley, J., pending its decision, and from the final decision in which Harlan, Brewer, and Brown, JJ., dissented. The decision was squarely to the effect that the power to borrow money did not authorize the issue of negotiable bonds, and that “even a 'bona fide holder of them cannot have a right to recover upon them or their coupons.” See a review of these cases, 5 Harv. Where a statute confers power to borrow money and fixes the limit of the amount which can be borrowed, a municipality cannot exceed that amount under power conferred by a general provision to borrow money for any purpose within its discretion; Read V. Plattsmouth, 107 U. S. 668, 2 Sup. Ct 208, 27 L. Ed. 414. ^ By constitutional provision in several states, the legislature is required to restrict municipal corporations in their power to borrow money, contract debts, or pledge ihelr credit. These provisions vary, but are mo^t commonly in the nature of a restriction of possible indebtedness to a certain percentage jof the assessed value of property; see Sener V. Ephrata Borough, 176 Pa. 80, 34 Atl.,954, and for a note collecting authorities on the municipal power to borrow money, see Wells V. Salina, 119 N. Y. 280, 23 N. B. 870, 7 L. R. A. 759. A creditor who had loaned to a municipal corporation in excess of the amount of the indebtedness authorized by the constitution money which had been used in part for, the construction of public works, was not entitled to a decree in equity for the return of his money, because the municipality had parted with the specific money and it could not be identified, and further because a constitutional provision forbidding the municipality to borrow money operated equally to prevent moneys loaned to it in violation of this provision and used in the construction of a public work from becoming a lien upon the works constructed with it; Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U. S. 190, 6 Sup. Ct. 820, 29 I^. Ed. 132. A municipal corporation can incur no indebtedness for an object not within the powers expressed- or implied granted by its charter and a purchaser of its bonds is chargeable with notice of its charter powers and limitations when the purpose for which the bonds were issued is fully disclosed in their recitals; White River S. B. v. Superior, 148 Fed. 1, 78 C. C. A. 169. Constitutional limitations on state indebtedness apply to the state alone and not to her political or municipal subdivisions; Prettyman v. Tazewell Co., Sup’rs, 19 111. 406, 71 Am. Dec. 230; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607. As to both constitutional and statutory limitations, see Beard V. Hopkinsville, 95 Ky. 2.39, 24 S. W. 872, 23 L. R. A. 402, 44 Am. St. Rep. 222. There can be no union of public and private, funds or credit, nor of that which is produced by such funds or credit; and a statute authorizing the union of public' and private capital or credit in any enterprise whatever is unconstitutional; Taylor v. Ross Co., 23 Ohio St. 78; Wyscaver v. Atkinson, 37 Ohio St. 97; but a Joinder of a city with a cisco, 2- Cal. 289, where it was held that they could take as tenants in common. -Such corporations have not the power of taxation, unless such is conferred by the legislature, and when it is so conferred the statute must be strictly construed; Green v. Ward, 82 Va. 324; Hare v. Kennerly, 83 Ala. 608, 3 South. 683; Winston v. Taylor, 99 N. 0. 210, 6 S. B. 114. A grant of the power of taxation by the legislature to a municipal corporation is subject to revocation, modification, and control by the legislature of the state; Williamson v. New Jersey, 130 U. S. 189, 9 Sup. Ct. 453, 32 L. Ed. 915. While the power to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation of municipalities exercising local self-government cannot be held to trench upon that rule; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141, 9 Sup. Ct. 256, 32 L. Ed. 637. See Legislative Poweb. So from necessity, these corporations exercise a large measure of police power. A city council may by ordinance authorize police oflicers to arrest without warrant persons engaged in a breach of the peace, and an officer who, from the outside of a house, hears a disturbance or disorderly conduct within it, may, acting in good faith under such authority, enter the house and arrest the person guilty thereof as being the inmate of a disorderly house; Hawkins v. Button, 95 Wis. 492, 70 N. W. 483, 60 Am. St Rep. 131. The delegation of power to municipal councils to determine between alternative methods for payment of assessments for municipal improvements is authorized by a constitutional provision directing the legislature to provide for municipal corporations; Heilman v. Shoulters, 114 Cal. 136, 44 Pac. 915, 45 Pac. 1057. Delegations of power to municipal corporations have been held valid to provide for the increase of Justices in proportion to population, and authorizing the appointment of the additional justices by county commissioners; 'Board v. Smith, 22 Colo. 534, 45 Pac. 357; allowing existing municipal corporations to elect to continue under their old charter or adopt the general incorporation law; Lum v. Vicksburg, 72 Miss. 950, 18 South. 476; authorizing a township committee to determine what territory shall be included in a proposed city; Glen Ridge v. Stout, 68 N. J. L. 698, 33 Atl. 858; authorizing cities of a given class to make laws for their local self-government, subject to the general laws of the state; Nelson v. Troy, 11 Wash. 435, 39 Pac. 974. A municipality may require a street railway company to sprinkle the streets to protect the public health; St Paul v. Ry. Co., 114 Minn. 250, 130 N. W. 1108, 86 L. R. A. (N. S.) 236, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1136; authorize the summary seizure and destruction of milk not conforming to the standard fixed prohibit its sale except In bottles; Com. v. Drew, 206 Mass. 493, 94 N. E. 682, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 401; or prohibit the sale of food from cold storage unfit for human consumption; North American O. S. Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306, 29 Sup. Ct 101, 63 L. Ed. 195, 15 Ann. Cas. 276; establish a standard weight for a loaf of bread; 2 Ont Rep. 192; prohibit the sale of other sizes; Schmldinger V. Chicago, 226 U, S. 578, 33 Sup. Ct 182, 57 L. Ed. 364; regulate the rates which a water company may collect from private consumers (which partakes of the nature" of a governmental power and of a business power); Omaha W. Co. v. Omaha, 147 Fed. 1, 77 O. C. A. 267, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 736, 8 Ann. Cas. 614. It has been held that the vesting In some body of men or in the hands of a single individual the power to grant permits in special cases to carry on some particular business is contrary to the spirit *of American institutions; Chicago v. Trotter, 136 111. 430, 26 N. E. 359; In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396, 30 N. W, 72, 6 Am. St. Rep. 310; State v. Fiske, 9 R. I. 94; Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217, 33 Am. Rep. 239; Sioux Falls v. Kirby, 6 S. D. 62, 60 N. W. 156, 25 L. R. A. 621, citing State V. Tenant, 110 N. C. 609, 14 S. E. 387, 15 L. R. A. 423, 28 Am. St. Rep. 715, where an ordinance was held void because it prescribed no general rule for the exercise of discretion In granting permits, but allowed the granting of a permit to one and the refusal to another under the same conditions, with no reason therefor but the irresponsible and arbitrary will of the majority of the aldermen; and to the same effect, Newton V. Belger, 143 Mass. 698, 10 N. E. 464. Other cases have held that such authority cannot be delegated to adjoining lot owners; Ex parte Sing Lee, 96 Cal. 364, 81 Pac. 246, 24