Right

A right, in jurisprudence, is an enforceable claim or title to any subject-matter whatever; either to possess and enjoy tangible things, or to do any act, pursue any course, enjoy any means of happiness, be exempt from any cause of annoyance, &c. It is often used to denote one's claim to something out of his possession. On the other hand, it is not always restricted to a claim to property, or in the nature of property; but is often used to designate power, prerogative, and privilege, especially when applied to corporations.

People V. Dikeman, 7 How. Pr. 124, 130.

Right accrued

For meaning of the phrase in an enactment declaring that certain new legislation shall not affect rights already accrued under the former law, see Brotherton v. Brotherton, 41 Iowa, 112; Link V. Beuner, 3 Cai. 325. Right in action. The Anglicized form, now often used, of the old phrase, chose in action. It contemplates a division of all rights into two classes, according as they are actually possessed and enjoyed, or depend upon a judicial remedy to enforce them (if resisted) before enjoyment. It includes the large class of rights over things in the possession of others, which must be asserted by action, in cases where the qualified or temporary possessor refuses to deliver them up. Right of action. Such a right as will sustain a suit; the right, upon a given state of facts, to recover by any judicial remedy, particularly by action at law. Right to begin, or to open and close. The privilege, upon a jury trial, of making the opening address, and introducing the first evidence, is associated with that of putting in rebutting evidence, and making the closing argument; and these, taken together, are in the parlance of the court-rooms as the right to liegfin, or the right to open and close. This right is generally conceded to the party who holds the affirmative or has the burden of proof; and it is not uncommon for a defendant who relies chiefly on matter of affirmative defence to declare at the outset of the trial that he admits the entire case alleged by the plaintiff, in order that, by thus assuming the burden of proof, he may secure the right to open and close. Brown gives a' more minute and exact statement of the rule as it obtains in the English courts, as follows: The general rule deciding the matter is the following: Supposing no evidence were adduced on either side, the party against whom the verdict would be given has the right to begin. This rule, however, does not mean that the defendant (if it should so happen) must open the pleadings; for in every case, without one exception, these are opened by the plaintiff or his counsel. The rule has therefore reference to the evidence merely. There are the three following principal applications of the rule: The plaintiff begins, if the onus of proving any one of the issues rests on him. The defendant begins, if the onus of proving not a single issue rests on the plaintiff, but all of them on the defendant. Where the burden of proving all the issues lies on the defendant, and the burden of proving the amount of the damage only lies on the plaintiff, then the plaintiff begins (Carter v. Jones, 6 Car. ^ P. 64), although formerly the rule in that case was that the defendant should begin. (Cooper v. Wakley, 3 Id. 474). Right to redeem. The terms, right of redemption, and right to redeem, are familiarly used to describe the estate of the debtor, when under mortgage, to be sold at auction, in contradistinction to an absolute estate, to be set off by appraisement. It would be more consonant to the legal character of this interest to call it the debtor's estate subject to mortgage. Such is the character of the interest, as fixed by law. Should the purchaser never exercise the right to redeem; should the mortgage debt be paid by the debtor, or by another, in hold the estate. It is, therefore, something more than a mere right to redeem: it is the estate, subject to the mortgage. White ».

Whitaey, 3 Melc. (Mass.) 81.

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